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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Voluntary action
Humans display an almost endless repertoire of motor behavior. We breathe,
walk in the garden looking at flowers, balance our posture during walking,
stop to pick some flowers, decide to throw the yellow one away in favor of
the red, retract a leg when stung by a bee, adjust our posture to provide
some relief for the painful leg, and comment upon the complexity of life.
These movements differ in the way in which we have voluntary control
over them. Reflexes, such as retracting our leg when we feel pain being in-
flicted, are a well-known example of movements over which we have almost
no voluntary control. Habits, defined as movements that are so ‘overlearned’
that they have become involuntary and will be executed independent of the
outcome of the response, are another such example. These reflexes and
habits can be contrasted with actions over which we have full voluntary
control (Dickinson, 1985).
Our movement skills also differ in the way we acquire the ability to per-
form them. Shadmehr and Wise (2005) distinguish three types of learning of
motor skills, i.e., three types of motor learning. The first type is concerned
with acquiring new motor skills during the course of evolution, through ran-
dom mutations in a species’ genetic code and natural selection of adaptive
mutations. Reflexes, such as retracting a limb when feeling pain from being
stung by a bee, belong to the class of motor skills acquired through evolu-
tion. The second type of motor learning is concerned with the acquisition
of motor skills during the lifetime of an organism and maintaining a suit-
able level of performance in response to changes. Within this type of motor
learning, we can distinguish between skill acquisition and motor adapta-
tion. Skill acquisition refers to learning how to perform a new motor action
such as learning to walk. Motor adaptation refers to the ability to adapt
the execution of a motor skill, such as learning to walk with an injured leg
or, in a more experimental setting, learning how to make accurate reaching
movements following the application of forcefield designed to consistently
interfere with movements in a reaching paradigm (Shadmehr and Mussa-
Ivaldi, 1994). The third type of motor learning concerns decision-making:
learning which action to perform given a certain environmental input and
knowing when to execute it. These different types of motor learning may
rely on partly dissociable neural systems in the human brain (Brasted and
Wise, 2005).
The research presented in this thesis is concerned with the neural con-
trol of voluntary actions. Passingham (1993) has defined these as actions
that are made in the context of choosing among alternative, learned actions
based on attention to those actions and their consequences. These are ac-
tions over which we have full control, i.e. we can choose to execute or with-
hold them depending on the circumstances, and which we have learned to
perform during our lifetime. Therefore, voluntary actions as defined above
fall into the third category of Shadmehr and Wise (2005).
The question addressed in this thesis is: What is the role of a specific
part of the human brain, the premotor cortex, in the selection and prepara-
tion of voluntary actions and the evaluation of these actions following their
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execution?
The studies described focus on simple motor tasks, mostly employing
arbitrary stimulus-response associations (Wise et al., 1996; Wise and Mur-
ray, 2000). In these tasks the stimuli and the responses they instruct have
no obvious (often spatial) relationship with one another, but are totally ar-
bitrary and have to be learned. This type of stimulus-response mappings
are at the core of the flexibility of the behavior of higher level animals and
the ability of humans to respond to symbolic cuing of behavior (Wise and
Murray, 2000).
The remainder of this introductory chapter provides a framework for the
studies discussed in Chapters 2-6. A review of the literature regarding the
two specific action control processes that will be investigated in this thesis,
namely motor preparation and performance monitoring, is given in the con-
text of this framework. Furthermore, a brief review of the anatomy of the
premotor cortex is provided. This chapter concludes with a brief overview of
the rest of the thesis.
1.2 Movement preparation
Planning a movement
As described above, reflexive movements and habits will be executed when-
ever the organism receives the appropriate stimulus. A reflex is thus a
stereotypical movement. Parameters such as the goal of the action, e.g.,
preventing (further) harm to the organism, the part of the body to be moved,
and the type of movement are all predetermined. In contrast, for voluntary
actions the goals and preconditions for movement execution and the precise
parameters of the movement are not predetermined and can vary accord-
ing to task circumstances. This implies that a simple input-output model
of the brain, in which all the brain does is transform the stimulus input
to a motor output in a one-to-one mapping, is inadequate to describe the
neural processes underlying voluntary actions (Jeannerod, 1997). Neural
representations of various aspects of the voluntary action, including but not
limited to the goal of the action, the internal state of the organism (e.g.,
hunger), the position of the limbs, and specific submovements of the action
are necessary for the successful planning of voluntary actions.
One of the challenges in the study of the neural control of actions is
to investigate how these various aspects of a motor plan are represented
in the brain, and how they are integrated in order to successfully select
and execute a purposeful movement (Hikosaka et al., 1999; Willingham,
1998). Jeannerod (1997) postulates that these representations—together
referred to as the movement representation—depend on sustained neuronal
discharges arising in structures relevant to the various stages of the prepa-
ration of motor acts. In accordance with this suggestion, a fruitful approach
in studying the neural representations of action has been to record the ac-
tivity of single neurons of the macaque brain while these monkeys perform
variations of an instructed delay paradigm. In these experiments monkeys
perform visuomotor conditional tasks with instructed delays between an
3
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original instruction cue and a later presented trigger (or ‘go’) cue. By ma-
nipulating various aspects of the instruction and trigger cues (e.g., informa-
tional value, reward) this paradigm can be used to study neuronal activity
related to various aspects of motor planning.
Probing movement representations in human and non-human
primates
The instructed delay task allows the experimenter to distinguish phasic
neural responses associated with processing of the stimulus (signal-related
activity) from sustained activation associated with the online preparation
of the movement plan (set-related activity), and phasic activity purely re-
lated to the actual motor execution following the trigger cue (Wise and Mau-
ritz, 1985; Alexander and Crutcher, 1990). Using this simple delayed re-
sponse task, electrophysiologists can distinguish between signal-, set-, and
movement-related activity in various regions of the macaque premotor cor-
tex. The set-related activity recorded in such a paradigm corresponds with
the pragmatic definition of a movement representation suggested by Jean-
nerod, namely that movement representations are reflected in sustained
preparatory activity which extends in time until the moment of movement
execution (Jeannerod, 1997).
Early neurophysiological studies on preparatory activity in humans re-
lied mostly on measures derived from EEG recorded at the scalp (Coles
and Rugg, 1995). Most notably, the Bereitschaftspotential [(Kornhuber and
Deecke, 1964), see Jahanshahi and Hallett (2003) for a review] and related
measures such as the Contingent Negative Variation (Walter et al., 1964)
and the lateralized readiness potential (Coles, 1989) have proved to be ro-
bust indices of preparatory activity in the human brain. However, although
providing millisecond resolution, they can only provide limited information
about the neural origin of the obtained signals.
Positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance
imaging [fMRI, see Matthews (2003) for an introduction] have the potential
to image activity in the whole brain at a high spatial resolution, but suffer
from poor temporal resolution. One common method employed to circum-
vent this problem is to subtract activity elicited in two conditions, one that
is hypothesized to engage the process of interest, and one that is hypothe-
sized to not engage the process of interest but all the other processes en-
gaged in the other condition, the so-called control condition. Consequently,
a number of studies have been performed comparing conditions where par-
ticipants could or could not prepare a movement (Kawashima et al., 1994;
Deiber et al., 1996). These studies rely on the assumption of pure insertion
of cognitive processes, that is they assume that each cognitive component
evokes an additional physiological activation that is the same irrespective
of the cognitive or physiological context. However, the assumption of pure
insertion underlying this approach, that it is possible to create conditions
which differ in only one aspect which does not interact with other processes,
does not always hold (Friston et al., 1996b; Zarahn et al., 1999).
4
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Only recently have advances in event-related fMRI (Josephs et al.,
1997) allowed the imaging of set-related activity in the human brain us-
ing paradigms related to those described above in primate studies. Making
full use of these newly developed methods, Toni and colleagues [for reviews
see Toni et al. (2001b) and Toni and Passingham (2003)] conducted a se-
ries of studies aimed at investigating movement representations. Assuming
that bridging a temporal gap between an instruction and trigger stimulus
requires sustained preparation of motor response driven by internal presen-
tations (Jeannerod, 1997), Toni and colleagues developed a method to sepa-
rate sustained activity during the delay-period from transient stimulus- and
response-related activity in the standard delayed-response paradigm (Toni
et al., 1999). It is important to note that, although in this approach acti-
vations in different conditions can be compared, it does not necessitate the
assumption that the two conditions are the same in all but the process of
interest.
This approach was subsequently employed to image movement repre-
sentations over the whole brain (Toni et al., 2002a). Consistent with the
hypothesized distributed nature of the neural substrates of movement rep-
resentations, Toni reported delay-period activity not only in parietal and
frontal regions which form part of the dorsal cortical stream traditionally
associated with visuomotor processing (Milner and Goodale, 1995), but also
in extrastriate and posterior temporal regions. To further characterize the
unique contribution of these areas, a follow-up study investigated which of
these regions showed delay-related activity modulated by the likelihood of
the response (motor preparation) and which were not (motor intention). The
results showed that delay-related activity in precentral regions was modu-
lated by the probability of responding, while parietal regions showed equal
activity regardless of the probability of responding (Thoenissen et al., 2002).
This finding is consistent with earlier suggestions from studies in nonhu-
man primates of intention-related activity in the posterior parietal cortex
(Kalaska and Crammond, 1995; Snyder et al., 1997). Subsequent research
in a number of laboratories has employed this approach and similar ap-
proaches to study the influence of reward expectancy on preparatory activ-
ity (Ramnani and Miall, 2003), the coding of behavioral rules (Bunge et al.,
2003), and the biasing of information processing for upcoming action selec-
tion through task context (Sakai and Passingham, 2003; Sakai and Pass-
ingham, 2006) in the human brain.
The results of these studies demonstrate the feasibility of studying the
neural substrates of various aspects of movement representations, applying
paradigms derived from studies employing non-human primates to image
neural contributions to preparatory motor control in the functioning human
brain. In Chapters 2 and 3 a similar approach will be employed to further
study these preparatory processes.
5
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1.3 Action monitoring
Action monitoring and the error-related negativity
To optimize behavioral performance it is not only essential for an organism
to be able to integrate information in an appropriate manner so as to select
and execute the appropriate action; it is also vital to be able to evaluate the
executed behavior. The ability to determine whether a selected action has
produced the appropriate result is not only useful for adapting future be-
havior but also essential for learning new behavior. Starting in the 1960s,
a body of work has described the effects of error detection on subsequent
behavior (Rabbitt, 1966; Laming, 1979). Research into error processing re-
ceived an enormous impulse in the early 1990s with the discovery of the
error-related negativity (ERN, or error negativity Ne), which led to the estab-
lishment of the subfield of action or performance monitoring1.
The ERN is a negative deflection in the human event-related brain po-
tentials following incorrect responses, and has been commonly reported in
speeded-response tasks where the participant knows what the correct re-
sponse should have been. The ERN peaks about 80 ms following the er-
roneous response, and has a fronto-central scalp distribution. This com-
ponent was first described by researchers in Dortmund (Falkenstein et al.,
1990) and Illinois (Gehring et al., 1993). Subsequent research has revealed
the effects of various factors on ERN amplitude such as the importance of
correct responding (Gehring et al., 1993), fatigue (Scheffers et al., 1999),
error awareness (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), error certainty (Scheffers and
Coles, 2000), degree of error (Bernstein et al., 1995), and the probability of
remedial actions (Coles et al., 1995).
Furthermore, a component similar to the ERN has been described follow-
ing negative feedback in tasks where participants cannot themselves evalu-
ate their behavior but need to rely on external performance feedback, such
as time-estimation tasks (Miltner et al., 1997) and guessing or gambling
tasks (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2004a; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2004b; Ruchsow et al., 2002). This component was subsequently
termed the ‘feedback-ERN’2 to distinguish it from its response-locked coun-
terpart, the ‘response-ERN’ [see Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a) for a review].
Early reports suggested that the ERN might be generated in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), consistent with observations of error-related activ-
ity in the ACC of monkeys (Gemba et al., 1986). Subsequent studies using
source modeling indeed showed an ACC source for both the response-ERN
(Dehaene et al., 1994) and the feedback-ERN (Miltner et al., 1997). More-
1In this thesis we employ the term ‘action monitoring’ to distinguish the evaluation of the
selection of the appropriate action (action monitoring) which is the topic of this thesis, from
the correct performance of the selected action (performance monitoring) (De Bruijn et al., 2003;
Krigolson and Holroyd, 2006) .
2Recently, the feedback-ERN and related components have also been referred to as the
‘feedback negativity’ (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a) or the ‘medial frontal negativity’ (Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002). It is still a topic of debate whether these components are a manifestation of
the same neural process (Holroyd et al., 2002; Gehring and Willoughby, 2004).
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over, this source was independent of the effector with which the error is
committed (Holroyd et al., 1998) or the modality of error feedback (Miltner
et al., 1997). These results were subsequently corroborated by work using
functional MRI showing error-related activity in the ACC and, in most stud-
ies, the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) (Carter et al., 1998; Kiehl
et al., 2000; Ullsperger and Von Cramon, 2001; Ullsperger and Von Cramon,
2003; Menon et al., 2001). Importantly, a study investigating activation re-
lated to response- and feedback-related error detection confirmed that the
two activate a common source in the dorsal ACC (Holroyd et al., 2004c).
Conversely, pre-SMA was only activated by response errors. We will return
to this point in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Models of action monitoring
As described by Coles (Coles et al., 2001), early theories of the ERN built
on theories of internal representations of action (Wolpert et al., 1995; Jean-
nerod, 1997). According to the original ‘mismatch hypothesis’, the neural
system involved in action monitoring is composed of two modules: a mon-
itoring system that detects errors and a remedial action system that deals
with behavioral adjustments. The monitoring system functions as a com-
parator, comparing representations of the correct response with representa-
tions of the actual response. Since the original ERN studies focused mostly
on speeded response tasks, in which most errors are due to premature re-
sponding before all necessary information is extracted from the stimulus
(Gratton et al., 1988), a representation of the correct response can be de-
rived from further, continued processing of the stimulus, after the system
has committed to executing a particular action. The representation of the
correct response is then compared to an efference copy of the response that
is actually being executed. When a mismatch between the two representa-
tions is detected, a signal indicating that an error has occurred is sent to
the remedial action system. The remedial action system can then inhibit
or correct the erroneous response and adjust behavior on the next trial, for
instance by slowing of responses (Rabbitt and Rodgers, 1977; Coles et al.,
1995).
The ‘reinforcement learning theory’ of the ERN (Holroyd and Coles, 2002)
(see Fig. 1.1 for a schematic representation) extends the original mismatch
hypothesis. This model is based on findings in non-human primates, sug-
gesting that the basal ganglia monitor ongoing events and predict the out-
come of these events (Barto, 1995; Houk et al., 1995). When an event is
better (positive prediction error) or worse (negative prediction error) than
predicted, this will result in a phasic increase or decrease of dopamine neu-
ron firing, respectively (Schultz et al., 1997). These dopaminergic ‘prediction
error signals’ are relayed to various parts of the striatum and frontal cortex.
According to the reinforcement learning model, when a negative prediction
error disinhibits pyramidal neurons in the ACC this leads to the generation
of the ERN. The error detection is thus done in subcortical areas, not in the
ACC. Moreover, the model suggests that an error can be detected based on
an efference copy of the executed movement or on the basis of negative per-
7
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Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of the reinforcement learning model of the ERN. Adapted from Holroyd
and Yeung (2003).
formance feedback, depending on which source of information is available
first. In this manner, the reinforcement learning theory can explain both the
response- and the feedback-ERN. Furthermore, consistent with the notion
that the goal of a voluntary action can change according to task circum-
stances, the ERN has been shown to be highly context-dependent (Holroyd
et al., 2004a), as is activity in most areas associated with the evaluation of
behavioral outcome (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a).
Importantly, in this framework, the function of the ACC is not error de-
tection, but the selection of actions for the task at hand (Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Holroyd et al., 2004b). The ACC functions as a ‘control filter’, select-
ing which motor plan will receive access to the motor execution system. In
this framework the ACC is sensitive to behaviorally relevant events and one
of its functions is to bring erroneous behaviors in line with desired goals
(Holroyd et al., 2004b).
It should be noted that a number of alternative models on the function
of the ACC in action monitoring have been proposed, the most prominent of
which is the conflict detection theory (Carter et al., 1998). However, we will
save a comparison of these models for the discussion in Chapter 7.
Anterior cingulate cortex, action selection, and error processing
The error processing work in this thesis was inspired by the Holroyd and
Coles (2002) reinforcement learning model, viewed from a motor-learning
perspective. In this context, one of the main theoretical advantages of the
Holroyd and Coles model is that it suggests a possible link between the
error processing literature and the extensive literatures on reinforcement
learning, reward processing, and motor learning.
Although recent literature on error processing has tended to focus on
8
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the ACC3 as solely involved in registering when a desired outcome was not
produced by an action, involvement of the ACC in other cognitive and mo-
tor functions is well established (Duncan and Owen, 2000; Fonteijn and
Buur, 2005; Posner and DiGirolamo, 1998). Early studies suggested that
the ACC is particularly important during situations that require—using the
terminology of cognitive psychology—supervisory attentional control (Nor-
man and Shallice, 1986). Indeed, the ACC is activated in response to errors,
during the free selection of actions (Frith et al., 1991), and in situations of
low response certainty (Barch et al., 2000). However, ACC is not activated
under circumstances which require merely stimulus selection (Rushworth
et al., 2002; Van Veen et al., 2001). Moreover, the ACC does not seem to be
active during working memory for stimuli, but sustained activation has been
reported during maintenance of motor codes (Petit et al., 1998). Thus, the
role of the ACC in behavioral control seems limited to the control of actions.
The challenge is to find a role of the ACC in the control of action that
can explain its activity in a wide variety of tasks, including its responsive-
ness to errors. One possible framework is that the ACC integrates informa-
tion concerning a particular action with its potential outcome. This would
be consistent with the extensive cortical input to the ACC, which places it
ideally to integrate information related to reward and the organism’s inter-
nal state into motor intentions (Paus, 2001). There is widespread support
for this framework in the macaque literature. As described above, activity
in ACC single neurons has been associated with response errors (Gemba
et al., 1986) and cells in the ACC fire especially when a reduction of reward
signals a change in behavior (Shima and Tanji, 1998). Moreover, reward-
related activity in the ACC can also be shown before the response, when the
appropriate action has to be selected (Matsumoto et al., 2003), suggesting
that the ACC has a role in determining which action should be executed
to obtain the most reward. Further evidence for this comes from lesions
studies showing that macaques with ACC lesions lack the ability to deter-
mine which response will yield the most rewarding outcome (Hadland et al.,
2003). Studies in rats have shown that rats with ACC lesions will not se-
lect the more effortful of two possible actions, even if the relative pay-off is
higher, something that normal rats can do (Walton et al., 2003).
Similar results are only beginning to be obtained from humans (Bush
et al., 2002; Williams et al., 2004), but the combined evidence from hu-
mans, macaques, and rats suggests that the ACC has a role beyond the
‘simple’ monitoring of responses as suggested by some theories on action
monitoring, at the very least biasing the selection of appropriate responses
based on the expected outcome. Returning to the models of action monitor-
ing discussed above, we see that the reinforcement learning model accom-
modates some of the properties described in the framework in this section.
Indeed, according to the reinforcement learning model the ACC has an active
role in the selection of actions based on the expected outcome of the action
(Holroyd et al., 2004b). Also consistent with the model, the ACC seems to
3Unless otherwise specified the term ‘ACC’ refers to the dorsal ACC (Bush et al., 2002), see
also section 1.4 for a more elaborate discussion of the subfields of the ACC relevant for this
thesis.
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work in conjunction with the ventral striatum (Salamone et al., 1994), al-
though the precise mechanisms of this interaction are currently not fully
understood (Walton et al., 2005). Because of its bridge function between the
action-monitoring and action-control literatures, the reinforcement learning
model provides an appropriate starting point for research into the neural
control of actions in the medial premotor areas, including the ACC.
1.4 Premotor cortex
The previous two sections have described approaches to study various as-
pects of motor control, ranging from the initial selection to the preparation
and finally the evaluation of the action. None of these processes is the re-
sult of the neural activity in one single brain region. Rather, these processes
likely result from the interaction of a number of regions (McIntosh, 2000).
This thesis is concerned with the role of a subset of these regions, namely
the premotor cortices, to these action control processes. This section pro-
vides an overview of the anatomical characteristics of the various premotor
areas of the brain relevant for the rest of this thesis.
Views on the premotor cortex
Large portions of the lateral convexity and the medial wall of each hemi-
sphere of the frontal lobes of the primate brain contribute to movement.
According to the traditional view of the primate premotor cortex, the frontal
lobes contain a region termed the ‘premotor cortex’ which integrates infor-
mation from the parietal and frontal cortices and sends its output to the
primary motor cortex (M1) (see Figure 1.2). M1 was viewed as the primary
origin of cortical commands to the spinal cord and the place where the spe-
cific commands for movement were generated; in contrast, the premotor
area was defined as that part of the frontal lobes that projected directly to
M1. While M1 was involved in the execution of action, the premotor cortex
was proposed to be involved in higher-order aspects of motor control.
However, this framework has been challenged by the discovery that the
frontal lobes contain multiple, cytoarchitectonically and functionally hetero-
geneous premotor areas, which each have the capacity to influence motor
output not only via M1, but also via direct connections to the spinal cord
[see Dum and Strick (2005) for an extensive review]. These regions all have
a full representation of the body and are frequently active during the plan-
ning and/or execution of a movement. Early studies contributing to this
framework used electrical stimulation to differentiate regions within area 64.
However, this approach failed to produce consensus on the subdivisions of
the lateral surface. More recent approaches for determining the location of
premotor cortex are, among others, based on differentiating neuroanatomi-
cal connections to various parts of the premotor cortices (Passingham et al.,
2002) and mapping of neurotransmitter receptors (Zilles et al., 1995).
4Unless otherwise specified, references to brain areas by a number refer to anatomical
areas as described by Brodmann (Brodmann, 1909), reporting different subdivisions within
the traditional supplementary motor area.
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Figure 1.2: Motor areas in the frontal lobe of the macaque brain. Shaded areas indicate regions with direct
connections to the spinal cord. Top: medial view. Bottom: lateral view. Abbreviations: ArS=arcuate sulcus;
CC=corpus collosum; CgS=cingulate sulcus; CS=central sulcus; IPS=intraparietal sulcus; PS=principal sulcus;
SF=superior frontal sulcus; IF=inferior frontal sulcus. See text for other abbreviations. Adapted from Dum and
Strick (2002).
This section provides a brief overview of the divisions of the lateral and
medial premotor cortices. We will focus mostly on the connectivity of each
region with the spinal cord and cortical areas. Since the connectivity of each
region places critical constraints on the types of computational processes a
certain brain area can perform, it is hoped that describing the connectivity
of the relevant regions will help us in defining its functional characteris-
tics in the experimental chapters (Passingham et al., 2002). We will only
refer to the functional properties of these regions in passing, leaving an
extensive discussion of this for the later chapters. The majority of the find-
ings discussed in this section are based on data obtained in macaque mon-
keys, since techniques for investigating the connectivity between regions in
the human brain, such as diffusion-weighted imaging, have only recently
started to become available (Johansen-Berg et al., 2004; Rushworth et al.,
2006).5
Premotor areas on the medial wall
The medial portion of area 6, in front of the hindlimb representation of the
primary motor cortex, was traditionally defined as the supplementary mo-
5This section will only discuss connections relevant to arm movement, which might differ
from the connections relevant for leg or eye movements (Dum and Strick, 2005). Furthermore,
this section does not deal with premotor areas specifically associated with eye movements,
such as the frontal and supplementary eye fields.
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tor area (SMA) (Penfield and Welch, 1951). However, based on connectivity
(Luppino et al., 1993), cytoarchitecture and neurochemistry (Zilles et al.,
1995), and functionality (Matsuzaka et al., 1992) the traditional SMA is now
recognized to consist of at least two distinct regions, the pre-supplementary
motor area (pre-SMA) and the SMA proper (henceforth: SMA). The border
between these two regions can roughly be taken to be a line through the an-
terior commissure perpendicular to the line between the anterior and pos-
terior commisures (Fig. 1.3). Like other premotor areas, the SMA projects
directly to the primary motor cortex and the spinal cord, while the pre-SMA
does not have substantial projections to either of these regions (Dum and
Strick, 1991a; He et al., 1993; Luppino et al., 1993). Conversely, pre-SMA
is interconnected with a number of prefrontal and other non-primary motor
areas (Luppino et al., 1993), suggesting that this region should be consid-
ered more as a ‘prefrontal’ region than as a premotor area.
The cingulate sulcus of primates contains three separate motor areas:
the rostral cingulate motor area (CMAr), the caudal cingulate motor area
in the ventral bank of the sulcus (CMAv), and the caudal cingulate motor
area in the dorsal bank of the sulcus (CMAd). Picard and Strick (1996;
2001) have proposed that these areas correspond to the human anterior
rostral cingulate zone (RCZa), posterior rostral cingulate zone (RCZp), and
the caudal cingulate zone (CCZ), respectively (Fig. 1.3). All of these areas are
interconnected with M1 and the spinal cord (Dum and Strick, 1991a). The
cingulate motor areas are densely interconnected, have relatively weak con-
nections to the lateral premotor areas, and receive connections from sub-
divisions of parietal area 7. CMAv and CMAd receive additional projections
form area 5. Along with the ventral premotor cortex (see below), CMAr and
CMAv are the only ‘real’ premotor areas that receive substantial input from
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, most notably from area 46 and, addition-
ally for CMAr, area 9. Furthermore, widespread regions of the limbic cortex
target CMAr and CMAv, providing these regions with access to information
about the state of the entire organism as well as an integrated view of the
body in space (Dum and Strick, 2005). As described above, a number of
medial premotor areas are involved in action monitoring and higher-order
aspects of motor control.
Lateral premotor cortex
The lateral premotor cortex (Fig. 1.2) was first described functionally by Ful-
ton (1935). Recent studies in macaques have distinguished between a dorsal
and a ventral lateral premotor cortex (PMd and PMv respectively), each con-
taining a rostral and a caudal subdivision (Barbas and Pandya, 1987) and
each strongly interconnected with M1, the spinal cord, and SMA. Both PMd
and PMv are involved in the preparation of motor actions and strongly in-
terconnected with the parietal cortex. These connectivity patterns are quite
different for PMd and PMv, however. Parietal inputs to PMd originate from
the superior parietal lobule and the parieto-occipital area and parietal in-
puts to PMv from the anterior intraparietal area (AIP), area PEip, the ante-
rior portion of the inferior parietal gyrus, and the somatosensory cortices
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Figure 1.3: Motor areas of the medial wall of the human brain. X and Y-axis depict Y and Z-coordinates ac-
cording to the atlas of Talairach and Tournoux (1988), respectively. See main text for abbreviations. Adapted
from Picard and Strick (1996).
(Tanne´-Garie´py et al., 2002). For frontal connectivity, as noted above, only
PMv is connected with area 46, and, in addition, to the precentral opercu-
lum. Conversely, only PMd is connected with pre-SMA. These differential
connectivities reflect different contributions to visuomotor control (Davare
et al., 2006). PMd specifically is activated consistently in tasks involving
arbitrary visuomotor associations (Wise et al., 1996).
Similar to the pre-SMA/SMA distinction, it has been proposed that the
PMd can be divided into a more caudal ‘motor’ part, with extensive connec-
tions to M1 and the spinal cord and a more rostral ‘frontal’ part, which has
extensive connections to the frontal cortex (Barbas and Pandya, 1987). This
distinction has also been highlighted in functional studies. For instance,
Boussaoud and colleagues reported that while more neurons in caudal PMd
fire during the concrete preparation of an action, rostral PMd neurons are
more active when attention is being directed to the stimulus itself (Bous-
saoud and Wise, 1993; Boussaoud, 2001). We will return to this point in
Chapter 2.
The homology between human and non-human primate lateral premo-
tor cortices is still an issue of debate. For instance, in macaques the main
border between premotor and frontal cortex is the arcuate sulcus, of which
there is no obvious homologue in humans. However, some suggestions for
homology between macaques and humans have been proposed by Rizzolatti
and colleagues (Rizzolatti et al., 1998; Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001). For
instance, the PMv of monkeys can be divided into two distinct cytoarchi-
tectonic fields, termed F4 and F5 by Matelli and colleagues (Matelli et al.,
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1985). The border between two homologue regions in human is debated,
but it has been argued that F5 corresponds to the human area 44. This
proposal has been particularly influential in research on action observation
(Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998).
In summary, this section has outlined the connectivity patterns of vari-
ous premotor areas. Most premotor areas are connected with M1, the spinal
cord, and areas of the parietal lobe that also project directly to the spinal
cord. Pre-SMA and the rostral parts of the PMd and PMv differ from this
pattern and may be described as ‘frontal’ regions, each one synapse away
from a premotor area. All regions described show a distinct pattern of con-
nectivity, which has been taken to suggest that each of these cortical areas
may operate as a functionally distinct system that differentially generates
and controls specific aspects of motor behavior (Dum and Strick, 1991b).
Of course, there are a number of brain regions other than M1 and the
premotor cortices that contribute to the generation and control of action.
The parietal cortex especially has been implicated in various aspects of vi-
suomotor processing (Snyder et al., 2000; Rushworth and Taylor, 2006).
This thesis will focus specifically on the premotor cortex, however. Parietal
cortex connectivity and functionality will only be addressed in the exper-
imental chapters when relevant to the discussion of the results obtained.
This, of course, does not mean the functionality of parietal cortex is not
essential to obtaining a complete model of the neural correlates on motor
control.
1.5 Outline of this thesis
The following chapters are aimed at providing further insight into the func-
tionality of some of the premotor regions described above. As described
above, the research in this thesis will follow two general themes: that of
action selection and preparation and of action evaluation. Studies reviewed
in the introduction of the first theme, action preparation, have consistently
shown activation in parietal and lateral premotor areas. The medial premo-
tor cortex has traditionally been associated with internally generated actions
[but see Petit et al. (1998)], while the lateral premotor cortex is traditionally
more associated with the selection and preparation of externally instructed
actions. Note, however, that this distinction is far from established, espe-
cially in the case of the medial premotor cortex.
This thesis will further investigate the motor control processes described
above by taking a closer look at motor processing, adaptation of motor re-
sponses, and error processing and specifically the contributions of the pre-
motor cortices to these functions.
Chapter 2 will focus on the preparatory motor activity by assessing
whether it is possible to dissociate at the neural level the functional roles
of delay-related activity in the premotor cortex related to maintenance of
sensory information versus preparation of upcoming motor responses. Ear-
lier studies focusing on processing of spatial and motor information (Simon
et al., 2002) suggested that the premotor/pre-premotor dissociation reflects
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the processing of spatial and motor information, respectively. The study
reported in Chapter 2 is aimed at exploring this dissociation in the domain
of arbitrary visuomotor processing, using a design closely related to that
employed in research on nonhuman primates.
Studies on preparatory activity conducted in the laboratory usually as-
sume that they influence neural processing starting from a ‘clean sheet’.
However, most actions are selected, prepared, and executed in the context
of ongoing behavior. Chapter 3 will focus on the effects of the presence of a
current motor program on the selection and preparation of new motor plans.
Chapters 4 and 5 will take a closer look at the contribution of the medial
premotor areas to error processing. In Chapter 4, event-related potentials
are used to take a closer look at the functional significance of the feedback-
ERN. Although the response-ERN has been the focus of most ongoing re-
search, and indeed the focus of most theories on the ERN (Botvinick et al.,
2001; Yeung et al., 2004), research on the functionality of the feedback-ERN
has been important in the formulation of the reinforcement learning model
of the ERN (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). This model makes a number of pre-
dictions about the behavior of the feedback-ERN. Specifically, Chapter 4 will
focus on the kind of information reflected in the feedback-ERN.
Chapter 5 will continue along the path of integrating error processing in
motor learning, by investigating error processing in an arbitrary visuomo-
tor learning task. The question is whether there is a single neural system
involved in processing errors independent of their source (i.e., external per-
formance feedback or internal error detection) and whether activity in the
neural system is modulated by the stage of learning, as suggested by the re-
inforcement learning theory of error processing (Holroyd and Coles, 2002).
Finally, Chapter 6 is devoted to exploring whether it is possible to further
extend the applicability of theories on error processing into the domain of
action observation. A number of models of motor control have been em-
ployed recently to the domain of action observation (Miall, 2003; Wolpert
et al., 2003). Chapter 6 will focus on probing the action monitoring system
as described in the reinforcement learning model in action observation.
Chapter 7 will summarize the results obtained, discuss these in the con-
text of recent models of motor control, and provide suggestions for further
research.
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2 Cerebral dynamics and
topography of preparatory
activity
This chapter is a modified version of:
Mars RB, Coles MGH, Hulstijn W, Toni I. Cerebral dynamics and topography
of preparatory activity. Manuscript submitted for publication
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Abstract
Flexible goal-oriented behavior requires the ability to carry informa-
tion across temporal delays. Neurally, this ability is associated with
sustained neural firing. In cognitive terms, this ability has often been
associated with the maintenance of sensory material on-line, as during
short-termmemory tasks, or with the retention of a motor code, as during
movement preparation tasks. The general issue addressed in this paper
is whether short-term storage of sensory information and preparation of
motor responses rely on different anatomical substrates.
We used fMRI to measure sustained and time-varying delay-related
cerebral activity evoked during performance of a delay non-match to
sample task, where task contingencies rather than explicit instructions
ensured that either sensory or motor representations were used to cross
the delay period on each trial. This approach allowed us to distinguish
sensory from motor characteristics of delay-related activity evoked by
task contingencies, rather than differences in the control of short-term
storage driven by verbal instructions.
Holding sensory material on-line evoked both sustained and time-
varying delay-related activity in prefrontal regions, whereas movement
preparation evoked delay-related responses in precentral areas. Sus-
tained activity in the intraparietal sulcus was sensitive to the presence of
memoranda, but indifferent to the type of information that was retained
in memory. Our findings indicate that short-term storage of sensory in-
formation and preparation of motor responses rely on partially segregated
cerebral circuits. In the frontal lobe, these circuits are organized along a
rostro-caudal dimension, corresponding to the sensory or motor nature
of the stored material.
2.1 Introduction
Adaptive behavior requires the ability to make decisions, avoiding stereo-
typed reactions to an environmental impulse (Glimcher, 2003). For instance,
it can be beneficial, following a sensory instruction, to delay a response un-
til it is appropriate. Under these circumstances, the brain needs to bridge
a temporal gap between perception and action. In neural terms, this ability
relies on the maintenance of information through internally-generated sus-
tained activity (Fuster and Alexander, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Romo
et al., 1999; Vogels et al., 2005). These neural patterns can support different
cognitive processes, from the storage of sensory information for prospective
behavior (Rainer et al., 1999), to sustained preparation of motor responses
(Wise and Mauritz, 1985) and abstract rules (Wallis et al., 2001). Empirical
tests of models of working memory have focused on the temporary storage of
visuospatial and verbal materials, neglecting movement representations as
a relevant informational code (Baddeley, 1992; Smith and Jonides, 1999).
Here we test whether the neural implementation of short-term storage of
sensory information and the preparation of motor responses involve differ-
ent anatomical substrates.
Some authors have argued against such a dissociation, since the neural
system involved in carrying sensory information over temporal gaps could
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also be involved in generating motor plans (Constantinidis et al., 2001).
According to this perspective, sensory features of an instruction are main-
tained on-line and there is no commitment to a specific response until its
execution. However, motor preparatory mechanisms do not need to main-
tain a sensory instruction on-line once the response is selected. Accord-
ingly, other authors have suggested a different interpretation of sustained
activity, in which mnemonic and preparatory activities are conceptually and
neuronally distinct phenomena (Fuster, 2000).
We have tested whether short-term storage of sensory and motor infor-
mation rely on spatially segregated cerebral structures. We have exploited
a novel task in which participants could cross temporal delays interposed
between instructions and responses by using either sensory or motor codes
(Toni et al., 2002b). In contrast to previous studies in which participants
were instructed to use a particular spatial code to solve a given task (Cur-
tis et al., 2004; D’Esposito et al., 2000; Leung et al., 2002; Simon et al.,
2002), our approach assesses differences in delay-related activity evoked
by task contingencies, rather than differences driven by verbal instructions.
Furthermore, our study is concerned with arbitrary stimulus-response map-
pings, i.e. flexible learned mappings that transcend the stereotypical perfor-
mance of spatially congruent sensorimotor associations (Wise and Murray,
2000; Toni et al., 2001a).
Participants solved a delayed-non-match-to-sample task between two
“sample” visual patterns and a “test” pattern, separated by a variable time
delay. The task involved a comparison of their shape (Fig. 2.1). We influ-
enced the type of information carried over the delay period by manipulating
the relevance of the shape of the test cue for correct performance. Using
fMRI, we measured sustained and time-varying delay-related cerebral ac-
tivity evoked during task performance. The experimental design allowed
us to distinguish delay-related activity from transient stimulus- and motor-
related effects; and sensory from motor characteristics of delay-related ac-
tivity, independently from spatial attention.
2.2 Materials and methods
Participants
We studied 9 right-handed volunteers (2 females, age range 19-27 years),
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants gave informed con-
sent according to institutional guidelines of the local ethics committee (CMO
region Arnhem-Nijmegen, Netherlands) and were paid eur. 30 for their par-
ticipation. Data from 2 additional participants were discarded because their
behavioral data indicated that they failed to engage in motor preparation.
Experimental setup
During the scanning session, participants lay supine in the scanner. Head
movements were minimized by an adjustable padded head-holder. Visual
stimuli covered a visual angle of approximately 6 ˚ and were projected onto
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a mirror above the participants’ heads. Motor responses were recorded via
an MR-compatible keypad (MRI Devices, Waukesha, WI), positioned on the
right side of the participant’s abdomen. Stimulus presentation and response
collection were controlled by a PC running Presentation 0.81 (Neurobehav-
ioral Systems, San Francisco, CA).
Behavioral procedures
To ensure optimal task performance during the scanning sessions, partici-
pants were trained extensively beforehand. In total, there were four training
sessions and one scanning session occurring over three consecutive days.
In the first training session (day 1), participants learned, by trial and error,
to perform a visuomotor associative task (160 trials) relating four shapes to
two movements of their right hand (Fig. 2.1A). Two shapes instructed the
flexion of the index finger; the other two shapes instructed the flexion of the
middle finger. During each trial, one of the four shapes [instruction cue (IC),
300 ms] was visually presented. A variable delay (0.5–2.5 s in steps of 0.5
s) was followed by a tone [trigger cue (TC), 300 ms]. The TC informed the
participants to deliver the motor response specified by the IC. On each trial,
immediately after the movement, a visual feedback stimulus (a green ‘V’ or
a red ‘X’) was presented (200 ms), informing the participants whether the
movement was correct or not.
In the second training session (day 1), participants learned, by trial and
error, to perform a delayed non-match to sample (DNMS) task (Toni et al.,
2002b) (800 trials). Two “sample” shapes (instruction cue, IC) out of a set
of six (Fig. 2.1B-C) were visually presented for 500 ms. The set of IC shapes
was constituted by the four shapes used in the first training session (i.e.
shapes associated with a particular finger movements) and by two novel
shapes not associated with any movement. A variable delay (1-5 s in steps
of 1 s during the first 400 trials; 1-21 s in steps of 5 s during the sub-
sequent 400 trials) was followed by the presentation (300 ms) of a “test”
shape (trigger cue, TC) out of the same set of four shapes used in the first
training session. To solve the DNMS task, the participants were required
to press the finger specified by the non-matching shape among the set of
three presented shapes (two sample stimuli and one test stimulus). In most
trials, the test shape matched one of the two sample stimuli. When this was
not the case (see below), the participants were required to press the finger
specified by the test shape. The response was to be provided as quickly as
possible after the presentation of the trigger cue. The presence of an RT cut-
off (range: 2000-700 ms, decreasing every 50 trials) forced participants to
emphasize response speed. On each trial, immediately after the movement,
a visual feedback stimulus (a green ‘V’ or a red ‘X’) was presented (200 ms),
informing the participants whether the movement was correct or not. When
participants responded after the RT cut-off, a message (‘too late’) appeared
on the screen.
The critical experimental manipulation embedded in the DNMS task was
the following. An instruction cue was composed by a pair of shapes that
could have instructed i) the same movement; ii) different movements; iii) no
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Figure 2.1: Experimental task. Four shapes were matched to two movements (A). Trials in the delayed non-
match to sample task (B)were constructed to invoke maintenance of sensory items (MEMORY), movement
preparatory activity (PREPARATION), or no memory load (CONTROL). During training, CATCH trials were also pre-
sented, to prevent the use of alternative strategies during MEMORY trials (C).
movement (Fig. 2.1B-C). When the two sample shapes instructed the same
movement, then the test shape invariably matched one of the two instruc-
tion stimuli. It follows that the correct response was completely specified by
the instruction shapes. In these trials (PREPARATION trials), the participants
could have selected the response after the presentation of the IC, and there-
fore could hold the movement ready during the delay. Thus, delay-related
responses evoked during these trials can be taken to include the effects of
carrying motor material over a temporal gap.
When the two sample shapes instructed different movements, then the
test shape could have matched (70%) or not one of the two sample stimuli. It
follows that the correct response was specified by the comparison between
sample and test shapes. In these trials (MEMORY trials), the participants
needed to wait until the presentation of the test shape to be able to com-
pare the sensory characteristics of test and sample stimuli and select the
appropriate response. In those trials in which the test shape did not match
any of the two sample stimuli (30%), the participant applied the rule that re-
quired them to press the finger specified by the test shape (see above). These
were CATCH trials (Fig. 2.1C). Their presence allowed us to probe whether
the participants were solving the MEMORY trials by applying an alternative
strategy to the one detailed above. Namely, during MEMORY trials, the par-
ticipants could have simply opted for performing the movement that was not
instructed by the TC. This alternative strategy did not require the partici-
pants to hold the IC shapes on-line, but it relied on the TC being invariably
matched to one of the two sample stimuli. Therefore, if the participants used
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this alternative strategy, they would have been unable to perform the CATCH
trials correctly. Therefore, delay-related responses evoked during MEMORY
trials can be taken to include the effects of carrying sensory material over a
temporal gap.
When the two sample shapes instructed no movement, then the test
shape did not match any of the two sample stimuli, since the TC was drawn
from a set of four shapes previously associated with a specific movement. It
follows that the correct response was completely specified by the test shape
alone. In these trials (CONTROL trials), the participants needed to wait until
the presentation of the TC to select the appropriate response, and the sam-
ple shapes did not need to be compared with the TC in order to solve the
task. Therefore, delay-related responses evoked during these trials can be
taken to reflect effects not specifically associated with carrying sensory or
motor material over a temporal gap.
On the third training session (day 2), participants were further trained
on the DNMS task for 250 trials, with delays varying between 1 and 21 sec
(in steps of 5 sec). For the last 200 trials, participants performed the task
without visual feedback.
The fourth training session (day 3) took place just before the start of
the scanning session. Participants practiced the DNMS task for 50 trials
before entering the MR scanner and for 50 trials inside the scanner just
before scanning. Afterwards, the scanning session started, and participants
performed the task for 120 trials. During the scanning session, the delay
between IC and TC varied between 1-21 sec (uniform distribution), and the
inter-trial interval varied between 1-13 sec (uniform distribution). Feedback
was not provided. Furthermore, unknown to the participants, there were
no CATCH trials during the scanning session. Catch trials were removed in
order to keep the length of the scanning session to a minimum. An equal
number of MEMORY, PREPARATION, and CONTROL trials were presented.
These settings optimized the ability of our DNMS task to induce partic-
ipants to bridge temporal delays interposed between instructions and re-
sponses by using either sensory or motor codes. By the same token, it
should be emphasized that our task cannot be compared to the trial-unique
DNMS tasks used to assess item recognition (Kowalska et al., 1991; Suzuki
et al., 1993).
Experimental timing
The experimental timing and the wide range of delays enabled us to char-
acterize the evoked hemodynamic responses at a finer temporal resolution
than the actual TR (Josephs et al., 1997) and allowed us characterize the
BOLD responses to independent components (Toni et al., 1999; Mars et al.,
2005) aligned with the instruction cue, with the trigger stimulus, and ex-
tending over the delay period. The extensive range of delays ensured that
the participants were ready to respond at any time after the presentation of
the instruction cue (Toni et al., 2002b). The pseudorandom presentation of
different trial types ensured that the participants could not anticipate the
order of the conditions.
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Behavioral analysis
Mean response times (RTs) and error rates (ERs) measured during the scan-
ning session were analyzed separately and considered as dependent vari-
ables in a 3 × 5 repeated measures ANOVA with main effects of TRIAL TYPE
(3 levels: MEMORY, PREPARATION, and CONTROL) and DELAY LENGTH (5 lev-
els, arising from the subdivision of the instructed delays into bins of equal
duration). Participants were considered as a random factor. The alpha-level
was set at 0.05, univariate approach, Huynh-Feldt corrected.
Image acquisition
Images were acquired using a 3T Trio scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Ger-
many). BOLD sensitive functional images were acquired using a single shot
gradient EPI sequence (TR/TE 2.430s/40 ms, 33 transversal slices, ascend-
ing acquisition, voxel size 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm). Following the experimen-
tal session, structural images were acquired using a MP-RAGE sequence
(TR/TE/TI 2.3 s/3.93 ms/1100 ms, voxel size 1 × 1 × 1 mm).
Image analysis
Functional data were pre-processed and analyzed using SPM2 (Statistical
Parametric Mapping, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first five volumes of
each participant’s data set were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. The
image timeseries were spatially realigned using a sinc interpolation algo-
rithm that estimates rigid body transformations (translations, rotations) by
minimizing head-movements between each image and the reference image.
The timeseries for each voxel were realigned temporally to the time of ac-
quisition of the middle slice. Subsequently, images were normalized onto a
custom MNI-aligned EPI template (based on 28 male brains acquired on the
Siemens Trio scanner at the F.C. Donders Centre) using both linear and 16
nonlinear transformations and resampled at an isotropic voxel size of 2 mm.
Finally, the normalized images were spatially smoothed using an isotropic 8
mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Each participant’s struc-
tural image was spatially coregistered to the mean of the functional images
(Ashburner and Friston, 1997) and spatially normalized by using the same
transformation matrix applied to the functional images.
The fMRI timeseries were analyzed using an event-related approach in
the context of the General Linear Model. Analysis of the imaging data con-
sidered main effects of trial Type and trial Epoch [10 levels: IC, MEMORY-
DELAYsust, PREPARATION-DELAYsust, CONTROL-DELAYsust, MEMORY-DELAYramp,
PREPARATION-DELAYramp, CONTROL-DELAYramp, MEMORY-TC, PREPARATION-
TC, CONTROL-TC]. IC- and TC-related effects were modelled as delta func-
tions. DELAY-related activities were modelled as i)square-waves time locked
to the onset/offset of the corresponding IC/TC and extending over the delay
period (DELAYsustained component); and as ii) triangular-waves time locked to
the onset/offset of the corresponding IC/TC and ramping-up over the delay
period (DELAYramp component). Delay-related activity was thus defined by
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a time interval rather than by a specific time point, and we accounted for
both sustained and (linearly) time-varying activity occurring over the delay
period. Each of these ten functions was then convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function (Friston et al., 1998), and down-sampled
at each scan in order to generate 10 regressors modeling the main effects de-
scribed above. Separate covariates including trials with incorrect or missing
responses, corrective responses, trial-by-trial variations in RT, head-related
movements (as estimated by the spatial realignment procedure) and a con-
stant term over scans were also considered in the model. Furthermore, we
included terms describing the average white-matter intensity and cerebral-
spinal fluid intensity as extracted from the EPI timeseries following a stan-
dard segmentation procedure (Verhagen et al., 2006). These regressors were
meant to capture scan-by-scan variations in global signals un-confounded
by task-related BOLD changes. Data was high-pass filtered (cut-off 500 s)
to remove low frequency confounds, such as scanner drifts. Temporal auto-
correlation was modelled as an AR(1) process.
Statistical inference
The statistical significance of the estimated evoked hemodynamic responses
was assessed using t-statistics in the context of a multiple regression anal-
ysis. The null hypothesis was that the variance explained by a given regres-
sor was consistent with the residual error, once the variance explained by
the other components of the model was accounted for. Linear compounds
(contrasts) were used to determine the effects associated with each task
component, generating t-values for each voxel in the image, i.e. statistical
parametric maps (SPM) of t-values. In particular, for each of the three ex-
perimental conditions described above (PREPARATION, MEMORY, CONTROL),
we isolated both differential delay-related responses (indicated by “>”) and
common delay-related responses (indicated by “∩”) (Nichols et al., 2005).
Furthermore, we assessed both sustained delay-period activity and activ-
ity showing increasing activity during memory and preparation intervals.
This time-varying activity was also taken into account following reports of
increasing memory-related activity with increasing load (Narayanan et al.,
2005) and increasing preparatory activity with increasing response proba-
bility (Schoffelen et al., 2005).
We assessed the spatial distribution of the following effects:
1. We isolated sustained delay-related responses showing stronger activ-
ity during the MEMORY trials than during the PREPARATION and CON-
TROL trials, ensuring that this differential activity was driven by rela-
tive increases during the MEMORY trials rather than decreases during
the PREPARATION and CONTROL trials. These constraints were imple-
mented in the following contrast: (MEMORY-DELAYsust > PREPARATION-
DELAYsust) ∩ (MEMORY-DELAYsust > CONTROL-DELAYsust), masked by
(PREPARATION-DELAYsust > 0 ∩ CONTROL-DELAYsust > 0).
2. We isolated sustained delay-related responses showing stronger activ-
ity during the PREPARATION trials than during the MEMORY and CON-
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TROL trials, ensuring that this differential activity was driven by rel-
ative increases during the PREPARATION trials rather than decreases
during the MEMORY and CONTROL trials. These constraints were imple-
mented in the following contrast: (PREPARATION-DELAYsust > MEMORY-
DELAYsust) ∩ (PREPARATION-DELAYsust > CONTROL-DELAYsust), masked
by (PREPARATION-DELAYsust > 0 ∩ CONTROL-DELAYsust > 0).
3. We isolated sustained delay-related responses showing common dif-
ferential activity during MEMORY and PREPARATION trials as com-
pared to the CONTROL trials. These constraints were implemented
in the following contrast: (MEMORY-DELAYsust > CONTROL-DELAYsust)∩
(PREPARATION-DELAYsust > CONTROL-DELAYsust).
4. We isolated time-increasing delay-related responses evoked during the
MEMORY trials as compared to the PREPARATION trials, ensuring that
this differential activity was driven by relative increases during the
MEMORY trials rather than decreases during the PREPARATION tri-
als. These constraints were implemented in the following contrast:
(MEMORY-DELAYramp > PREPARATION-DELAYramp), masked by (MEMORY-
DELAYramp > 0).
5. We isolated time-increasing delay-related responses evoked during
the PREPARATION trials as compared to the MEMORY trials, ensuring
that this differential activity was driven by relative increases dur-
ing the PREPARATION trials rather than decreases during the MEM-
ORY trials. These constraints were implemented in the following con-
trast: (PREPARATION-DELAYramp > MEMORY-DELAYramp), masked by
(PREPARATION-DELAYramp > 0).
Gaussian field theory allowed us to make inferences corrected for the num-
ber of non-independent comparisons (Friston et al., 1995b). The effective
degrees of freedom of the error term took into account the temporal auto-
correlation of the data (Friston et al., 1995a).
The statistical inferences adopted a cluster-level threshold of p < 0.05,
corrected for multiple comparisons over the whole brain using the family-
wise error correction (Friston et al., 1996a). Cluster-level statistics consid-
ers the spatial extent of activity lying above a given intensity threshold. In
this study the intensity threshold was set at a conservative t=4 [conservative
in the context of cluster-level statistics, Friston et al. (1994)]. This allowed
us to maximize the anatomical specificity of the inferences (high intensity
threshold) while preserving the increased power of cluster-level statistics.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report the corresponding intensity level t-values.
For areas displaying time-varying delay-related activity, we plotted the
BOLD signal time-course during the scanning session for each condition
separately. In particular, we calculated the inter-subject average and stan-
dard error of the peak BOLD response for each of 10 consecutive and equally
spaced time bins along the delay period.
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Anatomical inference
Anatomical details of significant signal changes were obtained by superim-
posing the SPMs on the structural images of each subject in MNI coordi-
nates. The atlas of Duvernoy (Duvernoy et al., 1991) was used to identify
relevant anatomical landmarks. When applicable, Brodmann Areas were
assigned on the basis of the SPM Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005),
i.e. the anatomical position of our significant clusters and local maxima was
formally tested against published three-dimensional probabilistic cytoarchi-
tectonic maps.
2.3 Results
Behavioral performance
Fig. 2.2 illustrates the mean error rate (ER) and response time (RT) as a
function of delay during the three trial types, obtained during the scanning
session. The data indicate that our design was successful in inducing par-
ticipants to bridge the gap between IC and TC by using different mental
representations. Participants were faster and made fewer errors during the
PREPARATION trials than during the CONTROL and MEMORY trials (main ef-
fect of TRIAL TYPE - ER: F (2,16)= 22.929, p < 0.001; RT: F (2,16)= 48.76,
p < 0.001). Also, there was a significant main effect of delay on error rate
(F (4,32) = 4.371, p = 0.006). Crucially, delay length differentially affected
the PREPARATION and the MEMORY trials (TRIAL TYPE × DELAY LENGTH
interaction – ER: F (8,64)= 3.26, p = 0.004). Post-hoc comparisons revealed
that during MEMORY, but not during PREPARATION or CONTROL, the error rate
increased as a function of the delay interposed between the IC and the TC
(p < 0.003). This indicates that the mental representations used to bridge
the temporal gap between IC and TC during the MEMORY trials were more
labile than those used during the PREPARATION trials. Because Figure 2.2
shows a strong trend on RT, we assessed the modulation of RT by delay in
each condition, using a linear regression for each participant. Participant’s
beta weights were tested at the second level using a one-tailed t-test. This
post-hoc analysis revealed shortening in RT with increasing delay length in
both PREPARATION (p = .044) and CONTROL (p = .007) conditions, but not in
the MEMORY condition.
A paired-samples t-test was performed on the RTs on correct MEMORY
and CATCH trials measured during the third training session (last 200 tri-
als) in order to ensure that participants were retaining sensory information
during the MEMORY trials (see Methods - Behavioral Procedures). Note that,
apart from the presence of CATCH trials, the task procedures used during
this training session were identical to those used during the scanning ses-
sion. RTs evoked during the MEMORY and CATCH trials did not differ (t(8) =
1.057, n.s.), indicating that in both conditions participants used a similar
strategy to solve the task (Toni et al., 2002b).
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Figure 2.2: Behavioral data. Error percentages (left panel) and reaction times on correct trials (right panel) in
the CONTROL, PREPARATION, and MEMORY conditions as a function of delay length, obtained during the scanning
session. Curves are fitted first order polynomials; error bars indicate ±SEM. For a color version of this illustration,
see p. 130.
Imaging data: Sustained delay-related activity
The following section describes the SPMs associated with sustained delay-
period activity. Significant differential delay-related responses are listed in
Table 2.1.
First, we isolated sustained delay-related responses showing stronger ac-
tivity during the MEMORY trials than during the PREPARATION and CONTROL
trials, ensuring that this differential activity was driven by relative increases
during the MEMORY trials rather than decreases during the PREPARATION
and CONTROL trials [i.e., (MEMORY-DELAYsust > PREPARATION-DELAYsust)
∩ (MEMORY-DELAYsust > CONTROL-DELAYsust), masked by (PREPARATION-
DELAYsust > 0 ∩ CONTROL-DELAYsust > 0)]. This contrast revealed two sig-
nificant clusters of activity (Fig. 2.3, in green). One cluster (local maximum
at -6, 8, 52) was located along the mesial aspect of the superior frontal
gyrus, within the 50% probabilistic boundary of cytoarchitectonically de-
fined BA6, and encroaching into the pre-SMA (Picard and Strick, 1996). A
second cluster (local maximum at -28, -6, 70) was located along the caudal
superior frontal sulcus, at the border between BA6 and BA8 (Eickhoff et al.,
2005).
Second, we isolated sustained delay-related responses showing stronger
activity during the PREPARATION trials than during the MEMORY and CON-
TROL trials, ensuring that this differential activity was driven by rela-
tive increases during the PREPARATION trials rather than decreases during
the MEMORY and CONTROL trials [i.e., (PREPARATION-DELAYsust > MEMORY-
DELAYsust) ∩ (PREPARATION-DELAYsust > CONTROL-DELAYsust), masked by
(PREPARATION-DELAYsust > 0 ∩ CONTROL-DELAYsust > 0)]. This contrast re-
vealed two significant clusters of activity (Fig. 2.3, in red), contiguous but
distinct and caudal to the MEMORY clusters described above. One cluster
(local maximum at -6, -12, 54) was located along the mesial aspects of the
superior frontal gyrus, within the 100% probabilistic boundary of cytoar-
chitectonically defined BA6 (Eickhoff et al., 2005), and encroaching into the
SMA (Picard and Strick, 1996). A second cluster (local maximum at -36,
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(MEMORYsust > PREPARATIONsust )
∩ (MEMORYsust > CONTROLsust)
(masked incl. by PREPARATIONsust > 0 ∩
CONTROLsust > 0)
Anatomical region MNI coordinates t value
x y z
Mesial sup frontal g -6 8 52 6.82
Sup frontal s -28 -6 70 6.49
(PREPARATIONsust > MEMORYsust) ∩
(PREPARATIONsust > CONTROLsust)
(masked incl. by PREPARATIONsust > 0) ∩
(CONTROLsust > 0)
Anatomical region MNI coordinates t value
x y z
Mesial sup frontal g -6 -12 54 11.59
Central s/Precentral g -36 -26 48 6.11
MEMORYsust > CONTROLsust ∩
PREPARATIONsust > CONTROLsust
Anatomical region MNI coordinates t value
x y z
Intraparietal s -44 -52 54 6.42
Putamen -26 6 -12 4.52
Table 2.1: Imaging results: Differential delay-related sustained activity.
-26, 48) was located along the central sulcus extending onto the precentral
gyrus. Probabilistic cytoarchtectonic maps (Eickhoff et al., 2005) place this
cluster at the border between BA3, 4 and 6.
Third, we isolated sustained delay-related responses showing common
differential activity during MEMORY and PREPARATION trials as compared
to the CONTROL trials [i.e., (MEMORY-DELAYsust > CONTROL-DELAYsust)∩
(PREPARATION-DELAYsust > CONTROL-DELAYsust)]. This contrast revealed two
significant clusters of activity. One cluster (local maximum at -44, -52, 54,
Fig. 2.4) was located along the intraparietal sulcus, posterior to the 20%
probabilistic boundary of cytoarchitectonically defined BA2 (Eickhoff et al.,
2005). A second cluster (local maximum at -26, 6, -12) was located in the
middle third of the left putamen.
Imaging data: time-varying delay-related activity
The following section describes the SPMs associated with linearly time-
varying delay-related activity, i.e. BOLD signals increasing during the delay
length. Significant effects are listed in Table 2.2.
First, we isolated time-increasing delay-related responses evoked during
the MEMORY trials as compared to the PREPARATION trials, ensuring that
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Figure 2.3: Differential delay-related sustained activity. Anatomical location [panels (B) and (E); SPM(t)s of
the contrasts detailed in Table 2.1, overlaid on spatially normalized anatomical sections of one participant]
and effect sizes [panels (A), (C), (D), and (F); parameter estimates of multiple regression in SEM units] of re-
gions modulated by the task contingencies during the delay period. Regions with stronger sustained activity
during delay periods of either MEMORY trials (in green) or PREPARATION trials (in red) are shown on sagittal (B)
and transverse (E) anatomical sections. Clusters of delay-related activity supporting task performance during
PREPARATION trials were distributed along the caudal precentral cortex (central sulcus, SMA-proper), whereas
MEMORY trials evoked activity along the caudal prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area 6/8 and pre-SMA). For a
color version of this illustration, see p. 130.
this differential activity was driven by relative increases during the MEMORY
trials rather than decreases during the PREPARATION trials [i.e., (MEMORY-
DELAYramp > PREPARATION-DELAYramp), masked by (MEMORY-DELAYramp >
0)]. This contrast revealed a significant cluster of activity (Fig. 2.5A, in
green, local maximum at -40, 62, -2), located on the middle frontal gyrus,
anterior to cytoarchitectonically defined BA9/46 (Rajkowska and Goldman-
Rakic, 1995), and thus in BA10.
Figure 2.4: Common delay-related sustained activity. Anatomical location (A) and effect sizes (B) of a region
with stronger delay-related sustained activity during PREPARATION and MEMORY trials than during CONTROL trials.
Other conventions as in Fig. 2.4. For a color version of this illustration, see p. 131.
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MEMORYramp > PREPARATIONramp
masked incl. by MEMORYramp > 0)
Anatomical region MNI coordinates t value
x y z
Middle frontal g -40 62 -2 4.57
PREPARATIONramp > MEMORYramp
(masked incl. by PREPARATIONramp > 0)
Anatomical region MNI coordinates t value
x y z
Precentral g -52 2 46 5.50
Table 2.2: Imaging results: Differential delay-related time-varying activity.
Second, we isolated time-increasing delay-related responses evoked dur-
ing the PREPARATION trials as compared to the MEMORY trials, ensuring
that this differential activity was driven by relative increases during the
PREPARATION trials rather than decreases during the MEMORY trials [i.e.,
(PREPARATION-DELAYramp > MEMORY-DELAYramp), masked by (PREPARATION-
DELAYramp > 0)]. This contrast revealed a significant cluster of activity (Fig.
2.5C, in red, local maximum at -52, 2, 46), located on the precentral gyrus,
within the 70% probabilistic boundary of cytoarchitectonically defined BA6
Figure 2.5: Differential delay-related time-varying activity. Anatomical location [panels (A) and (C); SPM(t)s
of the contrasts detailed in Table 2.1] and effect sizes [panels (B) and (D)] of regions modulated by the task
contingencies during the delay period. Regions with stronger time-varying activity during delay periods of
either MEMORY trials (in green) or PREPARATION trials (in red) are shown on transverse anatomical sections. Delay-
related activity increasing as a function of delay time during PREPARATION trials was found along the precentral
gyrus (BA6), whereas MEMORY trials evoked activity along the middle frontal gyrus (BA10). For a color version
of this illustration, see p. 131.
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(Eickhoff et al., 2005). Activity in this cluster increased with delay length
during both PREPARATION and CONTROL trials, but was not modulated by
delay length in the MEMORY condition.
2.4 Discussion
Wemeasured the spatial distribution of delay-related cerebral activity evoked
by holding on-line either sensory material or motor responses, while having
accounted for and removed the effects of presenting the sensory material
and providing the motor response. In medial and lateral frontal cortex,
different clusters of delay-related activity supported task performance, ac-
cording to the nature of the information retained during the instructed de-
lay. Some regions showed sustained activity throughout the delay period,
whereas in other regions activity increased as a function of delay length. In
posterior parietal cortex, clusters with delay-related activity were indifferent
to the type of information that was retained in memory. We infer that short-
term storage of sensory information and preparation of motor responses
rely on partially segregated cerebral circuits. In the following paragraphs,
we discuss our findings and their implications for current models of working
memory.
Behavioral performance
During scanning, participants solved the DNMS task at three different levels
of proficiency (Fig. 2.2). Participants responded faster during the PREPARA-
TION than during the CONTROL trials, indicating that in the former condition
the participants were preparing to execute the movement specified by the
sample cue. During both CONTROL and PREPARATION trials, performance
became faster as a function of delay length, indicating that the participants
took into account the increasing likelihood of providing a response as delay
length increased. Crucially, during MEMORY trials, accuracy decreased as
a function of delay length, whereas during PREPARATION trials, performance
was homogeneously error-free across delay lengths (Fig. 2.2). This indicates
that the type of information retained during the MEMORY trials was more
labile and of a different kind than that used during the PREPARATION trials.
Sustained activity in precentral cortex
We found sustained delay-related activity over the lateral and mesial aspects
of the left precentral cortex. The pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA)
and a caudal portion of the superior frontal gyrus (BA6/8; Fig. 2.3E, in
green) showed strong sustained activity during the delay-period of the MEM-
ORY trials, but less so during PREPARATION and CONTROL trials. Since MEM-
ORY and CONTROL trials had comparable movement selection requirements,
the pre-SMA activity cannot reflect a generalized readiness to select a re-
sponse (Petit et al., 1998). Rather, our results confirm that this region deals
with rules that convert sensory material or intentions into the associated
movements (Bunge, 2004; Hoshi and Tanji, 2004; Lau et al., 2004).
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The cluster on the superior frontal sulcus falls in the same region (BA6/8)
previously shown to be involved in holding visuo-spatial information on-line
during a working memory task, both in humans (Rowe et al., 2000) and in
macaques (Sawaguchi and Yamane, 1999). This finding is important since
it is not immediately compatible with domain-specific accounts of working
memory (Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000; Smith and Jonides, 1997) that
would predict a medio-lateral spatial segregation between regions support-
ing the on-line maintenance of identity and visuo-spatial features of a sen-
sory item.
In contrast to the MEMORY-related sustained activity found in pre-SMA
and BA6/8, both SMA and lateral precentral gyrus (BA6; Fig. 2.3) were
particularly active during the delay-period of the PREPARATION trials. This
finding illustrates how a substantial portion of the delay-related sustained
activity that can be found in the caudal precentral gyrus is specifically re-
lated to the preparation of a motor response, over and above the effects of
elapsing time (as indexed by the CONTROL trials) or holding sensory items
on-line (as indexed by the MEMORY trials; Fig. 2.3F).
Overall, these results fit with the general partition of the precentral cor-
tex into ‘premotor’ and ‘pre-premotor’ territories (Picard and Strick, 2001).
Here we show that this anatomical distinction has a cognitive counterpart
with respect to the nature of the material held on-line during a delay period.
There was a clear rostro-caudal distribution of MEMORY- and PREPARATION-
related effects (Fig. 2.3), indicating that the contributions of the frontal lobe
to working memory could also be organized along a rostro-caudal dimen-
sion, corresponding to the sensory or motor nature of the stored material.
This interpretation unifies previous distinctions made between motor prepa-
ration, visuospatial attention, and rule processing on the lateral surface
(Boussaoud, 2001; Bunge et al., 2003) and between motor preparation and
processing of visuomotor rules on the mesial surface (Bunge, 2004; Crone
et al., 2006; Hoshi and Tanji, 2004; Lau et al., 2004; Maier et al., 2002).
This interpretation is also consistent with the results of a related TMS study
(Van den Hurk, Mars, Van Elswijk, Hegeman, Pasman, Bloem, and Toni,
submitted for publication) showing that cortico-spinal excitability is altered
when holding a movement on-line, but not during the maintenance of sen-
sory material. This result fits with the fact that premotor regions, but not
pre-premotor regions, have direct output to the primary motor cortex and
the spinal cord (Picard and Strick, 2001).
Sustained activity in the intraparietal sulcus
Independent studies have shown that the posterior parietal cortex is in-
volved in the maintenance of both sensory items (Rowe et al., 2000; Todd
and Marois, 2004) and motor intentions (Andersen and Buneo, 2002;
Kalaska and Crammond, 1995; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Snyder et al.,
1997; Thoenissen et al., 2002) over time intervals of seconds. Here we illus-
trate how the delay-related sustained activity evoked in this region is specif-
ically related to the presence of memoranda, as evidenced by the relative
decrease in activity in the CONTROL condition, whether these memoranda
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specify a motor response or not, as evidenced by the comparable responses
during MEMORY and PREPARATION trials (Fig. 2.4B). These results appear
consistent with the suggestion that this region contributes to the tempo-
rary storage of information (Jonides et al., 1998; Thoenissen et al., 2002),
and more specifically storage in a format accessible to decision-making pro-
cesses (Toth and Assad, 2002). However, our results do not exclude the
possibility that MEMORY- and PREPARATION-related effects remain spatially
segregated at a spatial scale below our resolution, i.e. that different neurons
within the intraparietal sulcus exhibit sensory memory and motor prepara-
tory activity, respectively (Quintana and Fuster, 1999).
Time-varying delay-related activity
We found two regions which showed increasing activity with increasing de-
lay length in one or more specific conditions. A cluster along the the mid-
dle third of the rostral precentral gyrus showed increasing activity during
PREPARATION and CONTROL trials, but not during MEMORY trials (Fig. 2.5D).
This time-varying precentral response appears to be related to the time-
varying characteristics of the RT observed in the PREPARATION and CONTROL
trials. Given that the cerebral effect (delay-related activity) precedes the
behavioral effect (RT), it is plausible that this region might contribute to
biasing a generic motor plan with contextual information generalized over
trials, namely the conditional probability of providing a response at a given
time, given that no response has yet been required (Schoffelen et al., 2005).
Our results confirm that this temporal inference is not necessarily linked to
the implementation of a specific motor plan (Coull et al. 2004), since be-
havioral and cerebral effects occur during both PREPARATION and CONTROL
trials. On the other hand, the contributions of this precentral region ap-
pear to be embedded in a motor circuit, since there was no response (and
no anticipatory behavior) when the incoming test stimulus was more than a
simple motor instruction (MEMORY trials).
The anterior portion of the middle frontal gyrus (BA10) showed time-
varying delay-related activity in the MEMORY trials only (Fig. 2.5A). This
time-varying prefrontal response appears related to the time-varying char-
acteristics of the error rate observed in the MEMORY trials (Fig 2.2). However,
since the our analysis was confined to correct trials only, our effect is not
a trivial by-product of increasing error rate. It has been shown that main-
taining sensory information on-line requires additional resources as delay
length increases (Ploner et al., 1998; White et al., 1994). Therefore, it is
plausible that this prefrontal region might contribute to support activity in
other cerebral structures more specifically involved in maintenance of the
sensory items (Fig. 2.3D) only for the longer delays. This role appears to
fit with previous reports suggesting that this region is not involved in allo-
cating attentional resources per se (Koechlin et al., 1999), but rather it is
involved in biasing cognitive operations performed by other cortical regions
(Sakai and Passingham, 2003; Sakai and Passingham, 2006). Furthermore,
our findings are in line with the suggestion that BA10 involvement requires
more than the implementation of a single sensorimotor rule (Ramnani and
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Owen, 2004). Specifically, this region contributed to those trials where a
sensory item needed to be compared with similar items in memory, but not
to PREPARATION and CONTROL trials.
Conclusions
Our findings point to crucial differences in how prefrontal, precentral, and
parietal regions contribute to the basic faculty of holding information on-
line during a temporal gap between perception and action. The intraparietal
cortex appears to be involved in online maintenance of sensory material
with motor implications. Caudal precentral cortex appears to be involved
in holding a movement online, provided that the movement can be fully
specified in advance. Dorsal prefrontal cortex (border BA6/8) appears to
be involved in the maintenance of sensory material and of the sensorimo-
tor rules that allow for the selection of an appropriate response in the near
future. Furthermore, both precentral (BA6) and prefrontal (BA10) regions
reveal time-varying delay-related activity that is presumably involved in bi-
asing sustained preparatory and mnemonic responses as a function of con-
textual information generalized over trials (i.e. the conditional probability of
providing a response or selecting a rule, given that no response has been
yet required).
In summary, these findings illustrate that the contributions of the frontal
lobe to working memory are organized along a rostro-caudal dimension, cor-
responding to the sensory or motor nature of the stored material.
34
3 On the programming and
reprogramming of actions
This chapter is a modified version of:
Mars RB, Piekema C, Coles MGH, Hulstijn W, Toni I. On the programming
and reprogramming of actions. Manuscript submitted for publication
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Abstract
Actions are often selected in the context of ongoing movement plans.
Most studies of action selection have overlooked this fact, implicitly as-
suming that the motor system is passive prior to presentation of instruc-
tions triggering movement selection. Earlier studies addressed action
planning in the context of an already present motor plan, but focused
mostly on inhibition of a prepotent response under fierce time pressure.
Under these circumstances, inhibition of previous motor plans and selec-
tion of a new response become temporally intermingled. Here we explore
how the presence of earlier motor plans influences cerebral effects asso-
ciated with action selection, separating in time movement programming,
reprogramming, and execution.
We show that portions of parieto-frontal circuits, including intra-
parietal sulcus and left dorsal premotor cortex, are systematically in-
volved in programming motor responses, their activity indifferent to the
presence of earlier motor plans. We identify additional regions recruited
when a motor response is programmed in the context of an existing mo-
tor program. Several right-hemisphere regions, previously associated
with response inhibition, might be better characterized as involved in
response selection. Finally, we detail the specific role of a right precen-
tral region in movement reprogramming that is involved in inhibiting not
only actual responses, but also motor representations.
3.1 Introduction
Several studies have addressed the issue of how the goal of an action, the
relevant effector, and timing information are integrated into an appropriate
motor plan (Andersen and Buneo, 2002; Hesse et al., 2006; Rushworth and
Taylor, 2006; Thoenissen et al., 2002; Toni et al., 2001a). This issue has
been mainly addressed by assuming that the brain is an input-output device
that processes sensory material to generate motor responses; this reflex-like
process being set in motion by the presentation of a sensory trigger (Glim-
cher, 2003). However, it is known that primary motor areas are affected by
preparatory processes (Crammond and Kalaska, 2000), and primary visual
areas are affected by expectations (Engel et al., 2001), as well as ongoing
intrinsically generated activity (Kenet and others 2001). Accordingly, it has
been suggested that it might be more appropriate to consider the brain as
mainly driven by its own self-sustained internal dynamics (Friston 2005),
and by occasional samples of the environment (Bullier 2001; VanRullen and
Koch 2003).
These considerations imply that actions are often selected in the context
of ongoing preparatory activity for potential responses (Thoenissen et al.,
2002). There have been several studies on the planning of actions in the
context of an already present motor plan, using countermanding, go/no-
go, and stop tasks (Curtis et al., 2005; Garavan et al., 1999; Li et al.,
2006). The focus of these studies has been on the mechanisms support-
ing movement inhibition, and they have consistently implicated a predom-
inantly right-lateralized cerebral circuit, involving the right inferior frontal
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gyrus, the right inferior parietal cortex, the pre-supplementary motor area
(pre-SMA), and the striatum (Aron et al., 2004; Garavan et al., 1999; Gara-
van et al., 2002; Liddle et al., 2001; Nachev et al., 2005; Vink et al., 2005).
However, inhibition of a prepotent response, under fierce time pressure,
is likely to be accompanied by other concurrent phenomena, such as the
selection of a new motor plan, and the implementation of the new response.
Previous studies have accounted for these effects by relying on subtrac-
tion methods (Donders, 1969), i.e. by assuming that they add linearly, but
this assumption is unlikely to hold (Friston et al., 1996b; Sternberg, 1969).
Furthermore, putting time pressure on movement selection at the time of re-
programming motor actions is likely to emphasize response conflict due to
the presence of multiple motor programs competing for access to the execu-
tion system (Botvinick et al., 2001; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003), rather than
capturing the interplay between an external instruction and the intrinsic
dynamic of the brain.
Here we explore how the presence of earlier motor plans influences cere-
bral effects associated with action selection and preparation, separating in
time the original movement programming, the movement reprogramming,
and the actual movement execution. We address this issue in the context
of arbitrary combinations of instructions and movements, i.e. flexible map-
pings that do not need to rely on spatially or temporally congruent sensori-
motor associations (Passingham, 1993; Wise and Murray, 2000).
3.2 Materials and methods
Participants
Eleven right-handed volunteers (3 males, age range 19-29 years), with nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in this study. Participants
gave written informed consent according to institutional guidelines of the
local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, Netherlands) and
were paid eur. 20 for their participation.
Experimental setup
During the scanning session, participants lay supine in the scanner. Head
movements were minimized by an adjustable padded head-holder. Visual
stimuli covered a visual angle of approximately 6 ˚ and were projected onto
a mirror above the participants’ heads. Motor responses were recorded via
an MR-compatible keypad (MRI Devices, Waukesha, WI), positioned on the
right side of the participant’s abdomen. Stimulus presentation and response
collection were controlled by a PC running Presentation 0.81 (Neurobehav-
ioral Systems, San Francisco, CA).
Behavioral procedure
The experiment consisted of a training session (45 minutes) and a scanning
session (1 hour, including acquisition of structural scan). During the train-
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Figure 3.1: Experimental task. (A) Stimulus-response mappings learned during the training session prior to the
scanning session. During the scanning session, trials from the NORMAL (B), NEUTRAL (C), and SWITCH (D,E) condi-
tions were presented randomly intermixed. Visual stimuli were presented for 300 ms each. During the variable
delay intervals, a fixation cross was presented. An auditory trigger cue signaled participants to execute the
instructed response.
ing session, participants were first trained on a delayed response task on
trials with the following structure (Fig. 3.1B – NORMAL trials). Participants
were presented with one of four visual shapes [instruction cue (ICnormal)],
centrally presented. Two shapes instructed one response (flexion-extension
of the index finger of the right hand), the other two shapes instructed an-
other response (flexion-extension of the middle finger of the right hand -
Fig. 3.1A). After the ICNORMAL was displayed for 300 ms, it was replaced
with a central fixation cross, which remained on screen for the duration
of the trial. Following a variable delay (1000-5000 ms) a tone [trigger cue
(TCNORMAL), 300 ms] instructed the participants to provide the response
specified by the ICNORMAL. Visual feedback, consisting of a green ‘V’ or
a red ‘X’, was presented for 200 ms immediately after the response. The
visual feedback allowed the participants to learn the appropriate stimulus-
response mappings by trial and error. Participants were required to execute
the instructed response as fast as possible following the TCNORMAL. If par-
ticipants did not respond within an 800 ms deadline, a ‘too late’ feedback
was presented. This procedure ensured that on these trials the participants
prepared the response during the variable delay.
After 40 trials of this type, we introduced NEUTRAL trials, in which the
ICNEUTRAL (a question mark) did not specify the movement to be executed
in that trial. In this condition, the shape instructing the correct response
was presented simultaneously with the tone trigger (TCNEUTRAL - Fig. 3.1C).
This procedure ensured that the participants were discouraged from prepar-
ing a response during the variable delay. After 40 trials of this type, we in-
troduced SWITCH trials. These trials were identical to NORMAL trials, except
that during the variable delay a new IC (ICSWITCH) could have been pre-
sented (300 ms). Presentation of the ICSWITCH instructed the participants
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do discard the instruction provided by the ICNORMAL (at the beginning of
that trial) and prepare the response specified by the ICSWITCH. The trial
distribution was such that NEUTRAL and SWITCH trials occurred on approx-
imately 15% of the trials each. Furthermore, on approximately 15% of the
SWITCH trials, multiple switches occurred (Fig. 3.1E).
Following an additional 192 practice trials, participants entered the scan-
ner. During the scanning session, they performed 225 trials of the same
task as performed during the last phase of the practice, except that perfor-
mance feedback was no longer provided. Furthermore, delays between ICs
and TCs, both within and between trials, varied between 1.5 and 16 seconds
(right skewed distribution), such that the occurrence of trial events and on-
sets of fMRI volumes were not synchronized. This procedure enabled us to
homogeneously characterize the hemodynamic responses at a finer tempo-
ral resolution than the actual TR (Josephs et al., 1997; Price et al., 1999),
and to characterize the BOLD responses evoked by different events within
the same trial (Toni et al., 1999; Mars et al., 2005).
In summary, the extensive range of variable delays between ICs and TCs
ensured that the participants were ready to respond at any time after the
presentation of the instruction cue (Toni et al., 2002b). Furthermore, by
presenting the ICSWITCH at unpredictable moments during a small (15%)
percentage of the trials, we ensured that it was advantageous for the par-
ticipants to prepare a response whenever possible. Crucially, by comparing
the RTs evoked by NORMAL and NEUTRAL trials during the scanning session,
we could determine whether participants complied with our expectations
and prepared their response when possible.
Behavioral data analysis
Mean response times for correct trials (RT) and percentage of correct trials
(PC) measured during the scanning session were analyzed separately and
considered as dependent variables in a repeated measures ANOVA. Partici-
pants were considered as a random factor. The alpha-level was set at 0.05,
univariate approach, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected.
Image acquisition
Images were acquired using a 3T Trio scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Ger-
many). BOLD sensitive functional images were acquired using a single shot
gradient EPI sequence (TR/TE 2.430s/40 ms, 33 transversal slices, ascend-
ing acquisition, voxel size 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm). Following the experimen-
tal session, structural images were acquired using a MP-RAGE sequence
(TR/TE/TI 2.3 s/3.93 ms/1100 ms, voxel size 1 × 1 ×1 mm).
Image analysis and statistical inference
Functional data were pre-processed and analyzed using SPM2 (Statistical
Parametric Mapping, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first five volumes of
each participant’s data set were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. The
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image timeseries were spatially realigned using a sinc interpolation algo-
rithm that estimates rigid body transformations (translations, rotations) by
minimizing head-movements between each image and the reference image
(Friston et al., 1995b). The timeseries for each voxel were realigned tempo-
rally to acquisition of the middle slice. Subsequently, images were normal-
ized onto a custom MNI-aligned EPI template (based on 28 male brains ac-
quired on the Siemens Trio scanner at the F.C. Donders Centre) using both
linear and 16 nonlinear transformations and resampled at an isotropic voxel
size of 2 mm. Finally, the normalized images were spatially smoothed us-
ing an isotropic 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Each
participant’s structural image was spatially coregistered to the mean of the
functional images and spatially normalized using the same transformation
matrix as applied to the functional images.
The fMRI timeseries were analyzed using an event-related approach in
the context of the General Linear Model. Statistical models for each partic-
ipant’s data included separate regressors for the different instruction cues
(ICNORMAL, ICNEUTRAL, ICSWITCH), trigger cues (TCNORMAL, TCNEUTRAL),
and switch cues. Thus, we created separate regressors for individual trial
events, rather than creating regressors modeling activity during whole trials
simultaneously. Incorrect responses and trials in which no response oc-
curred were taken into account in separate regressors. Each of these func-
tions was then convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function
and its temporal derivative (Friston et al., 1998), and down-sampled at each
scan in order to generate regressors modeling the main effects described
above. Separate covariates including trials with incorrect or missing re-
sponses, head-related movements (as estimated by the spatial realignment
procedure) and their first derivatives, and a constant term over scans were
also considered in the model. Furthermore, we also included terms describ-
ing the average white-matter intensity and cerebral-spinal fluid intensity as
extracted from the EPI timeseries following a standard segmentation pro-
cedure. These regressors were meant to capture scan-by-scan variations in
global signals unconfounded by task-related BOLD changes (Verhagen et al.,
2006). Data was high-pass filtered (cut-off 500s) to remove low frequency
confounds, such as scanner drifts. Temporal autocorrelation was modelled
as an AR(1) process.
The statistical significance of the estimated evoked hemodynamic re-
sponses was assessed using t-statistics in the context of a multiple regres-
sion analysis. Contrasts of the parameter estimates for the main effects
of all correct trial events were calculated and entered into a one-way, re-
peated measures ANOVA treating subjects as a random variable (Friston
et al., 1999a), and correcting for nonsphericity at each voxel. We report
the results of a random-effects analysis, with inferences drawn at the voxel
level, corrected for multiple comparisons using the family-wise error correc-
tion (p < 0.05) (Friston et al., 1996a).
We isolated both differential hemodynamic responses (indicated by “>”)
and common hemodynamic responses (indicated by “∩”). The differential ef-
fects were identified by testing the null hypothesis that there was no effect in
the Statistical Parametric Map (SPM) of the t statistics describing the differ-
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ence between the variance explained by two given regressors (t-contrasts).
The common responses were identified by testing the null hypothesis that
there was no effect in any of the two constituent SPMs (Nichols et al., 2005).
Specifically, we assessed the spatial distribution of the following effects:
1. We isolated responses evoked by selecting a motor response on the
basis of a visual instruction cue. These constraints were imple-
mented in the following contrast: [(ICNORMAL > 0) ∩ (ICSWITCH > 0)
∩ (TCNEUTRAL > 0)].
2. We isolated responses evoked by selecting a motor response in the
context of ongoing preparatory activity, over and above the responses
evoked by selecting a response per se. These constraints were imple-
mented in the following contrast: ICSWITCH > ICNORMAL. We then con-
trolled for a series of potential confounds by limiting the search of effect
within the effects revealed by other contrasts. To control for poten-
tial effects of differential frequency of ICSWITCH and ICNORMAL, the ef-
fects isolated by our contrast were masked by the contrast ICSWITCH >
ICNEUTRAL. To further ensure that the effects isolated by the con-
trast were confined to regions specifically interested in movement se-
lection, we also masked by the contrast [(TCNEUTRAL > ICNEUTRAL) >
(TCNORMAL > ICNORMAL)]. This mask identifies cerebral voxels in-
volved in selecting a movement following presentation of a visual in-
struction (TCNEUTRAL, ICNORMAL), over and above the presentation of
a visual (non-informative) stimulus (ICNEUTRAL), as well as the presen-
tation of auditory cues and the execution of the response (TCNORMAL).
3. Finally, to distinguish reprogramming effects from increased atten-
tion to action, effect b) was masked by ICSWITCH > TCNEUTRAL. This
mask identifies cerebral voxels involved in reprogramming a movement
(ICSWITCH), over and above the increased attention to action that can
arise when selecting a response under time pressure (TCNEUTRAL).
Anatomical inference
Anatomical details of significant signal changes were obtained by super-
imposing the SPMs on the structural images of each participant in MNI
space. The atlas of Duvernoy (Duvernoy et al., 1991) was used to identify
relevant anatomical landmarks. When applicable, Brodmann Areas were
assigned on the basis of the SPM Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005),
i.e. the anatomical position of our significant clusters and local maxima was
formally tested against published three-dimensional probabilistic cytoarchi-
tectonic maps.
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Figure 3.2: Behavioral data. Reaction times for correct trials (A) and percentage correct responses (B) in the
three experimental conditions, obtained during the scanning session. Error bars reflect ±SEM.
3.3 Results
Behavioral results
Behavioral data obtained during the scanning session are summarized in
Fig. 3.2. Separate ANOVAs on the reaction times on correct trials (RT) and
the percentage correct responses (PC) revealed an effect of task condition
on both the RT (F(2,20) = 338.7, p < 0.001) and PC (F(2,20) = 12.2, p =
0.004). Planned paired t-tests revealed that reaction times were longer and
percentage correct was lower in the NEUTRAL conditions, while behavior on
the NORMAL and SWITCH trials was identical, both with respect to RT (t10 =
1.7, n.s.) and PC (t10 = -0.2, n.s.). These data indicate that participants were
similarly prepared to respond in the NORMAL and SWITCH conditions, while,
as predicted, no preparation was possible in the NEUTRAL condition.
Imaging results – programming actions
All imaging results are listed in Table 3.1 (see Fig. 3.3, 3.4). We first iden-
tified regions showing consistent responses evoked by selecting a motor re-
sponse on the basis of a visual instruction cue [contrast a), (ICNORMAL > 0)
∩ (ICSWITCH > 0) ∩ (TCNEUTRAL > 0)]. This effect was confined to the ventral
visual pathway (bilaterally), the posterior parietal cortex, the left precentral
gyrus, and the mesial superior frontal gyrus. Formal tests against pub-
lished probability maps (Eickhoff et al., 2005) indicated that 94% of the left
precentral cluster falls within the probabilistic boundary of BA6, and we
could label it as dorsal premotor cortex. The cluster in the mesial superior
frontal gyrus also falls within BA6 (probability 70%), and we could label it
as pre-SMA (Picard and Strick, 1996).
Given the structure of our task, it could be argued that the effects ob-
served in the pre-SMA are related to task switching (Rushworth et al., 2002;
Lau et al., 2006). Namely, on approximately half of the trials, the instruction
cue specified a response that was different from the response executed on
the previous trial. It has been shown that in speeded response tasks par-
ticipants might sometimes adopt a strategy to commit to a certain response
even before any explicit instruction has been provided (Gratton et al., 1988).
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(ICNORMAL > 0) ∩ (ICSWITCH > 0) ∩ (TCNEUTRAL > 0)
Anatomical region MNI coordinates t value
x y z
Frontal lobes
L sup frontal s -30 -8 64 7.43
Mesial sup frontal g 0 8 52 7.09
Parietal cortex
L anterior intraparietal s -44 -38 44 9.46
L posterior intraparietal s -26 -62 40 7.06
R posterior intraparietal s 32 -54 44 6.27
Occipital/temporal
R ventral visual pathway 34 -48 -30 9.46
L ventral visual pathway -40 -62 -30 6.08
ICSWITCH > ICNORMAL
masked by (ICSWITCH > ICNEUTRAL) ∩
[(TCNEUTRAL > ICNEUTRAL) >
(TCNORMAL > ICNORMAL)]
Anatomical region MNI coordinates t value
x y z
Frontal lobes
L frontal operculum/insula -42 20 -10 7.16
R inf frontal g 60 18 2 7.76
R precentral g* 42 0 42 6.69
R insula 32 20 -16 6.69
Parietal cortex
L supramarginal g -52 -48 40 7.15
R supramarginal g 54 -44 48 8.98
inferior parietal lobule
Subcortical
Caudate nucleus 16 -4 6 5.99
Table 3.1: Imaging results. Anatomical specification, MNI coordinates, and t-values of clusters identified by the
programming and reprogramming contrasts. The cluster labeled with * survives further masking as described
in the main text.
In principle, it is possible that participants might have opted to select the
same response provided in the previous trial, even before the presentation
of the ICNORMAL. In this scenario, the ICNORMAL might have included a
reprogramming component. To exclude this possibility, we performed a fur-
ther analysis and compared activity evoked by the presentation of ICNORMAL
specifying either the same or a different response than the movement exe-
cuted in the previous trial. There were no differences in activity between
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Figure 3.3: Imaging data—right frontal cortex. Anatomical location [SPM(t) of the contrasts detailed in Table
3.1, overlaid on spatially normalized anatomical sections of one participant] and parameter estimates [±90%
Confidence Interval boundary] of right frontal clusters activated during action reprogramming. The cluster in
cyan is the only cluster surviving a more constrained contrast (incl. masking by ICSWITCH ∩ TCNEUTRAL), see
main text for details. For a color version of this illustration, see p. 132.
these two event types, indicating that our results are not confounded by a
switch of task context on certain ICs.
Figure 3.4 illustrates how the three parietal clusters were located in both
the superior and inferior portion of this region (namely in the left anterior
and posterior intraparietal sulcus, and in the right posterior intra-parietal
sulcus). These regions responded whenever a movement needed to be se-
lected, i.e. ICNORMAL, ICSWITCH, and TCNEUTRAL.
We did not find any regions that showed more activation in response
to the informative instructional cues (ICNORMAL) than in response to the
switch cues (ICSWITCH)
Imaging results – reprogramming actions
Regions specifically activated in response to the switch cues, over and above
the effects associated with the instruction cues, are listed in Table 3.1
(contrast b), ICSWITCH > ICNORMAL). In the right hemisphere, there were
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Figure 3.4: Imaging data—parietal cortex. Anatomical location [SPM(t) of the contrasts detailed in Table
3.1, overlaid on spatially normalized anatomical sections of one participants] and parameter estimates (±90
Confidence Interval boundary) of right frontal clusters activated during action programming (red) and repro-
gramming (green). For a color version of this illustration, see p. 133.
clusters around the right insula (extending into the right inferior frontal
gyrus), in the right inferior frontal gyrus [assigned to BA44/45; Amunts et
al. (1999)], and in the right precentral gyrus (BA6 border - Fig. 3.3). On the
left side, a cluster was found along the left inferior frontal gyrus, extend-
ing into the left insula. Additionally, the left supramarginal gyrus and the
right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule were also activated
preferentially in response to the switch cues.
Given that, following the presentation of ICSWITCH, the participants
needed to select and potentially execute a response within a short period
of time, it could be argued that the activity of the regions identified by con-
trast b) was a mixture of switch-related effects and increased attention to
action associated with selecting a response under time pressure. To dis-
ambiguate this mixture of effects, we masked contrast b) with (ICSWITCH >
TCNEUTRAL). Following this additional constraint, only a right precentral
cluster (42 0 42) revealed a specific switch-related effect (Fig. 3.3).
3.4 Discussion
We isolated cerebral activity evoked by selecting a movement in the context
of an already present motor plan, while controlling for the effects of pro-
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cessing sensory instructions, executing motor responses, and the non-linear
interactions (e.g., response conflict) that could arise when these processes
occur in close temporal proximity.
We confirm the involvement of a distributed parieto-frontal system in
preparing motor responses (Toni et al., 2001a; Rushworth et al., 2003),
showing that portions of intraparietal and dorsal precentral cortex are fun-
damental for selecting responses on the basis of a sensory trigger according
to arbitrary visuomotor associations. Crucially, we also illustrate how the
contribution of these parieto-frontal circuits is embedded in a larger cere-
bral network when a new motor program needs to be selected in the context
of ongoing preparatory activity for potential responses.
Behavioral performance
Behavioral data indicate that our design was successful in inducing the par-
ticipants to prepare a motor response after receiving an instruction. Partic-
ipants responded faster and more accurately on NORMAL and SWITCH trials
than on trials where they could not prepare the response in advance of
the trigger cue (NEUTRAL trials). Since the participants could not predict
the temporal occurrence of the trigger cue that followed the presentation
of a switch cue, and given that participants’ responses during NORMAL and
SWITCH trials were indistinguishable, we infer that the switch cue induced
the participants to abort the ongoing preparatory process and to select a
new motor program.
Frontal cortex
We found that specific portions of the left dorsal precentral cortex and pre-
SMA were similarly activated following the presentation of visual cues speci-
fying the selection of a particular response. These regions revealed the same
activity when a movement program was established at the time of movement
execution (TCNEUTRAL), long before movement execution (ICNORMAL), or in
the context of an ongoing preparatory process (ICSWITCH). These findings
confirm and extend previous findings on the role of these precentral regions
in humans (Amiez et al., 2006; Mars et al., 2006; Toni et al., 2002a), namely
transforming a visual instruction cue into the associated movement, accord-
ing to a learned, arbitrary rule. Here, we further illustrate the crucial con-
tribution of these regions to the visuomotor transformation, their activation
being indifferent to the presence of an ongoing motor plan (ICSWITCH) or to
the need to respond under time pressure (TCNEUTRAL). Furthermore, the
presence of robust pre-SMA activity during each instance in which a motor
response had to be programmed indicates that this region is not exclusively
engaged during the inhibition of an ongoing response following a ‘stop’ cue
(Kelly et al., 2004; Nachev et al., 2005). Rather, pre-SMA is engaged at a
higher level of motor programming, dealing with the rules that convert sen-
sory material or intentions into the associated movements (Bunge, 2004;
Mars et al., 2006; Rushworth et al., 2004).
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Other frontal regions, mainly localized in the right hemisphere, were par-
ticularly responsive at the time the ICSWITCH was presented (Fig. 3.3), i.e.
during the abortion of the ongoing motor plan and the selection of a new
response. To distinguish between these two effects, we formally compared
the responses evoked during ICSWITCH and during TCNEUTRAL (where se-
lection but not inhibition was likely to occur). We found that a majority of
these right frontal clusters were also activated following the presentation
of TCNEUTRAL(Table 3.1, Fig. 3.3). This finding indicates that these right
frontal regions are not specifically involved in inhibition of the current mo-
tor plan (Garavan et al., 1999). Rather, these regions might intervene to
support an altered response selection process (Norman and Shallice, 1986).
This might be the case when a response must be selected in the context
of a current motor plan (following ICSWITCH) or when a response has to be
selected under fierce time pressure (following TCNEUTRAL).
However, in line with previous work, we also found specific inhibitory
responses in the right frontal lobe. There was stronger activity during
ICSWITCH than during TCNEUTRAL near (< 10 mm) a middle frontal region
previously associated with movement inhibition (Garavan et al., 1999). This
finding is consistent with the suggestion that this general region is involved
in response inhibition (Garavan et al., 1999). However, here we show that
this specific inhibitory effect is localized along the precentral gyrus (i.e.,
premotor cortex), and not in the middle frontal gyrus (i.e. prefrontal cortex).
This result fits with previous reports detailing a macroscopic spatial seg-
regation between neuronal clusters involved in mediating suppression and
facilitation of neuromuscular responses (Strafella and Paus, 2001; Thoenis-
sen et al., 2002). Furthermore, here we show that the inhibitory role of this
precentral region is not confined to the execution of a response, but extends
to its mental representation, i.e. to a motor program held on-line.
On the left side, we observed a large cluster of activation between the
insula and the inferior frontal gyrus. This region was activated in re-
sponse to both ICSWITCH and TCNEUTRAL. Since the stimulus-response
mappings used in the task were well-learned, and given the corresponding
lack of activity following the presentation of ICNORMAL, the effects observed
at ICSWITCH and TCNEUTRAL are unlikely to be related to the learning of
arbitrary stimulus-response associations (Passingham et al., 2000). Rather,
our findings appear consistent with the role of this region in selecting the
relevant stimulus-response association among a set of ongoing possibilities
(Rushworth et al., 2005).
Parietal cortex
Whenever a movement had to be selected, there was activity in the posterior
intra-parietal sulcus, irrespective of whether a motor program was already
in place or not. This finding is reminiscent of earlier studies showing acti-
vation of posterior parietal cortex during the selection and maintenance of
movement representations, independently from the likelihood of their execu-
tion (Andersen and Buneo, 2002; Thoenissen et al., 2002). Our results also
fit with previous fMRI studies showing increased activation of the left pari-
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etal cortex when motor sets are changed (Rushworth et al., 2001c) and TMS
studies of the left supramarginal gyrus showing interference with the redi-
rection of motor attention (Rushworth et al., 2001b). However, these earlier
studies did not directly address the question of whether the reprogramming
of a motor plan is associated with re-activation of the same posterior pari-
etal regions involved in the initial action selection, or if reprogramming of
a motor plan is also associated with activation of additional clusters. Our
results point to the latter scenario: In addition to the parietal regions in-
volved in motor programming, we have isolated an additional region along
the left supramarginal gyrus that is specifically recruited during motor re-
programming. More generally, our results confirm a left hemisphere dom-
inance for the selection and preparation of arbitrary visuo-motor associa-
tions (Rushworth et al., 2001a; Schluter et al., 2001), and a right hemi-
sphere dominance in reprogramming instructed responses (Garavan et al.,
1999). However, it should be emphasized that, although previous reports
have interpreted this parietal reprogramming activity in terms of motor in-
hibition (Aron et al., 2004; Garavan et al., 1999), our results indicate that
these regions are more involved in response selection processes than in the
inhibition of ongoing movements.
Conclusion
In this study, we examined how the presence of existing motor plans effects
cerebral activity related to the programming (i.e., selection and preparation)
of voluntary actions. We have argued that this experimental setting is more
likely to capture the interplay between sensory instructions and the intrin-
sic dynamic of the brain than a typical stimulus-response paradigm (Fitts
and Peterson, 1964). We show that portions of parieto-frontal circuits in-
volved in selecting and preparing a motor response on the basis of a visual
instruction cue are indifferent to the ongoing activity related to the pres-
ence of earlier motor plans. This finding points to the obligatory nature of
their involvement in the visuomotor process, at least in the context of the
arbitrary stimulus-response mappings used in this study. Furthermore, we
identified a number of regions that are additionally recruited when a motor
response has to be programmed in the context of an existing motor pro-
gram. Among these regions, we found that several right-hemisphere areas,
previously associated with inhibition of an ongoing motor plan, might be
better characterized as being involved in response selection. Finally, we de-
tail the specific role of a right precentral region in movement reprogramming
that may involve inhibition not only of actual responses, but also of motor
representations.
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4 Brain potentials and behavioral
adjustments elicited by feedback
in a time-estimation task
This chapter is a modified version of:
Mars RB, De Bruijn ERA, Hulstijn W, Miltner WHR, Coles MGH (2004) What
if I told you: “You were wrong”? Brain potentials and behavioral adjust-
ments elicited by feedback in a time-estimation task. In: Errors, conflicts,
and the brain. Current opinions on performance monitoring, Ullsperger M,
Falkenstein M, ed., pages 129–134. MPI of Cognitive Neuroscience.
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Abstract
Recent theories have associated the error-related negativity (ERN)
with the arrival of an error signal in the anterior cingulate cortex (Hol-
royd and Coles, 2002). This error signal is generated when negative
events occur, particularly when they are unexpected, and the anterior
cingulate uses the error signal to select among appropriate courses of
action. We evaluated these ideas by replicating and extending previous
studies of the ERN following performance feedback in which participants
receive feedback after making a time-production judgment. In three dif-
ferent conditions, participants received (1) correct or incorrect feedback,
(2) correct, incorrect-slow, or incorrect-fast feedback, and (3) the same as
condition (2), but with the graded incorrect feedback as a function of the
degree of error. Behavioral data indicated that participants adjusted their
time-estimation as a function of feedback: following incorrect feedback
in condition (2), they shortened or lengthened their judgments, and in
condition (3) the amount of adjustment was related to the suggested de-
gree of error. An ERN following negative feedback was present in all three
conditions, being largest in the first condition. However, no relationship
was found between ERN amplitude and behavioral adjustments. These
results are discussed in terms of current theories on error processing.
4.1 Introduction
In order to lead a safe and productive life, human beings have to adjust
their behavior to suit any particular situation. A principal requirement for
this is that an organism is able to evaluate the effects of its actions on
the environment and to use this information appropriately. In particular,
following an error, or following error feedback, adjustments have to be made
to assure that the likelihood of future errors is minimized. In the laboratory,
this phenomenon is evident in a slowing of reaction time after incorrect
responses in choice-response tasks (Rabbitt, 1966).
As described in Chapter 1, the study of errors has recently been facili-
tated by the discovery of a component of the event-related brain potential,
the error negativity (Ne) or error-related negativity (ERN), that accompanies
the detection of errors in choice reaction time tasks (Falkenstein et al., 1990;
Gehring et al., 1993). This component has a peak latency of approximately
80 ms following the erroneous response and appears to be generated in
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Dehaene et al., 1994; Holroyd et al.,
1998). A similar component, also originating in the ACC, can be observed
when participants receive feedback indicating that they have made an error
(Miltner et al., 1997). Consequently, this component is termed the feedback-
ERN.
In several early studies (Coles et al., 1995; Gehring et al., 1993), a re-
lationship was found between the amplitude of the ERN and various exam-
ples of behavioral adjustments. These ‘remedial actions’ were reflected in
the tendency to correct an error, to slow down following an error, and in the
force of the error itself. However, to date, no one has investigated the rela-
tionship between behavioral adjustments and the feedback-ERN. One aim
of the present study was to evaluate this relationship.
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The theoretical framework for this study was provided by the reinforce-
ment learning theory of the ERN (Holroyd, 2001; Holroyd and Coles, 2002),
which proposes that the ERN is associated with learning-relevant signals
that are carried by the mesencephalic dopamine system (MDS). This model
is based on the finding that the MDS carries reward signals indicating that
ongoing events are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than expected (Schultz, 2002). A moni-
toring system in the basal ganglia evaluates internal information about self-
generated behaviors and external information from the environment, and
predicts the expected value, or ‘reward’, of ongoing events. When the sys-
tem revises its predictions for the worse, either because of an internally
detected inappropriate motor action or upon receiving negative feedback, a
phasic decrease of mesencephalic dopamine activity disinhibits apical den-
drites of neurons in the ACC, resulting in an ERN [see Holroyd and Coles,
(2002) for a more detailed description]. Recent experimental evidence has
supported the notion of dopaminergic influence in processes underlying the
ERN (De Bruijn et al., 2004; Holroyd et al., 2004a). According to the re-
inforcement learning theory, the prediction error signals are carried by the
MDS to various brain areas, including the ACC, where they are used to ad-
just behavior to the task at hand: “The anterior cingulate cortex is trained
to recognize the appropriate [motor] controller, with reinforcement learning
signals conveyed to it via the mesencephalic dopamine system. We [. . . ] as-
sume that some of the motor controllers may themselves use those same
reinforcement learning signals to identify the appropriate response strategy
required of them” (Holroyd and Coles, 2002, p. 685).
In the present study, we further investigated the properties of the
feedback-ERN. First, we manipulated the information value of negative feed-
back in order to investigate how the system underlying generation of the
feedback-ERN reacts. Second, we were interested in the relationship be-
tween the feedback-ERN and remedial actions. Although the reinforcement
learning theory states that the system learns from errors to adjust future
behavior to suit the task at hand, it does not make any direct predictions as
to how this is reflected at the behavioral level. We addressed these questions
in the context of a time-estimation task that has been used previously by
Miltner and colleagues (Miltner et al., 1997; Lemke, 2003).
4.2 Materials and methods
Participants
Eight participants (6 female), ranging in age from 20 to 23 (M = 22.0) partici-
pated in the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. All participants were paid 6 euros per hour plus a bonus depending
on their performance. All participants provided written consent according
to the institutional guidelines of the local ethics committee (CMO region
Arnhem-Nijmegen, Netherlands).
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Task
Participants sat comfortably about 50 cm in front of a computer screen in
an electrically shielded room. On each trial of the task, participants saw a
white star (angle .8 ˚ ) appear in the center of the screen. Participants were
instructed to press a button with the index finger of their right hand when
they estimated the star had been on screen for one second. Immediately
following the button press, the star disappeared, and a blank screen was
presented for 500 ms. Following this, feedback was provided for 500 ms. In
the first condition (one block of 150 trials), participants received feedback
indicating ‘+6 cents’ on correct trials and ‘-6 cents’ on incorrect trials. In the
second condition (one block of 150 trials), participants received feedback in-
dicating ‘+6 cents’ and a white square underneath the text on correct trials,
and ‘-6 cents’ with an arrow underneath the text on incorrect trials. The
arrow was pointing to the right when participants were too fast in their es-
timation (indicating that they should ‘respond later in time’ in the future)
and to the left when participants were too slow in their estimation (indicat-
ing that they should ‘respond earlier in time’). In the third condition (three
blocks of 150 trials each), feedback was the same as in the second condi-
tion, except that the ‘punishment’ on incorrect trials was minus 2, minus 6,
or minus 10 cents. Participants were instructed that the larger the punish-
ment, the farther off their estimation was. In reality, each punishment level
was presented one third of the negative feedback trials. Participants were
told they started with fifty cents bonus money and the money won or lost
each trial would be added to or subtracted from their bonus money. The
blocks of different conditions were presented in the order 3-1-3-2-3 or 3-2-
3-1-3 (counterbalanced across participants). To keep the amount of errors
equal in all conditions, we used a sliding criterion to determine if a response
was correct or incorrect (Miltner et al., 1997; Lemke, 2003). All participants
started with a criterion +/- 200 ms. Following correct trials the criterion
was decreased 10 ms, following incorrect trials the criterion was increased
10 ms.
Data acquisition and analysis
Brain electrical activity was recorded from 61 Ag/AgCl electrodes, arranged
equally over the scalp, referenced to linked earlobe references. Vertical and
horizontal electro-oculograms were recorded from sites above and below the
left eye and 1 cm external to the outer cantus of each eye. The electrode
common was placed on the sternum. All electrode impedances were kept
below 5 kΩ. EEG data were amplified using BrainAmp amplifiers and digi-
tized at 250 Hz. Data were filtered off-line with a .03-15 Hz bandpass filter.
For each feedback type in each condition, a 700 ms epoch of data (100 ms
baseline) was extracted for analysis. Ocular artifact was corrected using the
procedure by Gratton et al. (1983) and waveforms of each electrode were
checked for amplifier artifacts. Trials containing amplifier artifacts were
discarded. Feedback-locked average waveforms were computed for correct
and incorrect trials for each condition and for each punishment level in the
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Figure 4.1: Behavioral adjustments (lines) and absolute feedback-ERN amplitudes (bars) across (A) different
conditions and (B) different punishment levels.
third condition. The feedback-ERN was defined as the most negative peak,
between 200 and 400 ms after feedback onset, in the difference wave of
incorrect minus correct trials.
4.3 Results
In this section we will first present evidence from behavioral measures, indi-
cating that the experimental manipulations were effective. We then consider
the effects of these manipulations on the ERN and the relationship between
the ERN and behavioral adjustment.
Behavioral findings
A comparison of the error rates in the three different conditions showed
that the sliding time window was effective. Participants did not differ sig-
nificantly in error rate in the different conditions (F (2,14) = 1.576, n.s.)1.
However, participants were more accurate in their estimation in the second
and third conditions (F (2,14) = 6.068, p = .034), indicating that they made
use of the feedback. To study the use participants made of the feedback,
we looked at the absolute adjustment in time estimation participants made
after incorrect feedback. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, participants made
larger adjustments in the informative conditions (F (2,14) = 11.563, p = .001).
Planned comparisons revealed that conditions two and three differed from
the first conditions (F (1,7) = 13.923, p = .007 and F (1,7) = 12.503, p = .010),
but not from each other (F (1,7) = 2.376, n.s.). Analysis of the data from
condition three (see Figure 4.1B) indicated that participants made larger ad-
justments when they received more punishment indicating they had made
a larger error (F (2,14) = 6.216, p = .012). Follow-up analysis showed that
a linear trend of increasing behavioral adjustment with increasing levels of
punishment was significant (F (1,7) = 8.217, p = .024). These results indicate
that the participants made use of the information provided by the feedback
in adjusting their behavior from one trial to the next.
1The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when appropriate to correct for possible
violations of the analysis of variance assumption of sphericity. The text lists corrected p values.
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Figure 4.2: ERP results obtained in the first condition. Left panel: Feedback-locked averages for incorrect
(solid line) and correct (dashed line) trials and the incorrect minus correct difference wave (dotted line). Right
panel: Scalp topography at peak of the ERPs on incorrect trials.
ERP findings
Figure 4.2 shows feedback-locked average waveforms for correct and incor-
rect trials in the first condition and the scalp distribution of the peak of the
negative ERP on incorrect trials. In all three conditions, a negative deviation
is present for incorrect as compared to correct trials. This deviation reaches
its maximum at electrode Cz, approximately 325 ms after feedback onset.
As shown in Figure 4.1A, the amplitude of the waveforms, as measured by
the peak of the difference wave, differed among the conditions (F (2,14) =
6.758, p = .009), being larger in the first condition as compared to the other
two, more informative, conditions (F (1,7) = 8.958, p = .020 and F (1,7) =
7.501, p = .029)2. Analysis of the ERN amplitude in condition three (Figure
4.1B) revealed no significant difference among the three punishment levels
(F (2,14) = .197, n.s.).
Relationship between ERN and behavioral adjustments
The relationship between ERN and behavioral adjustments was assessed di-
rectly in the following way. First, for each participant, all negative feedback
trials in condition one were ordered as a function of the absolute adjust-
ment in time-estimation on the following trial. Then four ‘bins’ were created
representing four levels of adjustment. Third, the average ERP waveforms
for each of the four bins were computed and the ERN amplitude for each
2It could be argued that the effects obtained are an artifact of the measure used, which is
to measure feedback-ERN amplitude using difference waves [cf. (Lemke, 2003; Miltner et al.,
1997)]. To show that this is not the case, we also analyzed our data using a “base-to-peak”
measure on the negative feedback waveform. The effects were in the same direction (largest
ERN in the first condition, smallest ERN in the third condition), although the effect did not
reach significance (F (2,14) = 1.691, n.s.).
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bin was derived. Analysis of the relationship between bin and ERN ampli-
tude failed to show any effect. There was no difference among the four bins
in ERN amplitude (F (3,21) = 1.498, n.s.). Another analysis examined the
relationship between ERN amplitude and the quality of the participant’s es-
timate on the trial following error feedback. Quality of estimate was defined
as the absolute difference between the actual estimate and 1000 ms. As
in the prior analysis, four bins were created representing different levels of
estimate quality. Again, no significant differences in ERN amplitude among
the bins were found (F (3,21) = 1.040, n.s.).
4.4 Discussion
The analyses of the behavioral data reveal that participants used the infor-
mation provided by the error feedback to adjust their behavior. Compar-
isons across the three experimental conditions indicate that more precise
adjustments were evident following more versus less informative feedback.
In addition, larger behavioral adjustments were seen when participants re-
ceived feedback that implied a large error than when they received feedback
suggesting a small error. These results all support the inference that our
manipulations were successful in influencing the processing of the error-
feedback information: Participants utilized the information to the extent
that it could be used to guide their future behavior.
Analyses of the electrophysiological data confirmed that the component
we identified as a feedback-ERN was in fact a feedback-ERN. The latency,
shape of the waveforms, and scalp distribution are similar to those found
in previous studies of the feedback-ERN using this paradigm (Lemke, 2003;
Miltner et al., 1997). Our results indicate that feedback-ERN amplitude was
smaller in the informative conditions (conditions two and three), and was
not influenced by the degree of error, as indicated by the feedback in con-
dition three. This suggests a dissociation between the processes underlying
generation of the feedback-ERN and the processes responsible for behavioral
adjustments. In contrast to the amplitude of the feedback-ERN, the magni-
tude of behavioral adjustment was larger in the informative conditions and
was influenced by the degree of error indicated by the feedback. Further
evidence for a dissociation is provided by the analysis of the data in the first
condition. Here the ERNs associated with different degrees of adjustment
did not differ from each other. However, these results should not be taken
to indicate that the feedback-ERN has no role in behavioral adjustments,
since feedback-ERN amplitude has repeatedly been shown to correlate with
learning (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). Rather, these
results indicate that feedback-ERN does not correlate with direct behavioral
adjustments as indexed by changes in RT.
These results are now considered in the context of the reinforcement
learning theory of the ERN (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). As discussed ear-
lier, the reinforcement learning theory of the ERN proposes that the mesen-
cephalic dopamine system (MDS) carries reward prediction errors to the ACC
and other brain areas involved in selecting appropriate motor responses.
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This prediction error could be of (at least) two types. First, it could convey
information about both an error in reward prediction and the kind of error
that has been made, and could be used to guide a specific remedial action.
In this case, one would expect a relationship between the ERN and remedial
actions such as the behavioral adjustments measured in the present study.
Second, the error signal carried by the MDS could act more as a scalar sig-
nal, indicating purely that the goal of an action has not been satisfied. In
this case, the additional information provided in the second and third con-
ditions of the current experiment, would be used by systems other than the
system that produced the ERN itself.
In his review of reward and the dopamine system, Schultz (2002) sug-
gests that the reward prediction error signals carried by the dopamine re-
ward system indicate the appetitive value of events relative to prediction,
but do not discriminate between different types of reward. This may explain
why we did not find any effects of the different levels of negative feedback
on the ERN. In terms of reward prediction, participants presumably always
make their best estimate and thus expect a positive reward of +6 cents. In all
cases where negative feedback is given, the expected reward is not obtained.
It is this observation that is reflected in the presence of the feedback-ERN
in the current data set. The magnitude of the difference between the ex-
pected and actual rewards, and the appropriate behavioral adjustments it
indicates, might be of relevance to different brain systems, which are con-
cerned with the remedial actions. According to this perspective, the reward
prediction error signals are said to convey a scalar signal, signaling either
‘good’ or ‘bad’, rather than a ‘vector’ signal signaling how behavior must be
adjusted. A similar conclusion was reached by Hajcak et al. (2006). See
also Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a) for a further discussion of this point in the
context of reinforcement learning.
In contrast to these results on the feedback-ERN, a strong modulation
by error significance on the amplitude of the response-ERN has been re-
ported repeatedly. In an early study of the response-ERN, participants were
instructed to give priority either to response speed or to accuracy (Gehring
et al., 1993). Response-ERN amplitude was larger when correct responding
was emphasized. A similar result was obtained by Hajcak et al. (2005), who
instructed participants what amount of monetary reward could be obtained
by correct responding on each particular trial. Furthermore, it has been
shown that response-ERN amplitude correlates with the size of behavioral
adjustments on the next trial (Gehring et al., 1993), which is not the case
for the feedback-ERN as reported in this study. These results demonstrate
some potential differences in the behavior of the two ERPs, suggesting that
they might not both be generated by a completely overlapping system (see
also Chapter 7 for a further discussion of the relationship between error-
related activity elicited by response and feedback).
The observation that the ERN is smaller when more information is pro-
vided by the feedback replicates the observation made by Lemke (2003). In
the more informative conditions, it is reasonable to assume that an alerting
signal following error feedback is less important because decisions about
remedial actions can be based on the information provided by the feedback.
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The computational process required to select an appropriate remedial action
is also less complex than that required when the feedback merely indicates
that an error has been made [cf. Lemke (2003)]. Similar results have re-
cently been obtained using fMRI (Zanoli et al., 2006).
Conclusion
In summary, we conclude that the systems underlying generation of the
feedback-ERN are influenced by the amount of information presented by
feedback stimuli [cf. Lemke (2003)], but not by the suggested degree of er-
ror. We did not find a direct relationship between feedback-ERN amplitude
and the degree of remedial action as indicated by behavioral adjustments,
indicating that these measures may result from different, although related,
neural processes. We have suggested that the ERN constitutes a scalar
signal, related to the occurrence of an error, but does not give any more
information concerning the type of error or any behavioral adjustments that
should be made. This suggestion is compatible with current theories of
reinforcement learning. However, the results pose some important discrep-
ancies between the behaviors of the response- and feedback-ERN, which will
need to be addressed in further studies.
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5 Neural dynamics of error
processing in medial frontal
cortex
This chapter is a modified version of:
Mars RB, Coles MGH, Grol MJ, Holroyd CB, Nieuwenhuis S, Hulstijn W,
Toni I (2005). Neural dynamics of error processing in medial frontal cortex.
NeuroImage 28:1007–1013.
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Abstract
Adaptive behavior requires an organism to evaluate the outcome of
its actions, such that future behavior can be adjusted accordingly and
the appropriate response selected. During associative learning, the time
at which such evaluative information is available changes as learning
progresses, from the delivery of performance feedback early in learning
to the execution of the response itself during learned performance. Here,
we report a learning-dependent shift in the timing of activation in the
rostral cingulate zone of the anterior cingulate cortex from external error
feedback to internal error detection. This pattern of activity is seen only
in the anterior cingulate, not in the pre-supplementary motor area. The
dynamics of these reciprocal changes are consistent with the claim that
the rostral cingulate zone is involved in response selection on the basis of
the expected outcome of an action. Specifically, these data illustrate how
the anterior cingulate receives evaluative information, indicating that an
action has not produced the desired result.
5.1 Introduction
Existing data on the neural substrates of action selection indicate that the
medial frontal cortex plays a crucial role in selecting actions on the basis
of their outcomes (Matsumoto and Tanaka, 2004) and subsequent mon-
itoring of response outcomes (Holroyd et al., 2004b; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004). Rather than attributing a single role to this vast cortical expanse,
recent studies have started to associate different functions to the different
anatomical structures that lay within the medial frontal cortex (Picard and
Strick, 2001; Rushworth et al., 2004). In this context, an anterior portion
of the cingulate cortex, the rostral cingulate zone anterior (RCZa), has been
specifically associated with processing of error information and selecting ap-
propriate behavioral adjustments (Fiehler et al., 2004; Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Rushworth et al., 2004).
These inferences on the neural bases of error processing have been ob-
tained in the context of a “static” experimental environment, in which the
organism knows the behavior that is appropriate for the current situation.
Thus, a given response can be evaluated immediately against an internal
representation of the correct stimulus-response relationship. Should the
response be incorrect, error information is available from an internal error-
detection process at the time of the response (Gehring et al., 1993; Hol-
royd et al., 2005). However, in a novel environment, with as yet unknown
stimulus-response associations, error information is not available until the
delivery of external performance feedback. This implies that, during the
learning of stimulus-response associations by trial and error, the time at
which error information is available will change. Prior to learning, error
information will not be available until external performance feedback is de-
livered, but after learning, error information will be available earlier from
internal sources at the time of the response itself. Thus, a neural structure
that adjusts behavior as a function of the evaluation of response outcomes
should dynamically shift its responsivity as a function of learning, from
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Figure 5.1: Experimental setup. Participants had to learn, by trial and error, arbitrary associations between
visual stimuli and motor responses. After a variable delay, visual feedback (red/green square) was provided,
indicating correct and incorrect responses. On 50% of the trials, feedback consisted of a noninformative
gray square. When responses occurred after the reaction time deadline (750 ms), immediate feedback (blue
square) was provided. For a color version of this illustration, see p. 133.
external sources provided by error feedback to internal sources associated
with the error response itself. We predicted that, following error feedback,
activity in the anterior cingulate cortex would decrease as learning proceeds;
conversely, following an erroneous response, activity in the anterior cingu-
late would increase as learning proceeds. These predictions can be derived
from a neuro-computational model (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) that formally
describes the relationship between neural systems involved in outcome eval-
uation with those involved in action selection.
To test these predictions, we asked human participants to learn arbitrary
visuomotor mappings (Wise et al., 1996; Toni et al., 2001a), using perfor-
mance feedback, while measuring their cerebral activity using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants were presented with line
drawings, each of which was associated with pressing one of four response
buttons (Fig. 5.1).We manipulated the degree of learning achieved during the
scanning session by varying the number of times a given visuomotor map-
ping was presented. For one condition (High Learning, HL), four distinct
visuomotor mappings were presented 36 times each over the course of the
scanning session, enabling the subject to fully learn the visuomotor associa-
tions. For a control condition (Low Learning, LL), 24 different mappings were
presented 6 times each. A reaction time (RT) deadline ensured that partici-
pants made errors, even during learned performance. Crucially, by varying
the delay between response and feedback, and by introducing neutral feed-
back on some of the trials, we were able to dissociate the hemodynamic
responses elicited by response and feedback (see Experimental timing).
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5.2 Materials and methods
Participants
We studied eight right-handed male volunteers (mean age = 30.4 years, SD
= 13.4) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision after obtaining informed
consent according to institutional guidelines of the local ethics committee
(CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, Netherlands). They were paid 10 per hour
for their participation. Imaging data from 5 additional participants were
discarded, since these participants either failed to learn the appropriate
stimulus-response mappings adequately (2 participants, less than 50% cor-
rect on post-scanning forced-choice recall task) or performed without any
errors during the last part of the scanning session, indicating that the RT
deadline was not tight enough for these participants (3 participants).
Experimental setup
Participants lay supine in the scanner. Head movements were minimized
by an adjustable padded head holder. Visual stimuli (visual angle of ap-
proximately 6 ˚ ) were projected onto a mirror above the participants’ heads.
Motor responses were recorded via an MR-compatible keypad (MRI Devices,
Waukesha, WI), positioned on the right side of the subject’s abdomen. Stim-
ulus presentation and response collection were controlled by a PC running
Presentation 0.51 (Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA).
Behavioral procedure
Participants were asked to try to learn arbitrary associations between visual
stimuli (black and white drawings of cars, airplanes, boats, etc.) and mo-
tor responses (pressing of one of four buttons with the fingers of the right
hand) by trial-and-error using performance feedback (Fig. 5.1). We manip-
ulated the degree of learning achieved during the experimental session by
varying the number of times a visuomotor mapping was presented. For one
condition (High Learning, HL), four distinct visuomotor mappings were pre-
sented 36 times each over the course of the scanning session, while for a
control condition (Low Learning, LL) 24 different mappings were presented
6 times each. Trials enabling learning (HL) were pseudo-randomly inter-
mixed and matched in number with trials in which learning was less likely
to occur (LL). Participants received either performance feedback (green or
red square) or neutral feedback (gray square, see Experimental Timing be-
low) after each response, with a variable delay between these two events.
To encourage error commission even during learned performance, a strin-
gent reaction time deadline of 750 ms was enforced. When participants
responded after this deadline, immediate feedback (blue square) was pro-
vided and the trial ended. Participants were instructed to try to avoid this at
all costs. Participants practiced the task in the scanner for 50 trials using a
different stimulus set before the experimental session.
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Following the scanning session, participants performed a forced choice
recall test, in which all stimuli of the HL condition and a subset (50%) of
the stimuli of the LL condition were presented 7 times each, randomly in-
termixed. Participants were required to press the button corresponding to
each stimulus, as during the scanning session. However, during the re-
call test, there was no reaction time deadline and no feedback was given,
to allow for a reliable assessment of the learning of the stimulus-response
mappings.
Imaging procedures
Images were acquired using a 1.5T Sonata scanner (Siemens, Erlangen,
Germany). BOLD sensitive functional images were acquired using a sin-
gle shot gradient EPI sequence (TR/TE 2.2s/40 ms, 28 transversal slices,
interleaved acquisition, voxel size 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm). Following the ex-
perimental session, structural images were acquired using a MP-RAGE se-
quence (TR/TE/TI 2250 ms/3.93 ms/850 ms, voxel size 1 × 1 × 1 mm).
Experimental timing
Our design was aimed at dissociating response- and feedback-related neu-
rovascular activities despite their temporal proximity. We achieved this by
using an event-related fMRI design that has proved effective in dissociating
between transient responses time-locked to sensory and motor events (Toni
et al., 1999; Thoenissen et al., 2002).
We introduced a variable delay between response and feedback (3.9-5.2
seconds, uniform distribution) and between the trials (1.3-13.5 seconds).
Also, we introduced neutral feedback on approximately half of the trials, to
decorrelate the stimulus/response and feedback regressors. Furthermore,
before actual scanning we ran simulations in order to optimize the range
and order of delay lengths, inter-trial intervals, and neutral feedback stimuli
and to minimize correlations between the regressors describing the expected
BOLD signal to response and feedback events (Friston et al., 1999b).
Following the scanning session, we verified the ability of our design to
dissociate response and feedback-related activity by examining the evoked
hemodynamic responses in V1 and M1. As expected, we found reliable
BOLD responses to both the stimulus/response epoch and the feedback
epoch in V1, but only response-related activation in M1 (data not shown).
Data analysis
Imaging data were analyzed using SPM2 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The
first five volumes of each participant’s data set were discarded to allow for T1
equilibration. Prior to analysis, data were spatially realigned and corrected
for differences in slice acquisition time using the middle slice in time as ref-
erence. Each participant’s structural image was coregistered to the first of
the functional images. Images were then normalized onto the ICBM tem-
plate (http://www.loni.ucla.edu/ICBM/) using linear transformations only.
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Finally, data were spatially smoothed using an isotropic 6 mm FWHM Gaus-
sian kernel.
Using standard multiple regression procedures (Friston et al., 1995b), we
partitioned the sources of experimental variance in the fMRI timeseries into
main effects of Condition (High Learning or Low Learning), Epoch (activity
time-locked either to the response or to feedback presentation) and Outcome
(correct or incorrect for response-related data; correct, incorrect, or neutral
for feedback-related data). Model regressors were convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function (Friston et al., 1998). Learning-dependent
modulations of activity were modelled as first and second order parametric
effects of time on the model regressors. Confounding factors such as tri-
als with late responses, corrective responses, head-related movements, and
trial-by-trial variations in RT were also accounted for and included in the
model.
In this paper we focus our analysis on the rostral cingulate zone anterior
(RCZa), a portion of the anterior cingulate cortex which has previously been
associated with response errors (Ullsperger and Von Cramon, 2001), nega-
tive feedback (Ullsperger and Von Cramon, 2003), and reductions in reward
leading to behavioral adjustments (Bush et al., 2002). This area is suggested
to correspond to the monkey rostral cingulate motor area (Picard and Strick,
1996) and is situated in what Bush et al. described as the ‘cognitive’ division
of the anterior cingulate cortex (Bush et al., 2000). We also consider a neigh-
boring portion of the superior frontal gyrus, namely the pre-supplementary
motor area (pre-SMA), given its reported role in performance monitoring and
action selection (Shima et al., 1996; Rushworth et al., 2004; Ullsperger and
Von Cramon, 2001; Fiehler et al., 2004). For each hemisphere, we created
two objectively defined spherical volumes of interest (VOIs, Fig. 5.2), cen-
tered in the ‘arm’ regions reported by Picard and Strick (1996), and with a
radius of 8 mm. The VOIs covering the RCZa were centered at ±8, 30, 32;
the VOIs covering the pre-SMA were centered at ±8, 10, 55, according to the
stereotactic coordinates of Talairach and Tournoux (1988) used in the maps
of Picard and Strick (1996). These coordinates were converted into the MNI
coordinates used by SPM2 using tal2mni (Matthew Brett, http://www.mrc-
cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/Common/downloads/MNI2tal/mni2tal.m).
The statistical significance of the estimated evoked hemodynamic re-
sponses was assessed using t-statistics in the context of a multiple regres-
sion analysis (Poline et al., 2004). Contrasts of the parameter estimates
for the Condition × Time interactions during the incorrect trials were cal-
culated, and entered into a paired t-test, treating subjects as a random
variable (Holmes and Friston, 1998). The statistical threshold was set at a
value of p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons according to the False
Discovery Rate (Genovese et al., 2002) over each of the specified VOIs. To
correct for false positives due to the use of multiple VOIs, we applied a fur-
ther Bonferroni correction to the resulting p-values.
In this study we were interested in assessing differential modulation of
time-related signal changes time-locked to feedback or response events dur-
ing performance of incorrect trials in the HL condition. Accordingly, linear
time-dependent increases in activity during the response Epoch on incor-
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Figure 5.2: Anatomical locations of regions of interest used in the random effects analysis, displayed on the
SPM2 canonical single subject T1 image. A spherical region of interest was placed in each hemisphere in each
of the anatomically defined structures.
rect trials were compared with the corresponding effect during the feed-
back Epoch (incorrect trials only). Furthermore, to isolate genuine learning-
related changes rather than mere time-related effects, we required the Con-
dition × Time interaction to be stronger in the HL than in the LL condition.
This constrain was imposed by selecting voxels in which the Condition ×
Time interaction for the response epoch was stronger in the HL than in the
LL condition (inclusive mask thresholded at p < .05 uncorrected).
Within the regions identified by our analysis, we calculated the effect
sizes for the main and time-related effects, using the ratio of the relevant
parameter estimate onto its standard error (Maxwell and Delany, 1990).
This allowed us to assess the specificity of the region’s activity to errors as
compared to correct trials and the presence of main effects of response and
feedback.
For analysis of the behavioral data acquired during the scanning session,
RT and error rates were each considered as dependent variables in a two-
way analysis of variance, with factors Condition (2 levels, HL and LL) and
Time (8 levels). After removal of missed trials, the RT time series of each
participant was divided into eight equal blocks, providing eight levels for the
Time factor.
5.3 Results
Behavioral data
Behavioral data indicated that our design was successful in manipulat-
ing the degree of learning achieved by the participants during the scan-
ning session. Participants learned the stimulus-response mappings at a
faster rate in the High Learning condition than in the Low Learning condi-
tion (Condition × Time interaction on Error Rate: F (7,49)= 3.2, p = .035,
Fig. 5.3). Although participants never reached error-free performance dur-
ing the scanning session in either condition (because of the RT deadline),
a post-scanning forced choice recall test indicated that more associations
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Figure 5.3: Behavioral results. Error rates (left) and RTs (right) on correct trials for the High Learning (dark gray)
and Low Learning (light gray) conditions obtained during the scanning session. Curves are fitted first and
second order polynomials; error bars indicate±SEM. It can be seen that subjects learned the stimulus response
mappings at a faster rate in the High Learning condition than in the Low Learning condition (left panel). RT
did not differ between the two conditions, approaching the RT cut-off (dashed horizontal line) at a similar rate
(right panel).
were learned in the High Learning condition (HL: 91%, LL: 43%; t(7) = 12.1,
p < .001).
RTs on correct trials (Fig. 5.3) did not differ between the two conditions
(main effect of Condition: F (1,7) = .446, n.s.). Over the course of the scan-
ning session, RT increased to approach the RT cut-off (main effect of Time:
F (7,49) = 5.493, p= .008), but at a similar rate across conditions (Condition
× Time interaction: F (7,49) = 1.514, n.s.). The number of missed responses
did not differ across conditions (HL: 19.7 % [SD = 15.2]; LL: 18.4 % [SD =
12.3]; t(7) = .908, n.s.).
Imaging data
We isolated BOLD signals satisfying our criteria by testing, in each of the
ROIs, for time-dependent response-related increases and feedback-related
decreases in activity during error trials. In addition, to distinguish genuine
learning-related changes from mere time-related effects, we required this
interaction to be stronger in the High Learning condition than in the Low
Learning condition.
Our VOI analyses identified a region within the rostral cingulate zone
anterior (RCZa, Table 5.1) which showed learning-related changes in acti-
vation elicited by incorrect responses and negative performance feedback.
As illustrated in Fig. 5.4, this region showed greater feedback-related er-
ror activation during initial learning. During learning, this feedback-related
activation decreased, while the response-related error signal showed a re-
ciprocal increase (Fig. 5.4C).
To further characterize the activity evoked in this region, we calculated
effect sizes for each main and time-related effect, normalizing the relevant
parameter estimate of the multiple regression onto its standard error (see
Materials and Methods). The reciprocity of the dynamic modulation of activ-
ity in this cluster is indicated by the presence of significant learning-related
effects, but no overall effects of response or feedback. The RCZa showed
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Anatomical region MNI coordinates Z value
x y z
Pre-SMA -8 -12 64 2.801
2 4 60 2.641
14 10 60 3.371
RCZa 14 28 32 3.72
Table 5.1: Anatomical specification, MNI coordinates (p < 0.5 corrected for multiple comparisons), and Z-
values of clusters yielded by the contrast testing for decreasing time-related changes in BOLD signal at the
moment of negative performance feedback, and increasing time-related changes in BOLD signal at the mo-
ment of the erroneous response. Z-values marked with 1 did not survive Bonferroni correction for testing of
multiple VOIs.
Figure 5.4: Imaging results. Anatomical localization, peak BOLD signal development during learning for both
incorrect and correct trials (High Learning condition), and effect sizes for time-related modulation in BOLD
response for the RCZa (top row, peak coordinates: 14, 28, 32). (A) SPM(Z) (threshold p < 0.05 corrected)
superimposed on normalized anatomical sagittal sections of one participant. (B) Effect sizes (in SEM units) for
the time-related changes in BOLD response in both the High Learning (HL) and Low Learning (LL) conditions,
indicating stronger modulations of activity in the High Learning condition. (C,D) Peak BOLD signal (in arbitrary
units, SEM) over the course of learning, following response (blue) and feedback (red) for incorrect (C) and
correct trials (D). For display purposes, the fMRI time series of each subject were subdivided into eight blocks of
equal length. The actual statistical model of the fMRI data considered time as a continuous parametric effect
(see Materials and methods). It can be seen that error feedback-related activation decreases as learning
proceeds, while error response-related activation increases, and these effects are reciprocal. For a color
version of this illustration, see p. 134.
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Figure 5.5: Imaging results. Anatomical localization and peak BOLD signal development during learning for
both incorrect and correct trials (HL condition) for the pre-SMA (peak coordinates: 2, 4, 60). It can be seen that
pre-SMA shows a response-related activation over and above the learning-related modulations of activation,
both on correct and incorrect trials. Color conventions as in Fig. 5.4. For a color version of this illustration, see
p. 134.
no significant activity on correct trials (Fig. 5.4D), indicating that activity
in this region was specifically related to error processing. Furthermore, the
time-related changes in activation on incorrect trials were stronger in the
High Learning (feedback: -3.17; response: 2.60, Fig. 5.4) as compared to
the Low Learning (feedback: -2.70; response: 0.15) condition, providing ev-
idence that these changes are not simply due to time-related effects (e.g.,
fatigue, habituation, sensitization), but are genuinely learning-related.
There were further clusters of activity in the pre-SMA VOI, although they
did not survive the additional Bonferroni correction for multiple VOIs (Ta-
ble 5.1). This region showed a clear modulation of activity as a function of
learning, as illustrated in Fig. 5.5, for both response (effect size: 4.20) and
feedback (effect size: -3.76), and these modulations were not as strong in
the LL condition (feedback: -0.04; response: 1.93). Crucially, this region
did not show the same reciprocity of effects seen in the anterior cingulate
clusters, as indicated by a significant main effect of response (effect size:
6.74). Furthermore, the pre-SMA revealed response-related activity during
correct trials (effect size: 4.55), an indication that this region is not exclu-
sively driven by error signals.
5.4 Discussion
The present data indicate that, over the course of learning a set of ar-
bitrary visuomotor mappings, a region along the cingulate sulcus (RCZa)
shifts its responsiveness to different sources of error information as a func-
tion of learning. Error feedback-related activation decreases as learning
proceeds, while error response-related activation increases, and these ef-
fects are reciprocal (Fig. 5.4). These results show not only that the anterior
cingulate cortex responds to both internal (Carter et al., 1998; Ullsperger
and Von Cramon, 2001; Garavan et al., 2002) and external (Ullsperger and
Von Cramon, 2003; Holroyd et al., 2004c) sources of error information, but
also that this cingulate region responds to the earliest source of error infor-
mation available.
Furthermore, the present data argue against a unique cognitive contri-
bution of the vast expanse of cerebral cortex labeled ‘medial frontal cortex’,
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confirming and detailing the functional heterogeneity of different anatom-
ical portions of this region (Rushworth et al., 2004; Nachev et al., 2005).
While the RCZa is activated in response to the first signal that an error has
occurred, independent of the source of this information, pre-SMA shows
response-related effects over and above learning-dependent modulations of
activity on both correct and incorrect trials. These findings are consistent
with the results of Akkal et al. (2002), showing that CMAr neurons are more
likely to be modulated by performance feedback than pre-SMA neurons.
This suggests that pre-SMA might be closer to motor aspects of the learning
process rather than subserving an explicit evaluative function.
It could be argued that the the differential time-related effects seen in the
RCZa for the High Learning and Low Learning conditions reflect the putative
role of the anterior cingulate region in controlling arousal (Critchley et al.,
2003). However, our behavioral data and post-scanning forced choice recall
test indicate that participants learned the stimulus-response mappings in
both learning conditions, although to a different extent (Fig. 5.4). This re-
sult implies that participants were evaluating stimuli and feedback during
both Low and High Learning trials, although the rapid turn-over of stimuli-
response mappings in the former condition prevented them from learning
as effectively as during the latter condition. Moreover, the two experimental
conditions evoked overlapping reaction times profiles (Fig. 5.3). These be-
havioral results are not immediately compatible with different arousal levels
evoked by the High and Low Learning conditions.
Recently, Walton and colleagues (2004) have shown that the RCZa can
be active not only on incorrect trials, but also on correct trials, provided that
these trials convey behaviorally relevant information. In the current learn-
ing task, it is possible that the first correct trial associated with a specific
mapping might have evoked ACC activity. Unfortunately, the current study
was not designed to address this particular issue and we lack an adequate
number of “first correct” trials to be able to provide a reliable estimate of
ACC activity under these circumstances. This issue remains open for fur-
ther investigation.
In this study, we have focused our search on RCZa on the basis of the role
played by CMAr [its putative macaque-homologue (Picard and Strick, 1996)]
in reward-based action selection and evaluation (Shima and Tanji, 1998).
Although recent meta-analyses (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger and
Von Cramon, 2004) have reported that error processing within the anterior
cingulate may encompass both RCZa and RCZp, the arm-subfields of these
two areas are structurally and hodologically different (Picard and Strick,
1996), which suggests they have different functional properties. Indeed, an
an explorative whole-brain fixed-effects analysis revealed a caudal anterior
cingulate region with response-related activation, but no strong effects of
feedback. Given the strong hypothesis-driven nature of this report, however,
we prefer to limit the inferences of this study to those regions for which we
had explicit hypotheses.
Overall, these results are consistent with a series of recent studies show-
ing that portions of the general region labeled ‘cingulate cortex’ are involved
in action selection based on the expected outcome of an action (Bush et al.,
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2002; Hadland et al., 2003; Shima and Tanji, 1998), integrating informa-
tion regarding a motor response and its potential outcome (Williams et al.,
2004). Our results illustrate how a specific portion of the medial frontal
cortex, the RCZa, might receive evaluative information, which can be used
to adapt behavior accordingly (Holroyd et al., 2004b; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004). Conceptually, our results are also consistent with the notion that
ACC activation during error trials is the result of an error in reward predic-
tion, indicating that ongoing events are unexpectedly disadvantageous and
that this information is subsequently used to guide action selection (Holroyd
and Coles, 2002).
In conclusion, in this study we have illustrated the dynamic character-
istics of the interplay between external and internal sources of error infor-
mation, emphasizing the contribution of a specific portion of medial frontal
cortex (RCZa) to the selection of appropriate behaviors.
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6 Modulation of activity in the
premotor cortices during error
observation
This chapter is a modified version of:
Van Schie HT, Mars RB, Coles MGH, Bekkering H (2004). Modulation of ac-
tivity in medial frontal and motor cortices during action observation. Nature
Neuroscience 7:549–554 (the first two authors contributed equally to this
work).
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Abstract
Measures of the human event-related brain potential were used to
investigate the neural mechanisms underlying error processing during
action observation. Participants took part in two conditions, a task exe-
cution condition and a task observation condition. We found that activity
in both the medial frontal cortex and in the motor cortices, as measured
via the error-related negativity and the lateralized readiness potential re-
spectively, was modulated by the correctness of observed behavior. These
data suggest that similar neural mechanisms are involved in monitoring
one’s own actions and the actions of others.
6.1 Introduction
Movements are the only means we have of communicating with the out-
side world. Accordingly, a large body of work has been established in re-
cent years, investigating the role of the motor system1 in functions such as
communication, action observation, and, more generally, social interaction
(Frith and Wolpert, 2003). One extremely influential proposal in this field
is that the actions of others are decoded by activation of one’s own motor
system. Empirical support for this position is thought be provided by the
discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ in the ventral premotor cortex of macaques
(Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996). These neurons were found
to fire not only when the monkey executes a specific grasping movement, but
also when the monkey observes another person executing the same action.
Neuroimaging studies on healthy human volunteers have suggested the
existence of similar mechanisms, showing activation of premotor areas in
observing actions performed by others (Gre`zes et al., 2003a), related to imi-
tation of another person’s actions (Iacoboni et al., 1999), and when viewing
objects associated with certain actions (Gre`zes et al., 2003b). These studies
provide evidence for a role of the motor system in a large variety of behav-
iors, beyond the pure preparation, execution, and evaluation of the organ-
ism’s own motor actions, and have inspired a number of research lines into
the neural mechanisms related to understanding the behavior of others.
Consequently, a number of researchers have began to explore how compu-
tational theories of motor actions may be applied to the understanding of
the behavior of others as well (Miall, 2003; Wolpert et al., 2003).
In the current study, we follow this approach by investigating, at the
experimental level, whether the system underlying action monitoring dur-
ing one’s own task performance is similarly activated when one observes
and evaluates the behavior of another person. If so, this would suggest
that reinforcement learning of motor actions (Holroyd et al., 2004b) and
observational learning of motor actions might rely on similar neural mech-
anisms. Indeed, data from non-human primates (Van Schaik, 2004) and
human functional imaging (Mattar and Gribble, 2005) suggest that similar
1‘The motor system’ in this chapter refers to the motor system at large, including not only
primary motor structures (M1), but also the premotor and parietal cortices.
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Figure 6.1: Experimental setup. Schematic overview of the experimental setup showing the actor (bottom)
and the observer (top).
cognitive and neural mechanisms are involved in the learning motor behav-
ior by execution and by observation. Moreover, a recent study has provided
first evidence that systems underlying generation of the error-related neg-
ativity are also active when participants observe another person commit
an error (Miltner et al., 2004). However, in this experiment, participants
observed simulated rather than real task performance, and the extent of
parallel activation of the motor system was not determined.
6.2 Materials and methods
Participants
Eighteen volunteers with no known neurological impairments and normal
or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the experiment. Data from two
participants were discarded due to recording artifacts (one participant) and
excessive noise in the EEG (one participant), resulting in data from 16 par-
ticipants [11 female, age ranging from 19 to 34 (M = 23.4)] that were used
in the analysis. All participants were paid 6 euros per hour and provided
written consent according to institutional guidelines of the local ethics com-
mittee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, Netherlands).
Apparatus and procedure
Two experimenters were continuously present during the experiment. One
controlled the experimental measurements, while the second participated
in the experiment. Participants were seated in front of a table facing an ex-
perimenter (Fig. 6.1). On the table were two custom-made joystick devices,
positioned to the left and right of an LED stimulus device.
The LED device contained two display sides, one facing the participant,
the other facing the experimenter. Both display sides contained five hori-
zontally aligned dot matrices (13 mm wide, 18 mm high), each consisting of
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a 7 by 5 LED-array. The size of the display was 77 mm by 18 mm, subtend-
ing a visual angle of 5.9 ˚ by 1.4 ˚ at an average viewing distance of 75 cm.
Stimuli consisted of left and right pointing arrowheads (0.8 ˚ by 1.4 ˚ each)
that were generated by turning on a selection of LED-dots.
Joysticks consisted of a 4 cm lever fitted in an electronic control box (10
cm wide and long, 3 cm high). The lever was constrained to move only in
lateral directions and a pair of springs ensured that it would return to its
original position after a response. Deviations of more than 5o from the re-
laxed position (maximum angle 30o) were measured as responses. Joysticks
were positioned bilaterally to either side of the stimulus device, slightly in
front of it (4 cm), at a viewing angle of 15.5 ˚ . Joystick movement generated
no auditory cues.
Participants took part in two conditions: an execution condition in which
they performed a choice reaction task, and an observation condition in
which they observed an experimenter performing the same task. In this
second condition the participant is referred to as the ‘observer’ and the ex-
perimenter as the ‘actor’.
The task consisted of a modified Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen and Erik-
sen, 1974), in which center arrowheads were presented in conjunction with
four flanker arrowheads, two on each side, which either pointed in the same
direction as the center arrow (congruent trials), or in opposite direction (in-
congruent trials). The probability of left- and right-pointing center arrows
was equal, as well as the probability of congruent and incongruent flankers.
A trial sequence began with a centrally presented, diamond shaped, fixation
point (0.6 ˚ by 0.6o) that was displayed for 200 ms. Following a 200 ms
stimulus-free interval, a target display was presented for 300 ms, showing
the four flankers and the center arrowhead. A 600 ms stimulus-free interval
completed the trial.
In the execution condition, participants were instructed to respond both
quickly and accurately in the direction of the center arrowhead. Joysticks
were moved with the thumb in an outward direction. Participants were
instructed to give only one response per trial, and to try to avoid correcting
initial errors. Also, participants were instructed to refrain from making eye
movements and to reduce blinking during task performance.
The experimental session began with 40 practice trials to allow partici-
pants to familiarize themselves with the task. After this, they performed 8
runs of 100 trials of the task, each run taking approximately 2.2 minutes.
Between runs, the participants were given feedback about their average re-
sponse times and number of errors. One experimenter sat opposite to the
participant and reported the number of observed errors after each run.
In the observation condition, which always followed the execution condi-
tion, participant and experimenter changed roles. Participants were now in-
structed to observe the behavior of the experimenter performing the Eriksen
flanker task and to count the number of errors made by the experimenter.
In this way, we could confirm that the observer was engaged in the task.
The observer’s display only included the center arrowhead, ensuring that
error detection was not compromised by the presence of flankers. The dis-
tance between the observer and the display was held constant, but joysticks
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were moved to the experimenter’s side of the display (4 cm behind the LED
device), resulting in a 12.4o viewing angle for each joystick relative to the
center of the display. Participants were instructed to maintain fixation on
the fixation point and to identify responses without making eye movements.
All participants could view the stimulus and the actor’s responses without
moving their eyes. A total of 8 runs of 100 trials each were completed in this
condition.
Behavioral recording and analysis
The onset of the target display and behavioral responses were sampled con-
tinuously at a frequency 1000 Hz. RTs, errors, and misses were analyzed
offline for individual stimulus types and conditions. Only trials with RTs in
the 150 ms – 550 ms range were included for analysis. Responses with only
the incorrect hand were labeled as “pure” errors. Trials with responses from
two hands were not included in the analysis.
Electrophysiological recording
Brain electrical activity was recorded from 47 Ag/AgCl electrodes, referenced
to linked earlobes. Electrodes were mounted in an elastic cap (Easycap,
Montage 10) configured for equal arrangement of the electrodes over the
scalp. Vertical and horizontal electro-oculograms were recorded from sites
above and below the left eye, and 1 cm outwards to the outer cantus of each
eye, respectively. The electrode common was placed on the sternum. All
electrode impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. EEG recordings were amplified
and digitized at 250 Hz. Data were filtered offline, using a 1–14 Hz bandpass
for the ERN analyses (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003) and a 4 Hz lowpass for the
LRPs (Miller et al., 1996), using Butterworth zero phase filters. Ocular arti-
fact was corrected (Gratton et al., 1983), whereas trials containing amplifier
artifacts were discarded.
Error-related negativity
For both correct and incorrect trials in both conditions, a 600 ms epoch
(baseline 100 ms – 0 ms prior to response) was extracted. To mitigate the
effects of differential contribution from stimulus-related activity to the ERP
we adopted a matching procedure (Coles et al., 2001). For each condition
and for each participant, the data for each incorrect trial were randomly
matched by RT (± 4 ms) with the data for a corresponding correct trial.
On average about 90% of all error trials and 10% of all correct trials were
matched for further analysis.
Lateralized readiness potential
LRPs were calculated using signals recorded from C3 and C4 electrodes.
The average asymmetry, defined as the difference between C3 and C4, was
derived by averaging the asymmetries associated with trials where the left
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movements were correct and those where right movements were correct ac-
cording to the following equation: LRP = [left hand(C4 − C3) + right hand(C3
− C4)] / 2. Negative values of the LRP indicate relative activation of the
correct response and positive values relative activation of the incorrect re-
sponse (Coles, 1989). For both conditions, stimulus-locked LRPs (700 ms
epoch, baseline −100 ms – 0 ms) and response-locked LRPs (−550 ms –
500 ms epoch, baseline −550 ms – −450 ms) were calculated. In the ex-
ecution condition, LRPs were response-locked to the participant’s own re-
sponse, whereas in the observation condition the participant’s (observer’s)
LRPs were response-locked to the actor’s response.
To derive a topographical visualization of motor activation, the LRP equa-
tion was applied to all lateral electrode pairs. Lateralized effects were (ar-
bitrarily) projected over the right hemisphere in the form of current source
density (CSD) maps. These maps emphasize the difference in voltage across
the scalp, and provide an indication of the loci of the underlying neural
sources.
ERP statistical analyses
For both ERN and LRPs, onset latencies and onset of the difference between
correct and incorrect trial waveforms were assessed via a stepwise series
of one-tailed serial t-tests (step size of 4 ms). For each test, data from a
time window of 40 ms (i.e., point of measure, plus and minus 20 ms) were
averaged. The onset latency was defined as the first point at which five
consecutive t-tests showed a significant difference (p < .05).
In the matching procedure, the pool of potential correct trials was larger
than the pool of potential incorrect trials, resulting in an arbitrary selection
of matched correct trials, which could result in variability associated with
the particular set of matching correct trials chosen. In turn, this could lead
to variability in the computation of the onset of the difference between cor-
rect and incorrect trial waveforms. For this reason, we used a bootstrapping
procedure (Wasserman and Bockenholt, 1989) to generate a distribution of
onsets over different sets of matching trials. The matching procedure was
run 500 times, and the mean onset time of the distribution was taken as an
indication of the time at which correct and incorrect trials started to differ.
Source localization
ERN source localization was performed on the difference between grand av-
eraged incorrect and matched correct trial waveforms, using Brain Electric
Source Analysis (MEGIS software GmbH, (Scherg and Berg, 1996). For both
the execution and observation condition, source analysis was performed for
the interval in which the difference between correct and incorrect trials was
statistically significant (−6 ms – 146 ms and 90 ms – 318 ms respectively).
A 4-shell ellipsoidal head model was used.
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6.3 Results
Behavioral performance
In both execution and observation conditions the standard effects of the
Eriksen flanker paradigm were observed (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). In-
correct responses were executed faster than correct responses (250 ms vs.
314 ms), F (1,25) = 275.6, p < .001. RTs to compatible stimuli were signif-
icantly faster (300 ms) than RTs to incompatible stimuli (328 ms), F (1,30)
= 64.6, p < .001, and fewer errors were made on compatible (4.6%) than on
incompatible trials (12.4%), F (1,30) = 53.0, p < .001.
Pure error trials, with only a single response of the wrong hand, were
found on 8.5% of all trials. Trials with responses from both hands were
recorded on 8.8% of all trials, and on 1.5% of all trials no response was
registered in the 150 ms – 550 ms response interval. Reaction times were
longer in the execution condition (297 ms) than in the observation condition
(267 ms), but the percentage of pure errors did not differ significantly be-
tween execution and observation conditions (7.9% and 9.1% respectively),
F (1,30) = .62, n.s.).
Error-related negativity
In the execution condition, there was a large negative deflection on (pure)
incorrect trials, as compared to correct trials (Fig. 6.2, upper left). The onset
latency of the negativity was 6 ms (SD: 10 ms) before the response. The peak
latency of the negative difference (between incorrect and correct trials) was
80 ms after the response, maximal at medial frontal electrode sites (Fig. 6.2,
lower left). These features are characteristic of the ERN observed in previous
studies (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1993; Dehaene et al., 1994).
In the observation condition (Fig. 6.2, upper right), we also found a
negative deflection on incorrect trials. This deflection started 90 ms (SD: 30
ms) after the observed response, and peaked at 252 ms. Scalp distribution
of this negative deflection was similar to that of the ERN in the execution
condition (Fig. 6.2, lower right).
Source localization
Grand average difference waveforms between ERPs to correct and incor-
rect responses were used for source localization to determine the possible
neural generators of the negativities in the execution and observation con-
ditions. As in previous studies, we modeled the source of the ERN using a
single source (Dehaene et al., 1994; Miltner et al., 1997). In the execution
condition, a single regional source (Fig. 6.3, right top), located in the me-
dial frontal cortex (Coordinates in Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux,
1988): x = −0.5, y = 0.6, z = 28.4), explained 97.3% of the variance in the
scalp distribution for the interval where correct and incorrect waveforms
differed significantly.
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Figure 6.2: Error-related negativities. Top: Response-locked averages at electrode Cz for correct and incorrect
responses in the execution condition (left) and the observation condition (right). Dashed lines indicate correct,
and solid lines indicate incorrect response trials. Bottom: Spline maps showing the topography of the ERN
difference wave in the execution condition and the observation condition, taken at the peak where correct
and incorrect ERPs differed maximally, 80 ms and 252 ms after the response, respectively. The Cz electrode at
the vertex is marked in light blue for reference. For a color version of this illustration, see p. 135.
To test the hypothesis that the negativities in the execution and observa-
tion conditions are generated in the same neural structures, we determined
how well the source for the execution condition would fit as a model for
the observation condition. The same source explained 92.4% of variance for
the negativity in the observation condition. In a separate analysis, we mod-
eled the data for the observation condition using an unconstrained source.
This analysis yielded a source (Fig. 6.2, right bottom) that was slightly more
frontal (x = 3.8, y = 4.0, z = 23.8), explaining 92.5% of variance. These
data support the hypothesis that medial frontal structures involved in the
processing of self-generated errors are also engaged by observing erroneous
behavior in others.
Lateralized readiness potential
LRPs in the execution condition (Fig. 6.4, top left) show a pattern similar to
that observed previously (Coles, 1989). For correct trials, the motor potential
is more negative over the hemisphere contralateral to the correct response
(indicated by negative values for the LRP), while for incorrect trials the motor
potential is more negative over the hemisphere contralateral to the incorrect
response (reflected by positive LRP values). LRPs for correct and incorrect
responses in the execution condition shared a distribution over the lateral
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Figure 6.3: ERN source localization. Sagittal view of the brain showing the source for the ERN difference wave in
the execution condition (top) and in the observation condition (bottom), displayed together within the same
head model (left), and projected onto a standard MRI template (right).
motor cortex as revealed by current source density maps (CSDs, Fig. 6.4,
bottom left; see Materials and methods section for further details).
In the observation condition, there is an LRP following the stimulus,
which differs significantly from zero from 212 ms (t(15) = −1.8355, p = .043)
until 514 ms after the stimulus. The analysis of the LRP time-locked to
the response of the actor (Fig. 6.4, top right), suggests that the observer’s
motor cortex started to be activated before the actor’s response. This ac-
tivation was associated with greater negativity over the motor cortex con-
tralateral to the correct response side, as viewed from the perspective of the
observer. CSD topography also showed lateralized activation over posterior
areas, probably related to processing of the preceding stimulus. This poste-
rior activation is more prominent for incorrect trials, while motor activation
is less prominent (Fig. 6.4, bottom right, +64 ms maps). This is due to a
difference in response times between correct and incorrect trials (incorrect
responses are faster), resulting in less time for the development of the LRP
in the observer on incorrect trials
Following the observation of a correct response, the LRP continued to de-
velop, reaching a maximum 160 ms after the actor’s response was observed.
However, when the actor responded incorrectly, the correct lateralization
in the observer (which had began before the actor’s response) rapidly de-
creased, and a widespread lateralized activity developed over parietal areas
(Fig. 6.4, bottom right). Statistically, LRPs following observed correct and in-
correct responses started to differentiate 146 ms after the actor’s response
(t(15) = −1.7645, p = .049).
To summarize, LRPs in the observation condition indicate that, for both
correct and incorrect trials, the correct response is initially activated by
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Figure 6.4: Lateralized readiness potentials. Top: Response-locked lateralized readiness potentials in the ex-
ecution condition (left) and the observation condition (right). LRPs recorded to correct response trials are
indicated by dashed lines, and LRPs to incorrect trials by solid lines. Bottom: CSD maps of LRP effects in the ex-
ecution condition (left) and the observation condition (right), for correct and incorrect responses separately.
The C3/C4 electrode over the lateral motor cortex is marked in light blue for reference. The relevant time-point
(relative to the response) is indicated above each map. For a color version of this illustration, see p. 136.
the observer’s motor system. Following the actor’s response, the observer’s
motor system is differentially activated as a function of the accuracy of the
observed response.
6.4 Discussion
The results of the present study provide insight into the neural mechanisms
underlying action observation and error processing. Importantly, we found
evidence that neural activity in both the medial frontal and the motor cor-
tex is modulated by the correctness of both self-generated and observed
responses. This suggests that similar neural mechanisms are involved in
monitoring one’s own actions and the actions of others.
Evidence for similar involvement of medial frontal cortex activity in both
the execution and observation conditions is provided by source analysis of
the negativities associated with errors. As in previous research, a medial
frontal source reliably accounted for the ERN following self-generated errors
and, importantly, the same source accounted for the negativity following ob-
served errors. For this reason, we infer that an ERN is elicited by observing
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errors.
The relationship between the ERN and other ERP components involving
medial frontal cortex (e.g. the N2) is currently a subject of debate (Holroyd,
2004). The present data do not inform this debate. However, they do enable
the critical inference that medial frontal cortex is involved in processing both
self-generated and observed errors. This suggests that the brain systems
associated with action selection and error processing in the medial frontal
cortex are also activated under conditions of action observation.
The data from the observation condition are compatible with those ob-
tained by the earlier study (Miltner et al., 2004). However, the extent of the
ERN in the present data was longer (320 ms versus 130 ms in the earlier
study) and the ERN had a shorter onset latency. These differences are most
likely due to a difference in the precision with which the observer could de-
termine when the actor responded. In the present case the observer was
observing a real actor, while in the earlier study the behavior of a virtual
actor was displayed in symbolic form on a computer monitor. In the latter
case, the onset of the actor’s movement could be precisely defined, whereas
in the present case there could be ambiguity in the time at which the actor
was judged to have responded. As a result, variability in the timing of the
detection of the erroneous response would have occurred.
In contrast to the earlier study, data from the present study allow us
to evaluate the activation of the observer’s motor system when the actor
executes correct and incorrect responses. LRPs in the observation condi-
tion showed that the observer’s motor system was activated in two ways.
First, motor cortex was active prior to the actor’s response, suggesting that
the observer generated a representation of the appropriate response follow-
ing stimulus presentation. Then, following the actor’s response, correct
response activation continued to develop when the response was correct.
However, following an incorrect response, differential motor activation de-
creased and activity lateralized over posterior areas. This lateralized activity
may be associated with perceptual or attentional processing of the actor’s
incorrect hand movement.
The LRP results of the present study are consistent with and extend pre-
vious studies that report activation of the motor system in response to the
observation of behavior (Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001). One important study
in this regard demonstrated that when participants anticipate the action
of another human being, sustained activation can be seen in the ventral
premotor cortex, and that this activity is absent when participants antici-
pate another event, such as a computer action (Ramnani and Miall, 2004).
Our data extend these results, by showing participants’ motor activation
during action observation may reflect sub-threshold preparation of (correct)
responses, and is modulated by the actually observed responses.
Noteworthy is that the initial motor lateralization following the stimulus,
and the subsequent lateralization following the observation of the correct re-
sponse were both found over the observer’s motor cortex contralateral to the
side of the correct response (from the observer’s own perspective). Thus, the
observer’s LRP shows what the observer would have done if he/she had ac-
tively done the task him/herself, instead of maintaining a representation of
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the task from the perspective of the actor. This pattern of results is consis-
tent with studies of imitation which show that when imitating, participants
mostly try to replicate the goal of the action, but tend to ignore how the ac-
tor did it [e.g., participants may use their left hand although the actor used
his/her right hand (Bekkering and Wohlschla¨ger, 2000)].
Given that activation in motor areas in the observation condition is sim-
ilar to motor activation found with task execution, it is important to investi-
gate the level at which there was covert response activation in the observer.
To this end, we ran five additional participants from whom we recorded
EMG in both execution and observation conditions. Response-locked aver-
ages of band-pass filtered (20-100 Hz) and rectified EMG recordings from
both hands showed a strong response with task execution, but no effect in
the observation condition. This indicates that the level of covert response
activation in the observer does not extend to the periphery.
Data from the present study suggest that neural mechanisms used to
monitor individual task performance are also activated under conditions of
task observation. These mechanisms may play a central role in our ability
to predict and classify the behavior of others, and thus provide a possible
pathway for observational learning.
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7.1 Introduction
To select and perform the correct action at the appropriate moment requires
substantial information. The goal of the action, the priority of this goal,
the target in space of the action, the current state of the limbs, and many
other factors need to be taken into account when one plans and executes
any voluntary action. By monitoring the consequences of one’s actions and
determining how well these actions correspond to their goal, one can decide
on the next course of action and learn how to respond in similar situations
in the future.
The goal of the research described in the thesis is to investigate the spe-
cific role of the various subdivisions of the human premotor cortex in the
control of action. To this end, the previous chapters described experiments
that were designed to contribute to our understanding of the role of vari-
ous subdivisions of the premotor cortex in the processes of action selection,
action preparation, and action monitoring. The purpose of this final chap-
ter is to summarize and discuss the results obtained in the experimental
chapters (Chapter 2–6) in the context of current knowledge and theories of
the premotor cortex and relate the results to recently published literature.
Furthermore, this chapter contains some suggestions for future research.
7.2 Lateral premotor cortex
Premotor, pre-premotor, and movement preparation
The involvement of the lateral premotor cortex in the selection and prepa-
ration of voluntary actions is well established. Most proposals on the func-
tionality of the lateral premotor cortex emphasize its role in the formation
of a movement plan and in the guidance of movement based on sensory in-
formation (Passingham, 1993; Wise, 1985; Wise et al., 1997). Lesion stud-
ies (Passingham, 1993) and electrophysiological studies in monkeys (Bous-
saoud and Wise, 1993; Di Pellegrino and Wise, 1993) and human functional
imaging studies (De Lange et al., 2004) all suggest that it is not a visual in-
struction per se that activates neurons in the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd),
but rather the motor significance of the stimulus.
Recently, the involvement of the PMd in action selection and preparation
has been further detailed in studies reporting a dissociation between the ros-
tral and the caudal parts of the macaque PMd. Neurons in the rostral part
of the PMd seem more concerned with processing stimulus attributes, while
neurons in the caudal part of PMd are predominantly involved in the actual
movement selection and preparation (Boussaoud, 2001). Subsequently, the
rostral and caudal parts of the dorsal premotor cortex have been labeled the
‘pre-premotor’ and the ‘premotor’ cortex, respectively. A similar dissocia-
tion has been reported in humans (Picard and Strick, 2001; Chouinard and
Paus, 2006; Simon et al., 2002).
The study reported in Chapter 2 further explored this dissociation in
the context of the preparation of simple visuomotor actions. The study ad-
dressed the question of whether the retention of these different types of
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information were associated with sustained activity in distinct cortical re-
gions. Viewed in the context of motor preparation, this study was thus
able to image sustained neuronal responses related to different stages of
the visuomotor transformation (Jeannerod, 1997), from processing of the
stimulus for action selection to the preparation of the movement following
action selection but before action execution. In contrast to previous stud-
ies (Simon et al., 2002; Curtis et al., 2004) this was done in the context
of an arbitrary visuomotor associative task (Wise et al., 1996), that allowed
the characterization of mechanisms underlying the flexibility to associate
abstract environmental stimuli with any form of suitable behavior, a char-
acteristic flexibility in behavior displayed by higher organisms.
Sustained activation was found along the caudal section of the superior
frontal sulcus at the border of BA6 and BA8 when participants retained vi-
sual information online during an instructed delay period. Conversely, when
participants retained a motor code during the delay interval, sustained ac-
tivity was found more caudally, along the precentral gyrus at the border of
BAs 6 and 4. This experiment thus showed that the retention of different
types of information, which can be taken to correspond to various stages
of the visuomotor transformation, is indeed associated with differential ac-
tivation in the rostral and caudal aspects of the dorsal premotor cortex. A
similar dissociation was not found in more posterior regions, with posterior
parietal cortex showing sustained delay period activity during the retention
of both sensory and motor codes.
In a recent follow-up to this study, Van den Hurk and colleagues (Van den
Hurk et al., 2006) endeavored to further characterize the neurophysiologi-
cal mechanisms of retaining stimulus and motor codes, by investigating
whether retention of stimulus or motor codes drives the motor system to dif-
ferent states, as indexed by cortico-spinal excitability. Although the imag-
ing results presented in Chapter 2 suggest that the retention of stimulus
and motor codes rely on partly dissociable neural structures, this study
did not address the mechanisms associated with these two computational
processes at a neurophysiological level within these separate clusters. Van
den Hurk and colleagues took a first step in this direction by qualifying
the cortico-spinal excitability during the retention of the two different in-
formational codes. Using a similar setup to that employed in Chapter 2,
cortico-spinal excitability was probed by determining the effects of a sin-
gle TMS pulse over the motor cortex on the movement evoked potential
(MEP). Cortico-spinal excitability was modulated compared to baseline in an
effector-specific manner in the movement preparation condition. When par-
ticipants retained stimulus representations online, however, cortico-spinal
excitability was not modulated compared to baseline. During the prepara-
tion of motor responses, the MEP recorded from the muscle that was in-
volved in the execution of the prepared action was increased, while there
was a general attenuation of the MEP recorded from muscles unrelated to
the upcoming movement.
It is important to note that, although this study probed cortico-spinal ex-
citability over the primary motor cortex, this does not necessarily imply that
primary motor cortex is the site of maintenance of the motor representation.
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Rather, the excitability of primary motor cortex is likely to be a non-linear in-
tegration of influences from a spatially distributed cortical circuit, reflecting
the effects of local circuitry but also distal effects from premotor and poste-
rior parietal cortex, as indicated by the data presented in Chapter 2. These
results provide further evidence for the claim that the retention of motor
codes during the preparation for an upcoming movement is associated with
specific neurophysiological patterns, patterns that are distinct from those
that subserve the retention of sensory codes.
Precentral cortex and the likelihood of responding
A crucial aspect in labeling an action as a voluntary action is that one has
the choice whether or not to execute the action. Not only can one select a
specific action amongst a number of alternatives, but one can also choose
to abort a previously selected action before it is executed. Two bodies of
work investigating the issue of voluntary control over actions relevant to
the present discussion are those investigating the effect of the probability of
having to execute a response on action preparation and those investigating
the inhibition of an already selected movement before it is executed.
Studies employing the first approach have shown the influence of the
probability of response execution on preparatory activity. For instance,
Low and Miller (1999) used lateralized readiness potentials [LRPs; see Coles
(1989)] to demonstrate the effects of partial stimulus information on prepara-
tory activity. Similarly, Schiebe and colleagues modulated the likelihood
that various response alternatives in a forced-choice experiment had to be
executed, showing a modulation of the contingent negative variation, and
to a lesser extent the LRP, by the implicit probability that a given response
would need to be executed (Scheibe et al., 2006).
Using functional imaging, Thoenissen and colleagues manipulated the
probability of response execution in a delayed-response task (Thoenissen
et al., 2002). Participants were presented with a visual cue instructing a
specific movement. Following a variable delay interval participants were
presented with a ‘go’ or a ‘no-go’ cue, instructing the participants to execute
or inhibit the prepared response, respectively. Thoenissen and colleagues
reported that sustained delay period activity in the precentral gyrus was
modulated by the probability of responding, with different clusters showing
stronger activity either following cues specifying a high or a low likelihood of
responding. Preparatory activity in some frontal clusters is thus modulated
by the probability of response execution. Importantly, sustained activity
in the posterior parietal cortex was not modulated by response probability,
consistent with the results of electrophysiological recordings in non-human
primates (Kalaska and Crammond, 1995).
Consistent with the observation of precentral activity modulated by re-
sponse probability, in the study reported in Chapter 2, we found a region
along the left precentral gyrus that became more active during the later
stages of the instructed delay period, when the probability of responding
increased. This indicates that activity in various precentral regions, i.e., re-
gions with direct connections to M1 and to the spinal cord, is modulated
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by the likelihood that a certain response will be executed. Together, these
results argue for the involvement of the precentral gyrus in determining
which of various response alternatives will be executed in conditions of un-
certainty.
A second approach for studying the volitional control over action is to
investigate the inhibition of actions. Studies following this approach have
predominantly focused on the inhibition of a prepotent or already initiated
response (Garavan et al., 1999; Kelly et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003;
Aron et al., 2003) and generally have reported a network of right frontal,
right parietal and medial premotor areas specifically involved in inhibition
and related processes. A limitation of these studies is that they cannot
distinguish between different functional properties of neural structures in-
volved in the different motor control processes evoked by a no-go stimulus.
These processes are likely to include not only inhibition of the prepared re-
sponse, but also the possible selection and preparation of the new response
under fierce time pressure. The results obtained in these studies may there-
fore not isolate activity related to the process of interest, but to a number of
confounding processes due to the task design.
The study reported in Chapter 3 investigated this issue in more detail
by dissociating in time processes related to programming of a motor plan
independent of previous task processing from processes related to the pro-
gramming of a motor plan in the context of an already existing motor plan.
This study allowed us to further explore cerebral correlates of selection and
inhibition of motor plans. A region in the left dorsal premotor cortex quite
close to the BA6/8 locus reported in Chapter 2 was active at all moments
during a trial in which a response had to be selected and prepared. However,
selecting an action in the context of an already existing motor plan recruited
a number of additional regions, particularly a large network of right frontal
regions, including precentral gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, and the insula.
Most of these regions, however, were also activated during action selection
under time pressure, indicating that they may not be related purely to the
inhibition of an already present motor plan. When controlling for this poten-
tial confound, we found that only a region of the right precentral gyrus was
activated specifically during the selection of actions in the context of already
present motor plans. Again, we found a region located along the precentral
gyrus, close to the regions identified in previous studies (Thoenissen et al.,
2002). These results again illustrate the importance of the precentral cortex
in determining which of various response alternatives will be executed.
Although these studies illustrate which brain regions are involved in dif-
ferent aspects of volitional control of action, they can only provide limited
inferences concerning the underlying neuronal mechanisms mediating this
control. Therefore, informed by the electrophysiological and imaging studies
described above, a number of TMS studies have recently started addressing
this question by examining the mechanisms underlying response prepara-
tion and cancellation at the neural level (Sohn et al., 2002; Coxon et al.,
2006). An important example of this approach is provided by Strafella and
Paus (2001) who investigated the neural structures involved in intra-cortical
inhibition (ICI) and intra-cortical facilitation (ICF) reported in paired-pulse
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paradigms (Kujirai et al., 1993). These mechanisms of ICI and ICF can il-
lustrate how different populations of interneurons within the primary motor
cortex mediate the activity underlying the maintenance of certain response
alternatives. Strafella and Paus showed that ICI and ICF within the primary
motor cortex are mediated by distinct neural populations in regions outside
the motor cortex, specifically by regions along the precentral cortex. This
study thus provides a first illustration of how the regions identified in imag-
ing studies described above might mediate the volitional control of actions.
7.3 Medial premotor cortex: Anterior cingulate cortex
The role of different subdivisions of the medial premotor cortex
in action monitoring
As discussed in Chapter 1, the ACC is not a homologous area, but con-
sists instead of a number of distinct anatomical substructures, which can
be functionally dissociated (Picard and Strick, 1996). However, the large
variability of ACC architecture between individuals, and the crudeness of
some experimental manipulations, make differentiation of the functional
properties of each ACC substructure using functional imaging a difficult
task. Illustrating this point, a recent meta-analysis by Ridderinkhof and
colleagues (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004) showed that typical action monitoring
tasks, such as error processing, conflict monitoring, and dealing with deci-
sion uncertainty, result in widespread activation of a region extending from
the rostral ACC (BA32) up into the pre-SMA (BA6).
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, a more fine-grained experimental design was
used in an attempt to differentiate the functional contributions of these
regions to error processing. Participants were asked to learn stimulus-
response mappings using external feedback. Earlier in the learning ses-
sion, RCZa was activated in response to negative performance feedback.
During the experimental session, when participants learned the appropri-
ate stimulus-response mapping, feedback-related activity decreased, while
activity related to the incorrect response increased. We concluded that RCZa
is responsive to the earliest source of error information available. Activity in
the pre-SMA and the RCZp followed patterns distinguishable from that in
RCZa and from each other.
As discussed in Chapter 5, we do not claim that the ACC cannot be ac-
tivated by performance feedback on correct trials. Indeed, Walton and col-
leagues (Walton et al., 2004) showed equal activation of the ACC following
both positive and negative feedback when both had an equal informational
content. The relationship between ACC activity and the informational value
of feedback remains poorly understood and will be a valuable topic of re-
search in the near future [see also Chapter 4 and Lemke (2003)].
Aside from the studies of ‘action monitoring’ such as those discussed by
Ridderinkhof (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), a number of studies have recently
reported activation of the medial frontal cortex in tasks probing social cog-
nition. Social cognition tasks here refer to tasks where one is monitoring
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the mental states of others (Frith and Frith, 1999; Frith and Frith, 2001).
These studies often report activation in the medial frontal cortex, mostly
in the paracingulate cortex. The question arises whether these activations
and those reported in action monitoring tasks are a reflection of similar
processes.
The loci of activation in social cognition tasks are generally located more
anterior than the loci associated with motor control. In coordinates of
the Talairach atlas (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988), the social interaction
foci mostly have a y-coordinate > 30 (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and
Frith, 2001), while motor and action monitoring tasks generally have a y-
coordinate between 0 and 35. Hence, the social interaction loci have most
commonly been described as located along the anterior paracingulate sul-
cus (Frith and Frith, 2001). Activation of the dorsal ACC during the ob-
servation of errors in others has been suggested now in three independent
studies (Miltner et al., 2004; Van Schie et al., 2004; Bates et al., 2005). In
each of these studies, a dorsal ACC source was reported as best fit for the
‘observation-ERN’. Although it would be imprudent to make strong claims
on the exact source of the component identified in these three studies be-
cause of the inverse problem in EEG dipole modeling, source localization in
all studies converged on a central source. Most likely this source is located
in the dorsal ACC, closer to the ‘motor’ loci than to the ‘social interaction’
loci.
Viewed from this perspective, the ACC activity elicited during the obser-
vation of erroneous behavior in others would be ‘just’ another source of in-
formation that can be used to bias action selection. This suggestion is com-
patible with the original suggestion raised in Chapter 6, where the purpose
was to explore similarities between the reinforcement learning system that
gives rise to the ERN and possible mechanisms of learning by observation.
Research in various laboratories now focuses on the functional significance
of the ‘observation-ERN’ and on determining its precise origin. Although the
three studies to date are hardly conclusive, they do suggest that this type of
research can provide an avenue for learning in a social context.
Feedback processing in the ACC
An important aspect of the functionality of the ACC in action monitoring is
its responsiveness to different sources of error information. The reinforce-
ment learning theory of the ERN especially emphasizes that the ACC is not
only active in response to internally detected errors, but also in response
to negative performance feedback (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al.,
2004c), although both sources of information might be relayed to the ACC
via a single intermediate brain region such as the striatum.
The first report of error-related activity elicited in the ACC by perfor-
mance feedback was the time-estimation study of Miltner and colleagues
(1997). Subsequently, the functionality of this feedback-ERN has been the
topic of fierce debate. In Chapter 4, it was reported that feedback-ERN am-
plitude was not modulated by the size of behavioral adjustments, but rather,
that feedback-ERN amplitudes reflects a binary outcome of actions, i.e. it
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reflects whether the goal of an action was obtained or not. These results
can be reconciled with recent work on reward processing in the dopamine
system, as suggested by the reinforcement learning theory of the ERN (Hol-
royd and Coles, 2002), but are not immediately consistent with results on
the response-ERN. For instance, Hajcek and colleagues manipulated the
amount of money a participant could earn on a trial-by-trial basis, and
found that this reliably modulated the size of the response-ERN (Hajcak
et al., 2005), replicating early results showing that response-ERN amplitude
is modulated by the significance on an error (Gehring et al., 1993). The find-
ing that error significance modulates the amplitude of the response-ERN,
but not the feedback-ERN suggests at least a partial dissociation between
response- and feedback-ERN.
Another important topic of debate concerns the neural source of the
feedback-ERN. In a recent fMRI study, Van Veen and colleagues reported no
activation of the dorsal ACC in response to negative feedback in the ‘stan-
dard’ time-estimation task (Van Veen et al., 2004). Since their study relied
on very long delays between response and feedback in order to separate the
BOLD responses associated with the different trial events, it could be argued
that this negative result is merely due to the fact that the reward processing
system works only on a relatively short time scale. To address this issue,
Nieuwenhuis and colleagues used a shorter, variable delay between the dif-
ferent trial events. Their results were similar to those of Van Veen, showing
no activation of the dorsal ACC in response to negative performance feed-
back (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b). Furthermore, they showed that dipoles
placed in the rostral ACC, posterior cingulate and superior frontal gyrus
which were activated in the fMRI study, can in principle explain the scalp
topography of the feedback-ERN. These studies raise the important question
of whether the feedback-ERN is really elicited in the ACC, in the same locus
as the response-ERN.
A number of fMRI studies investigating the neural source of the feedback
ERN did report activation of the dorsal ACC in response to negative perfor-
mance feedback (Ullsperger and Von Cramon, 2003; Holroyd et al., 2004c),
supporting the claims of the reinforcement learning theory of the ERN that
the response- and the feedback-ERN are a manifestation of similar pro-
cesses. It has been suggested that these results may be merely an ‘oddball’
effect, i.e., brain activation elicited by the occurrence low-frequency events.
Indeed, in the studies of Ullsperger and Holroyd the negative feedback was
less frequent than the positive feedback. It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that the feedback-ERN is also present when the frequencies of positive
and negative feedback are equal (Miltner et al., 1997; Lemke, 2003; Mars
et al., 2004), even though similar components such as the oddball N200 are
strongly modulated by frequency (Holroyd, 2004). Moreover, the fMRI data
reported in Chapter 5 show that activity in the RCZa elicited by negative
performance feedback was strongest at the beginning of a learning session
when the negative feedback was more frequent that positive feedback. In-
deed, error rates were as high as 70% during the first phase of learning.
Moreover, this activity in RCZa mimics the behavior of the feedback-ERN in
a similar learning task (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002),
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suggesting that the feedback-ERN is indeed a reflection of activity in the
RCZa, a region also activated by internal error detection.
The data reported in Chapter 5 thus provide evidence that the claim of
the reinforcement learning theory of the ERN that activity can be elicited in
the RCZa by internal error detection and negative performance feedback and
that this activity has a role in the learning of action selection is accurate.
The negative findings of Van Veen and Nieuwenhuis and the dissociation
between some findings on the response- and the feedback-ERN, however,
provide an important indication that either or both of these components
reflect processes additional to those described by the reinforcement learn-
ing model. One possible explanation for the dissociation in functionality of
the response- and the feedback-ERN is the fact that response-related error
processing often seems to recruit a number of additional sources along the
medial wall, such as the pre-SMA (Holroyd et al., 2004c). Although the re-
sults presented in Chapter 5 show that error processing is not the sole role
of the pre-SMA (see also Section 7.4 below), activity from additional sources
contributing to the response- but not to the feedback-ERN might account
for some of the functional differences of the two components. Although not
in general disagreement with the suggestions of the reinforcement learning
theory of the ERN, these results do illustrate the need for caution in inter-
preting the results of the ERN as a direct manifestation of activity of a single
cortical region.
ACC and action selection revisited
As argued in Chapter 1 (Holroyd et al., 2004b), the ACC plays an important
role in the selection of motor actions. The ACC, specifically the rostral cingu-
late zones, respond to different types of information that can be used to bias
action selection, such as response errors (Carter et al., 1998; Kiehl et al.,
2000; Ullsperger and Von Cramon, 2001), negative performance feedback
(Ullsperger and Von Cramon, 2003; Holroyd et al., 2004c), but also uncer-
tainty (Volz et al., 2005; Carter et al., 1998) and social pain (Eisenberger
and Lieberman, 2004; Ullsperger et al., 2004). The research presented in
this thesis has contributed to this body of work by showing, crucially, how
a single subregion of the ACC processes evaluative information from differ-
ent sources and that the ACC has access to information derived from the
behavior observed in others. Furthermore, the research presented in this
thesis further illustrates the functionality of feedback-related processing in
the ACC.
The research in this thesis was inspired mostly by the reinforcement
learning theory of the ACC (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). However, in ad-
dition to the reinforcement learning theory and the mismatch hypothesis
discussed in Chapter 1, a number of other models have been proposed con-
cerning the function of the ACC in action monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Luu and Tucker, 2003). One influential model proposes that the ACC serves
to detect simultaneous activation of multiple responses in the brain’s motor
system (Botvinick et al., 1999; Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004).
According to this model, when the ACC detects this response conflict, a
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signal is sent to regions in the lateral prefrontal cortex, e.g. dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, which serve to increase the attentional processing of task-
relevant stimuli in order to give the correct response access to motor output
system. By assuming that the ERN reflects response conflict generated by
the activation of the correct or corrective response following an error, this
model has been shown to adequately predict various ERN and adaptation ef-
fects, as measured by slowing in reactions times, found in speeded response
tasks (Yeung et al., 2004). Furthermore, the model has the added advantage
of being able to explain findings related to the N2, a negative frontocentral
ERP component commonly found in speeded response tasks on correct tri-
als when the stimulus primes a number of conflicting responses (Van Veen
and Carter, 2002).
However, the conflict model does not account for findings related to per-
formance feedback as described above and findings of reward processing
in the ACC, as outlined below. Therefore, the results obtained in both
Chapters 5 and 6 are inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the conflict
detection theory. Moreover, the conflict detection theory would predict in-
creased ACC activation prior to responses at the beginning of learning, since
this would constitute a situation of underdetermined responding (Botvinick
et al., 2001; Barch et al., 2000). In Chapter 5, we found no response-
related ACC activation at the beginning of learning. Rather, we found that
response-related ACC activation appeared and increased during the course
of the experiment, as a function of learning.
Conversely, the reinforcement learning theory in its original formulation
does not speak to pre-response ACC activations, as indexed by the N2, re-
ported in a number of studies. Both the reinforcement learning theory and
the conflict detection theory thus cannot be taken as a full description of
ACC function (Rushworth et al., 2004). Currently a number of labs are
working on integrative accounts of ACC function, relying on a combination
of conflict and reinforcement principles (Brown and Braver, 2005; Frank
et al., 2005; Holroyd et al., 2005). Furthermore, a greater emphasis is
placed on the role of ACC in the larger context of motor control, integrat-
ing the results from the cognitive control and error processing literatures
with those obtained in the literatures on motor learning and action selec-
tion (Holroyd et al., 2004b; Rushworth et al., 2004; Krigolson and Holroyd,
2006).
7.4 Medial premotor cortex: Pre-SMA and SMA proper
Functions of the pre-SMA in motor control
The medial part of area 6 is now recognized to contain at least two separate
anatomical areas: the supplementary motor area proper (SMA), and the pre-
SMA. In terms of anatomical connectivity, pre-SMA can be better described
as a ‘prefrontal’ rather than a ‘premotor’ region. Similar to the distinction we
observed between the rostral and caudal PMd, pre-SMA and SMA proper are
active during different stages of the visuomotor transformation (Chapter 2).
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Although pre-SMA is not a premotor region in the strictest sense of the
word, it is often activated in tasks involving complex action selection and ac-
tion monitoring. For instance, several imaging studies on action monitoring
have reported not only the ACC, but also the pre-SMA as a region critically
involved in error processing (Kiehl et al., 2000; Holroyd et al., 2004c). The
results obtained in Chapter 5 show a more complex pattern of activation. A
subtraction of response-related activation on correct trials from activation
on incorrect trials would indeed have yielded activation in the pre-SMA, sug-
gesting a role of the pre-SMA in error processing. However, a more detailed
investigation of the time-related changes of activity in the pre-SMA showed
that, although pre-SMA may be more activated on error as compared to cor-
rect trials, pre-SMA does have a clear role on correct trials as well. Pre-SMA
shows clear response-related activation on correct trials and this activity in-
creases during learning. Labeling pre-SMA simply as an ‘error processing’
region would thus be an oversimplification.
All three of the functional imaging studies reported in this thesis re-
ported activity in the pre-SMA. In the learning study described in Chapter
5, pre-SMA was active following or during response execution and this ac-
tivity increased with learning. At first glance, these results would appear to
contradict the results of Sakai (Sakai et al., 1998), who reported decreas-
ing pre-SMA activation with learning. However, it should be noted that the
tasks in the two studies differed substantially. Importantly, in the Chapter 5
study, participants were pushed for speed, which might encourage response
conflict. The finding that pre-SMA becomes more active with learning could
be explained by the suggestion that participants are prone to pre-select a
movement to be executed when they do not know which response is in-
structed. However, following learning, when participants have learned the
appropriate response, they have to suppress competing responses. A simi-
lar suggestion was put forward by Lau, when discussing the discrepancies
in the literature regarding the involvement of the pre-SMA in conflict moni-
toring and the free selection of actions (Lau et al., 2006).
In an attempt to provide an overarching theory of pre-SMA function,
Rushworth and colleagues suggested this region to be involved in the se-
lection of action sets, placing it at a higher hierarchical level than those
regions involved in the selection of single actions (Rushworth et al., 2004).
This suggestion dove-tails with a recent computational model of Nakahara
and colleagues, aimed at modeling the neural mechanisms underlying the
learning of visuomotor sequences (Nakahara et al., 2001). According to their
model, learning of visuomotor sequences occurs in two separate neural cir-
cuits, one which learns the sequence in spatial coordinates and one which
learns the sequence in motor coordinates, and at a different learning rate
(Bapi et al., 2000). The pre-SMA is positioned as a ‘coordinator’ between the
different neural circuits, coordinating which of the two neural circuits gains
access to the motor output system. This suggestion is based on the find-
ings that pre-SMA is active during the early stages of learning a visuomotor
sequence, when the two circuits are hypothesized to compete (Sakai et al.,
1998) and that pre-SMA neurons are especially active when a motor plan
needs to be updated (Shima et al., 1996). A related ‘coordinator’ role for the
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pre-SMA might be the suppression of undesirable output to the motor sys-
tem. Such a framework would be able to explain pre-SMA activation in task
switching (Rushworth et al., 2002; Crone et al., 2006) and during situations
of response conflict [Ullsperger et al. (2001), but see Lau et al. (2006)].
In the studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5, pre-SMA was active when
a visual stimulus was maintained online prior to the transformation from
visual into motor information (Chapter 2) and during the visuomotor trans-
formation (Chapter 3). In both studies, pre-SMA co-activated with the dorsal
premotor cortex. However, a number of models [e.g., Hikosaka et al. (1999)]
suggest different functions for these two anatomical structures, with PMd
involved in the translation of information from visual to motor coordinates
and pre-SMA involved in more higher-level aspects of motor control, such as
coordination between different visuomotor streams (Nakahara et al., 2001)
or task set implementation (Rushworth et al., 2004; Crone et al., 2006).
However, the studies reported here were aimed at dissociating the contri-
butions of premotor and ‘pre-premotor’ areas to visuomotor processing and
do not speak to the dissociation of the lateral and medial premotor cortices.
This remains a topic for further research.
SMA and movement preparation
Traditionally, the lateral premotor cortex has been implemented in the con-
trol of movement based on external sensory information, while the medial
premotor areas, specifically SMA proper, were thought to mediate the plan-
ning of movements from memory (Goldberg, 1985).
This framework has been challenged extensively in the past decade. For
example, Brett and colleagues (1997) showed that SMA activity during move-
ment selection disappeared when participants could not prepare their re-
sponse, suggesting that preparation, and not internal action selection, is the
crucial factor driving SMA activity. Similar claims have been made in a num-
ber of studies (Amador and Fried, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006). Consistent
with the suggested involvement of the SMA in motor preparation, the SMA
has been shown to be one of the prime generators of the Bereitschaftspo-
tential (Cui et al., 1999). Studies in monkeys show that SMA neurons are
indeed active during the preparation phase of instructed delay tasks, and
also during the movement execution (Hoshi and Tanji, 2004). Furthermore,
These studies showed that a number of SMA neurons responded in an ef-
fector specific matter, while very few SMA neurons were involved in action
selection based on visual information. These results point to a role for the
SMA in the preparation of actions after the action has been selected, when
the effector can be fully specified.
Supporting this preparation viewpoint, the study reported in Chapter 2
showed sustained activation of the SMA proper when participants prepared
a movement for execution. SMA thus became active only after the appropri-
ate action had been selected. Our data thus support the view that the SMA
is involved in later stages of action preparation. Amongst others, the SMA
might have a role in specifying the timing of an action (Macar et al., 2004),
but the studies reported in this thesis do not speak to this issue.
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7.5 Integration: Premotor contributions to the control of
action
As discussed in the previous chapters, the view that the generation of mo-
tor commands proceeds in a serial, hierarchical fashion, with the primary
motor cortex as the final common pathway for the central control of move-
ment has been revised. The frontal lobes contain a number of anatomically
and functionally distinct premotor areas, each with direct outputs to the
primary motor cortex and spinal cord. Consequently, Dum and Strick have
proposed that each premotor area is a functionally distinct efferent system
that differentially controls aspects of movement planning, preparation, and
execution (Dum and Strick, 2005). The control of action is accomplished
through parallel distributed processing in these multiple motor areas (Dum
and Strick, 1991b; Dum and Strick, 2005).
Roland (Roland et al., 1980) has suggested that the “premotor areas are
activated when a new motor program is established” or when a program
is “changed on the basis of sensory information”. The research presented
in this thesis was aimed at empirically testing and further developing this
statement, providing further insight into the specific contributions of the
various premotor areas to the control of action. As far as the lateral surface
is concerned, this thesis has concentrated on the dorsal premotor cortex,
illustrating its role in the various stages of action selection (deciding which
flower to pick) and preparation (waiting for the bee to leave the flower before
picking it). The work on the medial premotor areas presented in this thesis
has focused mostly on the role of these areas in action monitoring (learning
that it is not a good idea to pick flowers when bees are present). As dis-
cussed in the Introduction and in Chapters 4 and 5, the view taken in this
research is that action monitoring is part of process of response selection.
The medial premotor areas, and specifically the RCZa, are thus not passive
monitors, but have an active role in the selection of actions for which they
use information from other, perhaps striatal, areas. The results obtained in
this thesis have been generally consistent with this position.
Further research must focus on the integration of these results with
other approaches, such as computational modeling and neurophysiological
experimental data, as well as continuing experimental work at the system
level.
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Wij mensen hebben een zeer uitgebreid repertoire aan bewegingen. We ade-
men, lopen in de tuin kijkend naar de bloemen, bewaren ons evenwicht
tijdens het lopen, stoppen om wat bloemen te plukken, beslissen om de ene
bloem weg te gooien ten gunste van een andere, trekken ons been terug als
we gestoken worden door een wesp, passen ons lopen aan om het gestoken
been te ontzien, en mompelen over de complexiteit van het bestaan.
Dit proefschrift gaat over motorische acties. Onze acties verschillen in de
mate waarin we er vrijwillige controle over hebben en in de wijze waarop we
ze aanleren. Dit proefschrift richt zich slechts op motorische acties waarover
wij vrijwillige controle hebben en die we hebben leren uitvoeren.
Oorspronkelijk werd gedacht dat slechts een zeer beperkt deel van de
hersenen, de primaire motorische schors, betrokken is bij het aansturen
van bewegingen. De laatste 20 jaar is er echter veel aandacht voor de rol
van andere hersengebieden in het regelen van motorische acties. In dit
proefschrift staat de rol van een specifieke groep hersengebieden, die sa-
men de premotorische schors vormen, centraal. Deze gebieden vormen een
onderdeel van de frontale schors. Een kernmerk van deze gebieden is dat
ze verbonden zijn met de primaire motorische schors en met het ruggen-
merg. Het onderzoek dat de basis vormt voor dit proefschrift is gericht op de
rol van de premotorische schors bij het tot stand komen van acties en het
evalueren van uitgevoerde acties.
De selectie en preparatie van acties
De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 richten zich op de processen die plaatsvinden voor-
dat een beweging wordt uitgevoerd. In het meeste onderzoek daarnaar wordt
de proefpersonen geleerd om op een bepaalde visuele stimulus te reageren
met een specifieke beweging. In het onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrift
wordt veelvuldig gebruik gemaakt van de zogenaamde ’delayed-response
taak’. Bij deze taak wordt de proefpersonen opgedragen om, nadat ze de
stimulus hebben gezien, een korte tijd, meestal enige seconden, te wachten
met het uitvoeren van de bijbehorende actie. Op deze manier kunnen de
hersenprocessen die betrokken zijn bij het omzetten van visuele informatie
in een motorische actie worden geı¨soleerd.
Het experiment dat in hoofdstuk 2 wordt beschreven, had tot doel te be-
palen of er verschillende hersengebieden betrokken zijn bij het verwerken
van de stimulusinformatie enerzijdse en de motorische respons anderzijds.
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Daarbij werd een delayed-response taak zoals hierboven is beschreven ge-
bruikt. Om de taak goed uit te voeren moesten de proefpersonen enige
tijd wachten tussen de aanbieding van de stimulus en het uitvoeren van
de bijbehorende actie. Aangezien er tijdens het interval geen stimuli wer-
den gepresenteerd, moesten de proefpersonen taakrelevante informatie ont-
houden. Een conditie was zo ontworpen dat de stimulus onthouden moest
worden, maar de juiste beweging nog niet kon worden geselecteerd. In de
andere conditie kon de juiste beweging al wel geselecteerd worden en hoefde
de proefpersoon geen visuele informatie te onthouden. Uit de resultaten van
dit experiment blijkt dat andere delen van de premotorische schors betrok-
ken zijn bij het onthouden van stimulus informatie dan bij het vasthouden
van motorische informatie. Tevens is gebleken dat een ander gebied in de
hersenen, de posterieure parie¨tale schors, bij het onthouden van beide ty-
pen informatie betrokken is.
Bij dit type experiment wordt aangenomen dat de proefpersoon tussen
de trials rustig zit te wachten tot er een stimulus wordt gepresenteerd. Het
motorische systeem wordt aangenomen passief te zijn tot het moment dat
de stimulus wordt aangeboden. Deze ‘bottom-up’ benadering bijkt een over-
simplificatie te zijn. Uit de literatuur over visuele perceptie, bijvoorbeeld,
blijkt dat de staat waarin het brein verkeert op het moment dat een stimu-
lus gepresenteerd wordt, in grote mate bepalend is voor de verwerking van
deze stimulus. Evenzeer is de toestand van het motorische systeem belang-
rijk voor de manier waarop een nieuwe actie geselecteerd wordt.
In hoofdstuk 3 staat deze stelling centraal. Opnieuwe werd aan de proef-
personen gevraagd na een stimulus een actie te selecteren en voor te berei-
den en die enige tijd later uit te voeren. Uit de reactietijden bleek dat de
proefpersonen het interval inderdaad gebruikten om hun actie voor te be-
reiden. In een klein aantal trials werd de proefpersoon opgedragen om een
andere actie dan de reeds geprepareerde te selecteren en voor te bereiden.
In dit geval moest de voorbereide actie dus onderdrukt worden. Op deze
manier was het mogelijk hersenactiviteit te vergelijken tussen de conditie
waarin het motorische systeem al bezig was met de voorbereiding van een
actie en de andere conditie waarin het motorische systeem daar nog niet
mee bezig was. Het blijkt dat dezelfde hersengebieden betrokken zijn bij het
selecteren en voorbereiden van acties ongeacht of het motorische systeem al
een andere actie aan het voorbereiden was. Indien er echter al een andere
actie was voorbereid werden additionele gebieden in de inferieure parietale
schors en in de frontale schors actief. Deze gebieden zijn betrokken bij het
inhiberen van de reeds voorbereide actie en het selecteren van de nieuwe
actie. Veel van deze gebieden waren echter ook geactiveerd tijdens het selec-
teren van acties onder tijdsdruk. Wanneer hiervoor gecorrigeerd werd bleef
slechts e´e´n gebied over dat specifiek bij de inhibitie betrokken is: de rechter
precentrale schors.
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Het evalueren van acties
De hierop volgende drie experimentele hoofdstukken gaan over het evalu-
eren van uitgevoerde acties. Nadat een actie is uitgevoerd kan bepaald wor-
den of het beoogde doel bereikt is; deze informatie kan gebruikt worden om
bij volgende acties beter te presteren. Onderzoek naar de processen die be-
trokken zijn bij evalueren van acties, het zogenaamde ‘action monitoring’,
staat de laatste tien jaar zeer in de belangstelling. In dit proefschrift wordt
voortgebouwd op een model van action monitoring dat is voorgesteld door
Clay Holroyd en Michael Coles. Volgens dit model is een bepaald deel van
de mediale premotorische schors, de anterieure cingulate cortex, betrokken
bij het leren van acties op basis van de resultaten van ’action monitoring’.
Elektro-encefalografie (EEG) stelt ons in staat om de hersenactiviteit van
proefpersonen met een hoge temporele resolutie te meten. In het gemiddelde
EEG na een stimulus, de zogenaamde event-related potential, is een com-
ponent zichtbaar wanneer proefpersonen detecteren dat ze een fout hebben
gemaakt. Deze ‘error-related negativity’ (ERN) wordt opgewekt in een deel
van de mediale premotorische schors, in de anterieure cingulate cortex. Een
soortgelijke component is ook zichtbaar wanneer een proefpersoon niet zelf
zijn fout detecteert, maar informatie krijgt dat het uitgevoerde gedrag fout
was. Omdat deze component optreedt na de feedback die de proefpersoon
informeert over zijn prestatie, wordt deze component de feedback-ERN ge-
noemd.
In hoofdstuk 4 zijn enkele eigenschappen van de feedback-ERN nader
bekeken. Aan de proefpersonen werd gevraagd om na een tijdsinterval van
precies e´e´n seconde te reageren. Na elke trial kregen ze feedback over de
nauwkeurigheid van hun reactie. In verschillende condities kregen proef-
personen (1) goed/fout informatie, (2) goed/fout informatie aangevuld met
informatie over de richting van de fout, of (3) goed/fout informatie aange-
vuld met informatie over de richting en grootte van de fout. Uit het gedrag
van de proefpersonen bleek dat zij gebruik maakten van deze informatie:
hoe meer informatie ze kregen, hoe nauwkeuriger ze werden. Ook pasten ze
in de volgende trials hun gedrag meer aan als ze te zien kregen dat ze een
grotere fout hadden gemaakt. Hoewel de proefpersonen hun gedrag aanpas-
ten bleek de amplitude van de feedback-ERN niet samen te hangen met de
grootte van de gedragsaanpassing, maar wel met de hoeveelheid informatie
die de proefpersonen kregen. De feedback-ERN had een kleinere amplitude
in condities (2) en (3), in vergelijking met de conditie waar de minste infor-
matie werd gegeven, conditie (1). Tevens vonden we geen verband tussen
de grootte van de feedback-ERN en de aanpassing van het gedrag. Hoe-
wel de feedback-ERN wel gevoelig was voor de hoeveelheid informatie die de
feedback bevatte, konden we geen direct verband aantonen tussen de am-
plitude van de feedback-ERN en de gedragsaanpassingen. Dit lijkt erop dat
de feedback-ERN slechts een goed/fout signaal is, maar niet de mate van
informatie die zich vertaalt naar de grootte van de gedragsaanpassing.
Men kan het eigen gedrag op verschillende momenten evalueren. Soms
kan een fout al gedetecteerd worden op het moment dat deze wordt gemaakt:
‘Oei, dat was fout, te snel gereageerd’. Deze interne evaluatie kan echter al-
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leen plaatsvinden als al bekend of aangeleerd is wat de juiste respons moet
zijn. In andere gevallen, is men afhankelijk van externe informatie voor het
evalueren van gedrag. Een belangrijke stelling van het Holroyd en Coles
model is dat er e´e´n gebied in de anterieure cingulate cortex is dat actief is
in reactie op evaluatieve informatie, ongeacht de bron van deze informatie.
Dit zou ook verklaren dat een ERN gevonden wordt zowel wanneer de proef-
persoon zelf een fout detecteert als na externe feedback die aangeeft dat een
actie verkeerd was. Deze hypothese is getest in het experiment beschre-
ven in hoofdstuk 5. In dit experiment, waarin niet de ERN werd gemeten
maar waarin m.b.v fMRI de bij fouten actieve hersengebeiden werden opge-
spoord, werd proefpersonen opgedragen te proberen de associaties tussen
visuele stimuli en specifieke bewegingen te leren met behulp van feedback
die aangaf of een zojuist gegeven respons goed of fout was. Aan het begin
van het leerproces wisten proefpersonen nog niet welke beweging bij welke
stimulus hoorde en waren ze dus afhankelijk van de feedback om hun ac-
ties te evalueren. Later in het leerproces konden ze al bij het indrukken van
de responseknop, dus voordat de feedback gegeven werd, bepalen of ze de
juiste actie hadden uitgevoerd of niet. Hierbij moet opgemerkt worden dat
proefpersonen ook als ze de associaties goed geleerd hadden toch nog fouten
maakten vanwege de grote tijdsdruk.
Uit het experiment bleek dat een bepaald gebied, de anterieure rostrale
cingulate zone, actief wordt als proefpersonen registreren dat een uitgevoer-
de actie fout is. Cruciaal is echter dat dit gebied aan het begin van leren
actief was na de negatieve feedback, maar later in de experimentsessie al
na de verkeerde respons zelf, dus wanneer de proefpersonen hun actie zelf
konden evalueren. Hieruit kan worden geconcludeerd dat dit gebied rea-
geert op informatie dat een actie niet goed is uitgevoerd, onafhankelijk van
de bron van deze informatie. Deze bevinding is in overeenstemming met het
model van Holroyd en Coles. Tevens vormt dit experiment een brug tussen
het werk dat gedaan is binnen ’action monitoring’ en de literatuur over het
leren van motorische acties.
Het evalueren van het gedrag van anderen
Acties vormen de enige manier die we hebben om te communiceren met de
buitenwereld. De laatste jaren is veel aandacht besteed aan hoe wij onze
eigen acties bewaken, maar ook hoe wij de acties van anderen bekijken en
begrijpen. Gebleken is dat wanneer we acties van anderen waarnemen we
daarvoor niet alleen ons visuele systeem gebruiken, maar ook ons eigen
motorische systeem inschakelen. Het lijkt erop alsof we de acties van de
anderen mentaal ’simuleren’.
In het onderzoek dat in het laatste experimentele hoofdstuk van dit proef-
schrift wordt beschreven is gekeken of het systeem dat gebruikt wordt om
onze eigen acties te evalueren ook actief is als we het gedrag van anderen
evalueren. Twee proefpersonen werden tegenover elkaar aan een tafel ge-
zet. De ene proefpersoon voerde een simpel snelheidstaakje uit, terwijl de
andere bijhield hoeveel fouten de actor maakte. Hersenactiviteit werd ge-
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meten (met behulp van EEG) zowel wanneer de proefpersonen de taak zelf
uitvoerden als wanneer ze iemand anders de taak zagen uitvoeren. In over-
eenstemming met eerder onderzoek werd gevonden dat het maken van een
fout leidde tot de al eerder besproken error-related negativity in de actor.
Echter, wat we in dit experiment ook vonden was dat het detecteren van de
fouten van anderen ook leidde tot een error-related negativity. Dit geeft aan
dat hetzelfde systeem betrokken is bij het evalueren van ons eigen gedrag
en bij het evalueren van het gedrag van anderen.
Een tweede interessant gegeven was dat het motorische systeem van de
proefpersonen tijdens het observeren van het gedrag van anderen ook actief
was. Tijdens dit observeren activeerden de proefpersonen de correcte res-
pons op een subliminaal niveau. Dit resultaat geeft aan dat we ons eigen
motorische systeem gebruiken om het gedrag van anderen te simuleren of
zelfs te voorspellen.
Discussie
De premotorische schors bestaat uit een aantal kleinere deelgebieden die
elk verbonden zijn met de primaire motorische schors en met het ruggen-
merg. De activiteit van elk van deze deelgebieden samen ligt ten grondslag
aan de acties die we dagelijks uitvoeren. Geen enkel gebied is alleen volledig
verantwoordelijk voor een actie; elke actie is het resultaat van de gezamen-
lijke activiteit van meerdere gebieden. Het onderzoek dat in dit proefschrift
gerapporteerd wordt heeft als doel om te komen tot een nauwkeurigere om-
schrijving van de bijdrage van deze verschillende deelgebieden.
De experimenten in dit proefschrift laten zien wat de rol van verschillende
delen van de laterale premotorische schors is in de selectie en voorbereiding
van acties en de rol van de verschillende delen van de mediale premotorische
schors in de evaluatie en verbetering van de selectie van acties.
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Figure 2.2. Behavioral data. Error percentages (left panel) and reaction times on correct trials (right panel) in
the CONTROL, PREPARATION, and MEMORY conditions as a function of delay length, obtained during the scanning
session. Curves are fitted first order polynomials; error bars indicate ±SEM.
Figure 2.3. Differential delay-related sustained activity. Anatomical location [panels (B) and (E); SPM(t)s of
the contrasts detailed in Table 2.1, overlaid on spatially normalized anatomical sections of one participant]
and effect sizes [panels (A), (C), (D), and (F); parameter estimates of multiple regression in SEM units] of re-
gions modulated by the task contingencies during the delay period. Regions with stronger sustained activity
during delay periods of either MEMORY trials (in green) or PREPARATION trials (in red) are shown on sagittal (B)
and transverse (E) anatomical sections. Clusters of delay-related activity supporting task performance during
PREPARATION trials were distributed along the caudal precentral cortex (central sulcus, SMA-proper), whereas
MEMORY trials evoked activity along the caudal prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area 6/8 and pre-SMA).
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Figure 2.4. Common delay-related sustained activity. Anatomical location (A) and effect sizes (B) of a region
with stronger delay-related sustained activity during PREPARATION and MEMORY trials than during CONTROL trials.
Other conventions as in Fig. 2.3.
Figure 2.5. Differential delay-related time-varying activity. Anatomical location [panels (A) and (C); SPM(t)s
of the contrasts detailed in Table 2.1] and effect sizes [panels (B) and (D)] of regions modulated by the task
contingencies during the delay period. Regions with stronger time-varying activity during delay periods of
either MEMORY trials (in green) or PREPARATION trials (in red) are shown on transverse anatomical sections. Delay-
related activity increasing as a function of delay time during PREPARATION trials was found along the precentral
gyrus (BA6), whereas MEMORY trials evoked activity along the middle frontal gyrus (BA10).
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Figure 3.3. Imaging data—right frontal cortex. Anatomical location [SPM(t) of the contrasts detailed in Table
3.1, overlaid on spatially normalized anatomical sections of one participant] and parameter estimates ±90%
Confidence Interval boundary] of right frontal clusters activated during action reprogramming. The cluster in
cyan is the only cluster surviving a more constrained contrast (incl. masking by ICSWITCH ∩ TCNEUTRAL), see
main text for details.
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Figure 3.4. Imaging data—parietal cortex. Anatomical location [SPM(t) of the contrasts detailed in Table
3.1, overlaid on spatially normalized anatomical sections of one participants] and parameter estimates (±90
Confidence Interval boundary) of right frontal clusters activated during action programming (red) and repro-
gramming (green).
Figure 5.1. Experimental setup. Participants had to learn, by trial and error, arbitrary associations between
visual stimuli and motor responses. After a variable delay, visual feedback (red/green square) was provided,
indicating correct and incorrect responses. On 50% of the trials, feedback consisted of a noninformative
gray square. When responses occurred after the reaction time deadline (750 ms), immediate feedback (blue
square) was provided.
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Figure 5.4. Imaging results. Anatomical localization, peak BOLD signal development during learning for both
incorrect and correct trials (High Learning condition), and effect sizes for time-related modulation in BOLD
response for the RCZa (top row, peak coordinates: 14, 28, 32). (A) SPM(Z) (threshold p < 0.05 corrected)
superimposed on normalized anatomical sagittal sections of one participant. (B) Effect sizes (in SEM units) for
the time-related changes in BOLD response in both the High Learning (HL) and Low Learning (LL) conditions,
indicating stronger modulations of activity in the High Learning condition. (C,D) Peak BOLD signal (in arbitrary
units, SEM) over the course of learning, following response (blue) and feedback (red) for incorrect (C) and
correct trials (D). For display purposes, the fMRI time series of each subject were subdivided into eight blocks of
equal length. The actual statistical model of the fMRI data considered time as a continuous parametric effect
(see Materials and methods). It can be seen that error feedback-related activation decreases as learning
proceeds, while error response-related activation increases, and these effects are reciprocal.
Figure 5.5. Imaging results. Anatomical localization and peak BOLD signal development during learning for
both incorrect and correct trials (HL condition) for the pre-SMA (peak coordinates: 2, 4, 60). It can be seen that
pre-SMA shows a response-related activation over and above the learning-related modulations of activation,
both on correct and incorrect trials. Color conventions as in Fig. 5.4.
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Figure 6.2. Error-related negativities. Top: Response-locked averages at electrode Cz for correct and incorrect
responses in the execution condition (left) and the observation condition (right). Dashed lines indicate correct,
and solid lines indicate incorrect response trials. Bottom: Spline maps showing the topography of the ERN
difference wave in the execution condition and the observation condition, taken at the peak where correct
and incorrect ERPs differed maximally, 80 ms and 252 ms after the response, respectively. The Cz electrode at
the vertex is marked in light blue for reference.
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Figure 6.4. Lateralized readiness potentials. Top: Response-locked lateralized readiness potentials in the ex-
ecution condition (left) and the observation condition (right). LRPs recorded to correct response trials are
indicated by dashed lines, and LRPs to incorrect trials by solid lines. Bottom: CSD maps of LRP effects in the ex-
ecution condition (left) and the observation condition (right), for correct and incorrect responses separately.
The C3/C4 electrode over the lateral motor cortex is marked in light blue for reference. The relevant time-point
(relative to the response) is indicated above each map.
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